A Narrative of Uncertain Intent: Communication Ethics Literacy and FBI Counterterrorism Practices by Karolak, Hannah
Duquesne University
Duquesne Scholarship Collection
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Spring 5-11-2018
A Narrative of Uncertain Intent: Communication
Ethics Literacy and FBI Counterterrorism Practices
Hannah Karolak
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd
Part of the Rhetoric Commons
This Immediate Access is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. For more information, please contact
phillipsg@duq.edu.
Recommended Citation
Karolak, H. (2018). A Narrative of Uncertain Intent: Communication Ethics Literacy and FBI Counterterrorism Practices (Doctoral
dissertation, Duquesne University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1442
 
 
A NARRATIVE OF UNCERTAIN INTENT:  
COMMUNICATION ETHICS AND FBI COUNTERTERRORISM PRACTICES 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Submitted to McAnulty College of Liberal Arts 
 
 
 
Duquesne University 
 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
By 
Hannah Karolak 
 
May 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
Hannah Karolak 
 
2018 
 
 iii
 
 
 
 
A NARRATIVE OF UNCERTAIN INTENT: 
COMMUNICATION ETHICS AND FBI COUNTERTERRORISM PRACTICES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Hannah Karolak 
 
Approved March 23, 2018 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
Ronald C. Arnett, Ph.D. 
Professor, Department of Communication 
& Rhetorical Studies (Committee Chair)  
 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
Janie Harden Fritz, Ph.D. 
Professor, Department of Communication 
& Rhetorical Studies (Committee 
Member)  
 
________________________________ 
Craig T. Maier, Ph.D. 
Assistant Professor, Department of 
Communication & Rhetorical Studies 
(Committee Member)  
 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
James Swindal, Ph.D. 
Dean, McAnulty College and Graduate 
School of Liberal Arts  
 
________________________________ 
Ronald C. Arnett, Ph.D. 
Chair, Department of 
Communication & Rhetorical Studies  
 
 
 
 iv
ABSTRACT 
 
A NARRATIVE OF UNCERTAIN INTENT: 
COMMUNICATION ETHICS AND FBI COUNTERTERRORISM PRACTICES 
 
 
 
By 
Hannah Karolak 
May 2018 
 
Dissertation supervised by Ronald C. Arnett  
 This project works in the horizon of one driving question: What value does 
communication ethics bring to counterterrorism practices in this current moment? 
Following insights of communication ethics scholars that have come before, this work 
understands communication ethics as practices that yield social literacy about what 
matters to an other. This work adds to communication ethics scholarship the following 
finding: When applied to current and future events, communication ethics literacy affords 
one a lens for opening and sustaining spaces for creative communicative 
response. Through five chapters—which work in tandem to perform an application of 
communication ethics literacy to the current and ongoing practices of FBI 
counterterrorism—this project finds that what one ends up with is not solution-based 
answers, but reflective communicative practices that sustain counter responses to 
 v
terrorism. These reflective practices, performed with attentiveness to communication 
ethics literacy, validate the importance of communications ethics for thinking about and 
responding to terrorism. Communication ethics literacy affords professionals a lens for 
exploring the questions that shape counterterrorism. And while this application does not 
provide answers for the demands that terrorism places on professionals in this historical 
moment, it provides meaningful assistance for navigating threats in a manner that does 
justice to the diverse nation it seeks to protect. In this moment where solution-based 
answers are not an attainable reality, and the demands of terrorism are ongoing, reflective 
communicative practices offer a space for learning and adapting to challenges in real-
time. 
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Chapter 1: National Security through the Ages: Shaping Counterterrorism  
 This project works in the horizon of one driving question: What value does 
communication ethics bring to counterterrorism practices in this current moment? This 
driving question shapes additional considerations regarding communication ethics and 
counterterrorism. For instance, how does communication ethics assist in navigating 
counterterrorism practices; and, how can professionals engage counterterrorism in 
reflection of communication ethics? Counterterrorism practices and procedures assist the 
security community in navigating the increasing demands that terrorism presents to our 
country. These methods for preventing and responding to attacks work within a 
framework committed to a singular goal—to keep the nation safe. This project explores 
counterterrorism from the vantage point of communication ethics asking: can the literacy 
of communication ethics provide assistance? This work attends to two basic and 
grounding assumptions regarding communication ethics and counterterrorism: (1) the 
literacy of communication ethics serves as an interpretive lens, allowing us to discover 
new hermeneutic openings for research and development; and (2) terrorism is foreground 
violence fueled by competing background goods—terrorism is an ongoing phenomenon 
with multiple sources. This project argues that communication ethics as interpretive lens 
offers a pragmatic first step1 to navigating counterterrorism responses in the 21st century. 
The work recognizes the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 as a turning point in the 
organization of national security policy and counterterrorism in the United States. As a 
significant story that transformed the narrative of counterterrorism, 9/11 continues to 
shape our communicative response to counterterrorism. Due to the range and scope of 
                                                 
1 Ronald C. Arnett, “The Fulcrum Point of Dialogue: Monologue, Worldview, and Acknowledgement,” 
The American Journal of Semiotics 28, no. ½ (2012): 105–127. 
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counterterrorism research and practices, this project will identify one area of this large 
study that will serve as a catalyst for future research. Particularly, this work will explore 
the role of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) in combatting terrorism. In order to 
(1) situate the FBI in the area of national security and counter terrorism within the U.S., 
and (2) to provide a context for the current organization of national security offices 
following 9/11, the beginning of this project will provide a historical context of American 
national security. This work understands communication ethics as historically situated, 
therefore, by offering an account of national security prior to the 9/11 attacks. This 
beginning chapter provides a backdrop against which counterterrorism practices can be 
explored.  
Introduction 
 
 Communication ethics involves practices that yield social literacy about what 
matters to an other.2 When applied to social artifacts, the literacy of communication 
ethics provides a lens for collecting, interpreting, and making sense out of data. In this 
moment, the U.S. faces a unique threat as terrorism continues to present security 
professionals with demanding challenges to national security. The challenges resulting 
from terrorism are both complex and dynamic. As professionals develop means to 
respond to threats, new challenges arise. Thus, efforts are ongoing in the fight against 
terrorism. In response to this challenge, this project begins with the assumption that 
communication ethics can assist researchers in navigating the post-9/11 terrains of 
counterterrorism practices by broadening the scope of counterterrorism research and 
                                                 
2 François Cooren, Action and Agency in Dialogue: Passion, Incarnation, and Ventriloquism. (Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins Publish Co., 2010). 
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opening new avenues for creative response. Creative response, which, this work argues, 
is made possible by active and continued reflective communicative practices, prevents 
terrorism from achieving its aim of crippling persons to inaction through violence and 
fear. These reflective communicative practices are shaped by attentiveness to 
communication ethics. Communication ethics, in this project, articulates the goods that 
persons are willing to die for in order to secure; questions concerning the importance of 
these goods in our current historical moment, as well as the communicative practices 
used to protect these goods, demand our attention. 
 This project begins not from a critical stance, but with an openness to learning 
from and about the complexities of counterterrorism in this moment. As I engage 
communication ethics scholarship alongside documented FBI counterterrorism practices 
and procedures, this work will continually ask the following questions: (1) What are the 
emerging limitations to practices and research? (2) What touch points between these two 
areas of research exist? (3) Are there additional hermeneutic openings for engagement? 
These questions shape this project as both exploratory and practical in this attempt to 
bridge theory and practice in a way that offers pragmatic steps for future insights. 
Reflecting upon these questions, this project frames creative response with attentiveness 
to the following definition of creativity: “The faculty of being creative; ability or power 
to create.”3 This definition highlights ability as a key aspect of creativity. As such, 
creative response rests on a capacity to create rather than on the creation of specific 
goods. The hope, then, of this project is to speak to the ability of communications ethics 
                                                 
3 This definition comes from the Oxford English Dictionary. Merriam Webster defines creativity in a 
similar manner: The ability to create.  
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literacy to open and maintain the capacity to create communicative openings when 
confronted with complex and ongoing challenges. Regarding counterterrorism, this hope 
for creativity rests on the capacity to open spaces for response in the face of violence 
seeking to overrun these spaces with fear and uncertainty.  
 Over the course of five chapters, this work will bring a communication ethics lens 
to FBI counterterrorism practices. Chapter one, “National Security through the Ages: 
Shaping Counterterrorism,” provides insights on the history of U.S. national security in 
order to shift our focus of attention away from national security as an objective end goal 
toward national security as the ever-evolving challenges and demands that shape our 
security demands and responses. Of primary concern for this project, this chapter shows 
that national security responds to the needs of a given moment. As leaders interpret 
emerging threats, the narratives, goods, and practices that define national security shift. 
Additionally, this opening chapter begins to shape the story of 9/11 as one with a rich and 
diverse history. Chapter two, “Communication and Competing Backgrounds: The 
Interruption of 9/11,” presents the 9/11 terror attacks as both a turning point in American 
national security practices and a significant story that continues to shape our narratives of 
national security. This chapter acknowledges that stories guide one’s engagement with 
the historical moment and offer appropriate grounds for responding to current existential 
demands. Of particular importance for this project, chapter two engages September 11 as 
story for guiding our engagement with counterterrorism in this particular moment. 
Chapter three, “Communication Ethics: The Importance of Being Literate,” addresses one 
significant question: Why communication ethics? While the literacy of communication 
ethics is used in a preliminary fashion throughout the first two chapters, chapter three 
 5
vets the significance of communication ethics literacy for this project. Chapter three 
argues that communication ethics assists counterterrorism professionals by providing an 
interpretive lens through which security professionals can better identify the 
commitments, motivators, and aims of terrorists. Regarding this project as a whole, 
chapter three reviews communication ethics literature and presents the dialogic approach 
to communication ethics, which frames this project’s interpretive lens. Chapter four, 
“Communicative Context: Counterterrorism in this Historical Moment,” presents 
counterterrorism in our historical moment by framing the current communicative context 
of counterterrorism. To identify the practical and significant contributions that 
communication ethics makes to counterterrorism and the FBI, this chapter identifies the 
emerging questions and demands regarding counterterrorism. For the purposes of this 
project, this chapter recognizes that with knowledge of the communicative context, we 
can address the challenges of terrorism with tools and practices that are grounded in 
current context, capabilities, and limitations. This chapter also begins to frame the 
application portion of this project by establishing specific areas in FBI counterterrorism 
practices that can benefit from a communication ethics lens. The purpose of this chapter 
is to offer the FBI as a key artifact in the battle against terrorism in this moment. As a key 
artifact, this chapter becomes an exemplar of how the literacy of communication ethics 
can sustain creative opportunities for new avenues of practice. The fifth and final chapter 
of this work offers pragmatic first steps in the future of counter-terrorism research and 
development in the case of the FBI’s defense against domestic terrorism. Using the 
communicative context of counterterrorism situated within our current historical moment 
as a guide, this chapter offers connections between communication ethics metaphors and 
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counterterrorism. This chapter recognizes the importance of narrative for continued 
intelligence work while acknowledging that navigating narrative in this era is a difficult 
task. Chapter five, “Communication Ethics Literacy as Lens: Responsiveness, 
Imagination, and Creativity,” finds that what we end up with are not answers, but 
communicative practices for sustaining our counter response to terrorism. These 
practices, built with attentiveness to communication ethics literacy, offer genuine hope in 
the face of violence and fear perpetrated by terrorists. Engaging the demands that shape 
our moment requires a commitment to strive for imagination that fuels creativity. These 
recommended practices validate the importance of communications ethics for thinking 
about and responding to the phenomenon that is terrorism. 
 The overall objectives of this project are as follows: This project situates terrorism 
and counterterrorism within the broader context of U.S. national security interests and 
challenges; This project presents terrorism as a conflict characterized by a 
communication ethics gestalt of foreground violence fueled by competing background 
sentiments; This work analyzes the Bureau’s practices for countering domestic terrorism 
efforts within the United States with the purpose of showing how communication ethics 
assists in finding new insights into this area; Through the lens of communication ethics, 
this project offers pragmatic next steps for groups charged with responding to and 
countering terrorism. As a whole, this work finds pragmatic significance in bridging the 
theory of communication ethics literacy with practical processes and procedures for 
addressing terrorism. This feat is made with attentiveness to the complexities of our 
current historical moment as hypertextual (in which the goods of multiple historical eras 
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are copresent) and in response to complexities of counterterrorism as diverse and 
unending. The first of these objectives guides this proposal.  
  Communication ethics scholars Arnett, Fritz, and Bell remind us that ethics are 
performed, defended, and practiced in response to that which has come before; this 
project also understands communication ethics as historically and contextually attentive.4 
For this reason, this chapter will situate current practices of U.S. national security against 
a broad historical backdrop. This project is attentive to communication ethics metaphors 
articulated in the work of Ronald C. Arnett, Pat Arneson and Leeanne Bell in their article, 
“Communication Ethics: The Dialogic Turn,” and Arnett, Janie Harden Fritz and Bell in 
their text Communication Ethics Literacy.5 These works provides a literacy of 
communication ethics through particular metaphors discussed at length in later chapters. 
However, in this chapter, the metaphors of narrative and communicative goods are 
particularly important.  
 Communication ethics metaphors offer one a “fuzzy clarity” of interpretation that 
resists attempts to control research with exact definitions. As such, metaphors act as a 
                                                 
4 Ronald C. Arnett, Janie Harden Fritz, Leeanne M. Bell, Communication Ethics Literacy: Dialogue and 
Difference (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2009). 
5 Ronald C. Arnett, Pat Arneson, and Leeanne M. Bell, “Communication Ethics: The Dialogic Turn,” 
Review of Communication 6, no. 1/2 (2006): 62–92. Arnett, Arneson, and Bell articulate each of the six 
approaches to the study of communication ethics, explaining that four of the approaches function as 
prescriptive approaches, or approaches that view the study of communication ethics as prescribing right and 
wrong action, one of the approaches function as descriptive, or approaches that seek to describe the ethics 
being protected and promoted. Finally, the sixth approach, the dialogic approach, is presented as a counter 
to both prescriptive and descriptive approaches. The dialogic approach is attentive to postmodernity as an 
era rich with diversity. The following four approaches function as prescriptive and were first presented by 
James Chesebro (1) The universal-humanitarian approach, (2) the democratic approach, (3) the codes, 
processes and procedure approach, and (4) the contextual approach. The fifth approach, the narrative 
approach, functions as descriptive and was identified with the work of Arnett. (See James Chesebro, “A 
Construct for Assessing Ethics in Communication,” Central States Speech Journal 20 (1969): 104-114; 
Ronald C. Arnett, “The Status of Communication Ethics Scholarship in Speech Communication Journals, 
1915–1985,” Central States Speech Journal, 38 (1987): 44–61.) The final approach, the dialogic approach, 
is an alternative to prescriptive and descriptive approaches. 
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literacy for texturing our understanding of communicative events.6 These metaphors 
allow one to see differently; or, see beyond what is initially apparent. Communication 
ethics metaphors transform our efforts to explore events to find the what is, to explore 
events with the hope of finding what could be. The following paragraphs offer 
introductory remarks on the metaphors of narrative and communicative goods. As noted 
above, these metaphors will be discussed at length in subsequent chapters.  
 Narratives frame our communicative response to the demands that call us in a 
given moment. As noted by Arnett, narrative houses the persons, stories, and events that 
provide meaning to the communicative practices we embody and perform.7 Additionally, 
narratives shape and uncover the things that matter most; the communicative goods we 
protect and promote. Communicative goods, as understood by Arnett, Fritz, and Bell 
depict what matters to particular persons, places, and organizations. Communicative 
goods are that which persons protect and promote at all costs. In this project, 
communication ethics is characterized by the protection and promotion of particular 
communicative goods situated in particular narratives.8 These communicative goods have 
two components. First, communicative goods reflect the substantive good protected and 
promoted. Second, communicative goods are protected and promoted in real time by 
communicative practices. The communicative practices component of goods 
characterizes communication ethics as pragmatic and responsive; communicative 
practices are embodied and performed in a given moment in response to a given situation.  
                                                 
6 Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, Communication Ethics Literacy, xx. 
7 Ronald C. Arnett, “The Fulcrum Point of Dialogue: Monologue, Worldview, and Acknowledgement” The 
American Journal of Semiotics 28, no. ½ (2012): 105–127. 
8 Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, Communication Ethics Literacy, 3.  
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Communicative goods provide clarity of communicative practices of a given 
person or organization. Thus, acknowledging the goods in action during a communicative 
event provides a backdrop for understanding. To that end, within the following historical 
overview of U.S. national security, the communicative goods protected during each time 
period will be identified. This historical overview presents national security as 
characterized by leadership who define the goods of a country at a given time; evolving 
as a result of the changing landscape of politics; and, shaped by the needs a given public 
at a specific time. Announcing these goods of multiple time periods reveals how national 
security reflects and responds to the needs of a given communicative environment. 
Therefore, the communicative goods that shape national security practices will be 
acknowledged at the end of each subsection. 
National Security in the United States: Overview & Trends 
 This section identifies major coordinates of the history of U.S. national security. 
Following the insights of seminal works in the area of U.S. foreign policy and national 
security studies, this section presents the historical backdrop of national security through 
the key events that shaped this policy over time. This section begins by discussing 
security in early American history leading to the 1941 attacks on Pearl Harbor. Next, this 
section overviews national security during World War II and covers U.S. security 
following the 1947 National Security Act. Finally, this section overviews security 
challenges resulting from the Cold War. The objective of this section is to present a 
contextualized view of the national security challenges that emerge from the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001.  
 10
 While a formal policy of national security in the U.S. did not begin until the 1947 
National Security Act, the decades leading up to and following the American Revolution 
set a precedent for how Americans dealt with foreign relations and challenges. During 
this period, a policy of isolationism9 developed. Following the Pearl Harbor attacks and 
subsequent entry of the U.S. into World War II, national security was formalized in the 
U.S. The attacks at Pearl Harbor proved that a policy of isolationism was no longer 
practical in a world with advanced technology. In response to the failure of isolationism, 
a policy of containment was established. These turning points in the policy of national 
security will be discussed in the following sections. Within this section, these policies 
will be textured by significant historical events that shaped the trends and changes of 
security policy over time.  
Security: Early American History-World War I 
 In the following paragraphs, national security in early America will be presented 
using the work of William O. Walker, professor of history and international relations as 
Florida International University. Walker’s research explores early U.S. national security 
working to identify the threads of security challenges leading to the Cold War. Within 
this section, additional scholarly voices will texture Walker’s story as needed.  
 In the years leading to and following the American Revolution, security was 
characterized by two components: First, with the goal of establishing America as an 
independent power, leaders of the Colonies bridged the relationship between security and 
economics; Second, following the war for independence, leaders witnessed challenges 
                                                 
9 Isolationism is a policy of excluding one’s country from international affairs. This policy attempts to 
protect one’s country from foreign entanglements and conflict. For a discussion of isolationism, see Eric A. 
Nordlinger, Isolationism Reconfigured (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995).  
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and responses to the civil liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and recognized a close 
connection between the security of the nation and the social atmosphere of its citizens. 
During the American Revolution (1765–1783), leaders “hoped to provide security 
through a political economy of expansion and commerce,”10 and while this sentiment of 
economic security was challenged during the early years of America, it was maintained 
through the mid 19th century. By the mid to late 1800’s, the industrial revolution and 
modernization of industry secured the relationship between security and economic 
stability in the U.S. and abroad.11 While economic security secured the future of 
America, the importance of unity between and among states was also necessary to secure 
the country as a whole. Challenges to the founding documents of the U.S. from individual 
states and citizen groups arose as early the Civil War, and these challenges carried over to 
the 20th century with civil rights activism. While many events during this period in 
American history contributed to the particular challenges the nation faced, this project 
focuses on The French and Indian War (1756–1763), the American Civil War, and the 
social environment before and after World War I as significant events that shaped a 
policy of national security during this time period prior to 1941. Therefore, in the 
following paragraphs, a brief discussion of these events will elucidate the on-going 
tension in discussions of liberty versus security, the mergence of private security as a 
national force, and the strengthening of isolationism as a security tactic.  
 The French and Indian War, also known as the Seven Years War, established a 
sentiment of revolution among colonists. Prior to the Revolutionary war, colonists, 
                                                 
10 William O Walker, National Security and Core Values in American History (New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 2009), 43. 
11 As is witnessed through work of Thomas Paine, who in 1776 published Common Sense, and Adam 
Smith, who in the same year published The Wealth of Nations. 
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having linked security to economic stability, worked to enter and exert control over lands 
occupied by Native Americans. Attempts to expand into these lands led to the French and 
Indian War as military forces under the direction of George Washington attempted to 
disperse the French out of the Ohio Valley. Following Great Britain’s victory in this war, 
the imperial leash of British control over the colonies tightened. An increase in colonial 
taxes was imposed specifically in response to this conflict, and the Royal Proclamation 
was signed. 
 The Royal Proclamation formally ended the French and Indian War and gave 
French land in the colonies to Great Britain. It prevented colonists from claiming land 
west of the Appalachia and limited colonists from expanding into Indian lands. Yet, 
colonists and Great Britain paid little respect to the Proclamation, and dispossession, or 
the forcing out of their homelands, of Native Americans by Great Britain and the 
colonists followed. This dispossession continued until 1876 when two important treaties 
were signed—Hard Labor and Fort Stanwix.12 These Treaties redefined the boundaries of 
Great Britain land and Native American land and attempted, finally, to calm relations 
between these two groups and their allies by stressing the importance of respect for the 
Proclamation. Following the Treaties, colonists identified Native Americans as a threat to 
their security, which was tied directly to economic interest through land expansion. This 
sentiment carried on into the Revolutionary War until the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 
1794.  
                                                 
12 The Treaty of Hard Labor was signed by Great Britain and representatives of the Cherokee Indians to 
verify that land south and east of a line running from Fort Stanwix to the Allegheny River was ceded by 
American Indians and open to European expansion.  
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 When, as mentioned above, Great Britain attempted to strengthen their imperial 
rule of the colonies and rebuild funds spent during the French and Indian War by 
imposing and increasing taxes, the colonies began a formal rejection of Great Britain’s 
intentions. Colonists, having “linked. . . political economy of trade and development with 
their security,” rejected the taxes and the increased control imposed by Great Britain.13 
Worrying about the aftermath of the French and Indian War, Benjamin Franklin 
expressed in a 1755 letter to the Governor of Pennsylvania that “those who would give up 
essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty or 
Safety.”14 With the imperial leash tightened, the colonies further recognized their need 
for independence on a social, political, and economic front. 
 Prior to the American Revolutionary War, colonists recognized that freedom from 
Great Britain’s rule would secure the colonies as an independent political entity and 
economy. Following the Revolutionary War, a remaining British presence in the colonies 
threatened the security of new America. It was not until the Jay Treaty of 1795 that this 
threat lessened.15 Close to this same time, the Articles of Confederation placed power 
within and among the 13 sovereign states. Yet, class conflicts led to public outcry against 
the articles in the form of protests and rebellions (Shay’s Rebellion and Whiskey 
Rebellion, for example).16  
 Once independence was won, leaders of the country recognized the importance of 
unity among states and the need for both public and private systems of security. As 
                                                 
13 Walker, National Security and Core Values in American History, 16. 
14 Ibid., 19. 
15 Ibid., 24. 
16 Ibid., 26. Shay’s Rebellions occurred in 1786 and 1787 when groups of farmers publically protested the 
enforcement of local and national taxes. The Whiskey Rebellion occurred in 1791 as protestors resisted the 
“Whiskey Tax” imposed by the national government. 
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leaders worked to quell threats to unity through law—for example, John Adams in 1798 
approved strengthening the navy and supported Alien and Sedition Acts, which silenced 
oppression17—the need for private forms of security was recognized as dissent to these 
laws resulted in private contempt of law on a local scale. Additionally, as a newly formed 
nation, the U.S. recognized the need to suppress international conflicts, which threatened 
free trade and the economic stability of the county.  
 Following the War of 1812, The Missouri Compromise of 1820 delineated a line 
in American soil limiting the spread of slavery from South to North. As slaves began to 
be transferred illegally into free territories via the Underground Railroad, slave owners 
began hiring private investigators to find and return escaped persons.18 Regarding 
security, disputes between and among persons and state leaders began to demand 
attention of the country as a whole. While the Revolution had secured America as its own 
entity, disputes among states threatened the security of the new nation. On September 14, 
1865, Hon. Charles Sumner addressed the Republican State Convention in 
Massachusetts, calling attention to the debate concerning civil liberties and security. He 
stated, “Be just, and the republic will be strong.” Yet, as the revolution began, groups 
within the young country expressed competing virtues. Groups within the country, often 
elementarily depicted as southern states and northern states, disputed freedom as a human 
and civil right. These disagreements came to a head during the American Civil War 
(1861–1865). 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 29. 
18 Milton Lipson, "Private Security: A Retrospective," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science (1988): 16. 
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 The need for private security expanded during the Industrial Revolution as the 
birth of railroads and big business required protection for good transfers. Responding to 
this need was the birth of private security firms, notably was Allan Pinkerton’s agency.19 
In 1849, Pinkerton was named Chicago’s first detective, and, by 1850, he began a private 
practice of investigation. Due to the need for private security at the time, Pinkerton’s 
agency was a success, and by 1853, the agency housed a staff of five investigators 
including one woman. On retainer with the agency were a number of railroad companies 
including the Illinois Central Railroad and the Pennsylvania Railroad. During the Civil 
War, Allen Pinkerton served the Union through President Abraham Lincoln.20  
 Following the Civil War, the need for private security in American industry 
remained as expansion into the West continued and as questions concerning civil liberties 
and economic/employee rights continued to foster public debate. The development of 
private security organizations would come to shape the organization of security at a 
national level. Questions concerning the founding values of American freedom—life, 
liberty, and pursuit of happiness—created tensions among civilians. When the republic 
unified at the conclusion of Civil War, a cohesive “capitalist political economy” resulted 
in early 20th century prosperity.21 Within the country, opposition to social order continued 
with the question of minority rights and the establishment of groups such as the Ku Klux 
Klan. Externally, the U.S. worked to secure economic prosperity and security through 
international efforts aimed at democratizing other nations.   
                                                 
19 Ibid. Pinkerton was a Scottish-born man who immigrated to a small town outside of Chicago at the age of 
23. By happenchance, Pinkerton, while wondering a wooden area near his home, came across a plant 
producing counterfeit currency. Upon alerting the local sheriff, Pinkerton was rewarded and named a 
deputy sheriff of Kane County. This marked the beginning of Pinkerton’s career providing private security 
20 Ibid., 18. 
21 Walker, National Security and Core Values in American History, 46. 
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 Social issues throughout the U.S. resulted in a variety of local and national 
concerns over crime. At the local level, violence increased due to famed gangsters such 
as Al Capone and John Dillinger. Additionally, corruption in local politics and big 
business continued (as was explored in the work of Upton Sinclair and his seminal text, 
The Jungle). At the national level, arguments against capitalism came in the form of 
anarchism. In 1901, U.S. President William McKinley was shot and killed by Leon 
Czolgosz. Angry about capitalism and government policy following the loss of his 
factory job, the FBI labeled Czolgosz as the first U.S. terrorist.22 In response to increasing 
violence at the local, domestic, and national level, formal organizations charged with 
preventing crime were established.  
 In 1896, the National Bureau of Criminal Identification was founded with the 
purpose of gathering and releasing local crime information to police agencies across the 
country. By 1912, local, federal, and national police forces existed in 48 states.23 In 1908, 
Attorney General Charles J. Bonaparte, recruited 9 Secret Service investigators to join 25 
of his own investigators. Bonaparte’s group was charged with conducting investigators 
for the Department of Justice. In 1935, the group was formally named the Federal Bureau 
of Investigations (FBI).  
 Beginning near the turn of the century, clandestine intelligence efforts increased.24 
Efforts to protect the state from external threats were contained to the military at this 
time. Apart from The Pinkerton Agency, the State Department’s Cipher Bureau (also 
                                                 
22 “A Brief History: The National Calls 1908–1923,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, from 
https://www.fbi.gov/history/brief-history (accessed October 1, 2016).  
23 Lipson, “Private Security: A Retrospective,” 21. 
24 Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, Strategic Intelligence in American National Security 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 7. 
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known as the “American Black Chamber”) served as a national agency from 1917–1929, 
and was charged with “collecting, deciphering, and analyzing signals intelligence.”25 
Following WWI, Republican presidential candidate for the 1920 election, Warren G. 
Harding, preached a return to prewar isolationism in regards to foreign affairs. Harding’s 
commitment to isolationism gained him a significant advantage in the election, which he 
won.26 However, as the country moved toward the Second World War, this sentiment of 
isolationism was publicly challenged.  
 As foreshadowed in the above paragraphs, this project recognizes World War II 
as a turning point in U.S. national security. As shown above, early U.S. national security 
responded to the economic interests of the Colonies, and the need to be a unified country 
among states following the Revolutionary War. During this time in American history, the 
communicative goods protected and promoted by leaders of the country was access to a 
free market without imperial taxes or limitations and commitments to the values 
established by the founding documents of the country—the Bill of Rights and the 
Constitution—which attempted to provide unity among states. Yet, as shown in the 
following section, as past threats were resolved and new threats emerged, the 
communicative goods that shaped national security in this early American period 
transformed. 
Security: World War II and the 1947 National Security Act 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 7. The Cipher Bureau, charged with intercepting and analyzing foreign communications and 
threats, was disbanded by Secretary of State Henry Stimson who felt that U.S. collection of other countries’ 
messages was immoral.  
26 Douglas T. Stuart, Creating the National Security State: A History of Law that Transformed America 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 5. 
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 National security prior to WWII was tied directly to the interests of given leaders 
who interpreted security needs alongside a set pathway for the growth of a new country. 
Until the attacks on Pearl Harbor, leaders maintained this sentiment of tying national 
security directly to American interests. However, the communicative goods of security 
connected to the interests of a young country would soon change with advances in 
warfare introduced during World War II. As will be discussed in the following 
subsection, while the system of national security in the U.S. formalized as a result of 
WWII, many of the challenges facing the country during these early years continued into 
the post-World War II era. Yet, the ways in which these challenges were addressed 
changed significantly following the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the 1947 National 
Security Act. Security scholars recognize the 1941 attacks on Pearl Harbor as a 
significant turning point in American foreign policy and national security. While the 
trend of economic security and isolation from threats abroad had carried the country into 
the 1900s, the attacks on Pearl Harbor quickly altered the feelings of citizens and leaders 
within the U.S., causing them to recognize the reality of external security threats. 
Following World War II, trends in national security were tied to a modern system of 
containment, which is a strategy of securing a nation’s interests and ideals by containing 
the threat and expansion of competing governments.27 The work of Douglas T. Stuart, 
chair of international studies at Dickinson University and director of civilian-military 
education cooperation funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, guides this 
subsection. Stuart’s work examines the move to modern national security. 
                                                 
27 See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security 
Policy During the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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 The concept of national security in the U.S. that we know today—one maintained 
by multiple government organizations and driven by strategic intelligence with both 
defensive and offensive aims—did not exist prior to U.S. involvement in WWII. 
Following involvement in World War II, the ideal of isolationism with respect to securing 
the country crumbled. The December 7, 1941 attacks on Pearl Harbor were a significant 
turning point for leaders and citizens in the U.S., in terms of security. The attacks 
uncovered the limits of isolationism and proved to Americans that they could not be 
secure from technological advances leading to changes in perceived time and space. 
Protection of the country had to extend beyond a sole focus on military capabilities and 
had to last beyond wartime. National security transformed from a strategy implemented 
at critical moments of fear, to one requiring maintenance during times of peace.  
 The current system of national security bureaucracy was foreshadowed in the 
Roosevelt era following WWII and was formalized following the attacks on Pearl 
Harbor.28 In his text, Creating the National Security State: A History of Law that 
Transformed America, Douglas T. Stuart,29 chair of international studies as Dickinson 
University, traces the roots of modern national security ideology among Americans to 
WWII.30 Stuart recognizes the 1941 attacks on Pearl Harbor as a “turning point in 
                                                 
28 While this section does not focus particularly on Third World conflicts including the Korean War, 
Vietnam War, and Arab-Israeli conflicts, I do not wish to minimalize these events for the history of 
American policy. This work echoes the sentiment of Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman who 
write, “When the Third World has been considered important. . .it was mainly in the context of the larger 
Soviet American conflict.” The Soviet-American conflict is discussed in the following section. See Bruce 
D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, “Afterword to the Second Edition,” in Strategic Intelligence in 
American National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 188. 
29 Douglas T. Stuart is the chair of international studies as Dickinson University. He is the author/editor of 
11 books and multiple scholarly articles. Additionally, he is director of a civilian-military education 
cooperation funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. 
30 The roots of the move from isolationism to our current system to national security can be seen just prior 
to the attacks on Pearl Harbor. Following WWI, Republican presidential candidate for the 1920 election, 
Warren G. Harding, preached a return to prewar isolationism in regards to foreign affairs. Harding’s 
commitment to isolationism won his a significant advantage in the presidential election and he won. Noting 
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American history,” at which point the concept of national security replaced the concept of 
national interests as the guiding component of foreign policy. The effects of this change 
were instrumental for the development and organization of national security efforts.31  
 In addition to the events leading to U.S. involvement in WWII, Stuart recognizes 
the work of Edward Pendleton Herring (1903–2004), former Harvard University 
professor of government, whose writings in the early 20th century introduced 
policymakers to a concept of national security by challenging their current system of 
defense.32 Herring served as president of the Social Science Research Council (1948–
1968),33 during which time he was influential in moving political science from a purely 
theoretical study to a “behavioral science” drawing on many disciplines, including 
sociology.34 Prior to the attacks at Pearl Harbor, Herring published The Impact of War in 
which he worked to develop a systemic concept of national security.35 In his text, Herring 
argued that technological developments in air warfare and the increase in totalitarian 
regimes presented America with a unique and timely threat. While Herring recognized a 
trend in the American public to be fearful of militarization, he argued that security 
needed to be upheld by a powerful military who were integrated into and among society. 
                                                 
the success of Harding’s campaign, Stuart argues that 1932 presidential candidate, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
recognized the American public’s commitment to isolationism and expressed a commitment to this policy 
while campaigning for the presidency. However, economic changes and the beginning of Nazi power in 
Germany during the prewar years of Roosevelt’s presidency allowed to explore other avenues of foreign 
policy. Particularly, in his later years as president, Roosevelt expressed a commitment to being prepared for 
war over isolation.  
31 Stuart, Creating the National Security State, 2.  
32 Ibid., 5. Herring’s writings include Group Representation before Congress (1929) and The Politics of 
Democracy: American Parties in Action (1940).  
33 The Social Science Research Council is a nonprofit, leading research organization in the U.S. aimed at 
fostering scientific inquiry in the social sciences through rigorous research. 
34 Christopher Lehmann-Haupt, “Pendleton Herring, 100, pioneer in political science,” New York Times 
August 21, 2014. 
35 See Edward Pendleton Herring, The Impact of War; Our American Democracy Under Arms (New York: 
Farra & Rinehart, 1941).  
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Even once current threats were dispersed, Herring argued that a system of national 
security would need to be maintained continuously. Herring’s work fought against a stark 
distinction between peace time and war time, arguing that the line between them was no 
longer clear and that preparations for war needed to be made even during times of 
peace.36 The attacks on Pearl Harbor confirmed Herring’s claims and stand as a turning 
point in American public sentiment toward security. Specifically, the Pearl Harbor 
attacks proved to leaders of America that (1) the lack of armed forces unification in 
defense disallowed the army and navy to “prepare for, and respond to, a military attack;” 
(2) that a central intelligence agency was needed; and (3) that a central system of 
“civilian-military coordination” for national security was needed.37 These arguments 
were “reinforced” during the rest of WWII.38  
While WWII saw the creation of the first central intelligence organization, the 
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the organization was disbanded in October 1945 by 
Harry Truman.39 Upon the death of President Roosevelt on April 12, 1945, Harry S. 
Truman assumed the role of president. As a stark supporter of military unification, 
Truman proposed unifications of the War Department (the Army) and the Navy 
Department. A message to Congress on December 19, 1945, details his resistance.40 
Speaking to military unification, Truman writes: “A grave responsibility will rest upon 
                                                 
36 Douglas T. Stuart, “Ministry of Fear: The 1947 National Security Act in Historical and Institutional 
Context,” International Studies Perspectives 4 (2003): 294.  
37 Ibid., 295. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Jeffrey T. Richelson, The US Intelligence Community (5th ed.) (Philadelphia: Westview Press, 2008), 15–
16. 
40 Anna Kasten Nelson, “President Truman and the Evolution of the National Security Council,” The 
Journal of American History 72, no. 2 (1985): 360–378, 362. 
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Congress if it continues to delay this most important and urgent measure.”41 Debate 
ensued following the delivery of Truman’s letter to congress. While Army leaders 
supported Truman’s plan for unification, James Forrestal, the then U.S. Secretary of 
Navy, began searching for counter arguments. In his search for an alternative plan for 
national security changes following WWII, Forrestal invited his friend, Ferdinand 
Eberstadt, a U.S. lawyer and political advisor recognized for his contributions to the 
creations of the National Security Council and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to 
research the effects of unification on American national security.  
  Following the war, the questions and arguments concerning military unification, 
the development of the CIA, and the coordination of military and civilian national 
security came to the forefront of politics. These debates were addressed formally with the 
1947 National Security Act. The National Security Act created the infrastructure of 
American national security that stands today.  
 The outcomes of the National Security Act are as follows:  
 First, the act created the National Military Establishment (renamed the 
Department of Defense in 1949) led by a Secretary of Defense. The Department 
of Defense is a coordinated effort of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Chiefs of 
Staffs (also established with the National Security Act), and the Office of the 
Inspector General.  
                                                 
41 Harry S. Truman, “December 19, 1945 Special Message to the Congress Recommending the 
Establishment of a Department of National Defense,” Harry S. Truman Presidential Library & Museum, 
from https://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=508&st=&st1= Of importance for this 
chapter, Truman also noted “the necessity of making timely preparations for the Nation’s long-range 
security now-while we are still mindful of what it has cost us in this war to have been unprepared.” 
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 Second, the Act established the National Security Council. The Council was 
created with the purpose of advising the President on domestic, foreign, and 
military polices regarding national security.  
 Third, the Act established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA, under 
the direction of the National Security Council, was established with the purpose 
of “coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments 
and agencies in the interest of national security,”42 to advise and make 
recommendations to the NSC on such matters, and to obtain intelligence.  
 Fourth, the Act established the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
established under the provision for the National Military Establishments and 
under the direction of the President and Secretary of Defense, was created with 
the purpose of preparing plans for military direction and for unifying these 
commands in the interests of the safety of the American public.  
The National Security Act of 1947 set the precedent for the coordinated efforts of 
national security in the U.S. for the years to come.  
 As witnessed through the previous paragraphs, the communicative goods of 
national security in the U.S. dramatically shifted following World War II. After the 
attacks on Pearl Harbor, American leaders and citizens recognized that the particular 
interests of the country could no longer direct national security. Rather, national security 
had to be proactive in an effort to secure the nation from external threats; gone were the 
days where national security was simply response to emerging threats. Proactive security 
required an ability to research, analyze, and forecast attacks. Following the 1947 National 
                                                 
42 National Security Act, 1947.  
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Security Act, the communicative goods of the U.S. transformed into strategic and counter 
intelligence, domestic and international security agencies, and preventative practices of 
security.  
The 1947 Act introduced an understanding of national security that saw little 
difference in peace times versus war times. National security in itself became a leading 
interest of the nation. After the war, it was apparent that the “United States would have to 
protect its national interests throughout the world without the support of a stronger 
ally.”43 As the reach of communism at the hands of the Soviet Union stretched, new 
security challenges emerged during the Cold War, to which this work now turns.  
Security: The Cold War and Post-Cold War 
 Following the 1947 Security Act, America faced security challenges presented by 
the rise of communism. The Cold War created a unique challenge to U.S. national 
security. For arguably the first time in American history, threats to national security were 
not simply driven by military forces; threats to national security at times were also formal 
challenges of “ideological, social, and economic” stature.44 The following paragraphs tell 
the story of U.S. national security responding to the Cold War using the work of Bruce D. 
Berkowitz, Foreign Policy Research Institute fellow, former International Affairs fellow 
at the Council on Foreign Relations, and lecturer at multiple foreign policy programs in 
the United States, and Allan E. Goodman, president and chief executive officer of the 
Institute of International Education and former dean of the School of Foreign Service at 
                                                 
43 Berkowitz and Goodman, Strategic Analysis for American National Security, 3. 
44 Barry Buzan, “Rethinking Security after the Cold War,” Cooperation and Conflict 32, no. 5 (1997): 5–
28, 6. 
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Georgetown University. This section textures the work of Berkowitz and Goodman with 
the work of John Lewis Gaddis, professor of naval history at Yale University.  
 During the Cold War, a continuation of Roosevelt’s efforts of containing 
international security threats through a policy of firm and patient displays of strength was 
carried on by Truman.45 The Truman Doctrine, which went into effect in 1947, promised 
economic and military supports to countries under threat by the Soviet Union.46 The Cold 
War policy of containment highlighted the relationship between U.S. national security 
and the environment of international relations as a whole. The policy recognized the 
importance of spheres of influence and friendly relations with other political regimes. In 
his seminal text on the policy of containment during WWII, Gaddis explains that 
containment worked to defend national security with the following goals: 
 (1) restoration of the balance of power through the encouragement of self-
 confidence in nations threatened by Soviet expansionism; (2) reduction, by 
 exploiting tension between Moscow and the international communist movements, 
 of the Soviet Union’s ability to project influence beyond its border; and (3) 
 modification, over time, of the Soviet concept of international relations, with a 
 view to bringing about a negotiated settlement of outstanding differences.47  
During the Cold War, the notion of securing the nation through military force was 
challenged as weapons of mass destruction and the sheer size of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) and their forces made a successful vision of war appear as an 
                                                 
45 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security 
Policy during the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 22. 
46 The policy of containment was coined and defined by George Frost Kennan in his 1947 article “The 
Sources of Soviet Conduct.” Kennan worked for the State Department and his scholarship informed and 
influenced the Truman Doctrine. See Gaddis, “George F. Kennan and the Strategy of Containment.”  
47 Ibid., 36–36. 
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unachievable goal.48 During the decades of Cold War, a move toward securing the nation 
through policy and the support of democratic values superseded military efforts, as was 
made apparent during the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 14–October 28, 1962) and 
through the negative aftermaths of the Vietnam War (1955–1975). Criticism surrounding 
American failures in the Vietnam War particularly urged leaders to think broadly about 
the role of militarization and the role of natural security. 
 The Cuban Missile Crisis and Vietnam War showed that militarization alone was 
insufficient for protecting the U.S. and its citizens. National security challenges were 
complex matters involving communicative actors, events, and motives beyond the scope 
of the current pressing issue. Thus, a military solution aimed toward securing the nation 
with military capabilities required additional diplomatic support.  
 At the conclusion of the Cold War, marked in this project by the fall of the Berlin 
Wall on November 9, 1989, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S. began 
to face intricate and multifaceted challenges of national security. Stuart characterizes the 
moment as a “cluster of complex and interacting threats including transnational terrorism, 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the spill-over effects of failed and 
failing systems,”49 What the Cold War brought to light was the understanding of multiple 
grounds upon which security threats stand. These grounds, including, and yet not limited 
to, those of military, economic, and social challenges, since the Cold War, become areas 
of importance in all efforts of securing the nation.  
 The unique challenges to national security that the Cold War presented also 
determined the importance of ongoing strategic intelligence. During this time in 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 47. 
49 Stuart, Creating the National Security State, 284. 
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American history, national security protected and promoted the influence of American 
values in areas outside of its borders. The good of introducing and spreading democracy 
as a strategic tool in the fight against communism directed the decisions of leaders. 
During the Cold War, the focus of security practices was directed at the challenges 
caused by the Soviet Union. At the conclusion of the War, and following the subsequent 
dismantling of the Soviet Union, scholars began to question how the U.S. would adapt.50 
The national system for security was broad and diverse and post-Cold War challenges 
were not easy to identify.51  
 This section presented national security in this period as dynamic and ever-
evolving. Specifically, national security, as the U.S. approaches it today, evolved from 
multiple turning points in American history, including the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the 
1947 National Security Act; these turning points called attention to gaps in security and 
shifted the communicative goods of security. The following section introduces the 9/11 
terrorist attacks as the most recent turning point in U.S. national security.  
The Disruption of 9/11: Conclusions and Implications for this Project 
 The above historical account of U.S. national security provides a context for thinking 
about the particular challenges to national security as they would emerge following the 
attacks of 9/11. From the information provided above, we see a textured view of national 
security policy in the U.S. as responding to the challenges of given times and places; 
national security reflects and responds to a given communicative environment, and the 
                                                 
50 Berkowitz and Goodman, Strategic Analysis for American National Security, 182–183. 
51 The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security proves this point well. The Department 
consolidated approximately 170,000 persons from 22 agencies charged with national security initiatives.  
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organizations charged with defending national security adapt to these challenges as they 
arise. This sentiment drives the remainder of this project.  
 The particular challenges of a post-Cold War world were exposed on September 11, 
2001, when Islamic extremists strategically coordinated four terrorist attacks on the 
United States. Since these attacks, there have been over 60,000 other terrorist attacks 
worldwide (68,888 according to the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD) 2001-2014). Due to the severity of the attacks on 9/11 and the subsequent 
increased visibility and vulnerability presented by terrorism, the catastrophe marks a 
significant turning point in the history of U.S. national security. Yet, these attacks do not 
stand apart from the broader historical, social, and political context presented above. As 
this project argues, terrorism is grounded in and sustained by multiple background 
sentiments. As such, terrorism present a dynamic challenge to security professionals 
charged with counterterrorism.  
 In his seminal text on terrorism, Bruce Hoffman, director for the Center of Security 
Studies at Georgetown University, writes, “The most feared terrorists are arguably those 
who are the most successful in translating thought into action.”52 This work extends and 
explores Hoffman’s sentiment with particular attention paid to the importance of 
communication ethics. Attentiveness to communication ethics frames communicative 
action as situated within a historical context, amongst a diversity of communicative 
goods, and in response to the demands of a given communicative event. Terrorists do not 
think and act apart from the moment in which they stand. This work adds that terrorism 
and counterterrorism are not only driven by a motive of translating thought into action, 
                                                 
52 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 178. 
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but rather, risking one’s life to defend particular communicative goods. This chapter, 
therefore, serves as the hermeneutic entry into the remainder of this project. 
 This chapter provided insights on the history of U.S. national security, which allows 
us to shift our focus of attention away from national security as an end goal to national 
security as an on-going concern involving ever-evolving challenges and demands that 
shape our time. Of primary concern for this project is how national security responds to 
the demands of a given moment. As leaders interpret emerging threats, the narrative, 
goods, and practices that define national security shift. Understanding the stories that 
shape national security provides greater clarity into the practices used to defend a nation. 
When we shift our definition of national security from an objective goal to an 
overarching metaphor that shapes a given moment’s security practices, we open the term 
for broader intel and application. Understanding national security as embedded in a given 
moment and responsive to the stories that shape our time affords us a more solid ground 
to begin this project’s investigation.  
 The next chapter begins where this introductory chapter leaves us—the story of 
September 11, 2001. This project recognizes 9/11 as a significant turning point in 
American national security. The attacks presented an existential crisis to national security 
professionals by displaying the reality that current security practices were inept to meet 
the demands of a world riddled with terrorism.  
 The attacks on 9/11 demanded of security professionals new means for responding to 
the emerging challenges of our time with advanced practices and insight. The following 
chapter frames post 9/11 terrorism and counterterrorism practices as communicative 
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gestalts driven by grounded background commitments. Communication ethics yields 
insight and new directions for exploring these current challenges.  
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Chapter 2: Communication and Competing Backgrounds: The Interruption of 9/11 
 In this project, communication ethics attends to the emerging questions that shape 
a given historical moment. Stories guide one’s engagement with the historical moment 
and offer appropriate grounds for responding to current existential demands. Engagement 
with the stories that shape our moment allots the communicator with what Aristotle 
termed phrônesis, or the practical wisdom for meeting the demands of a particular 
moment.53 This chapter engages the events of September 11, 2001 as story for guiding 
our engagement with counterterrorism in this particular moment. September 11, 2001 
marks the most recent turning point in U.S. national security. 9/11 exposed the power and 
reach of Islamic terror groups, most notably, al-Qaeda, and made visible the security 
limitations of the U.S. intelligence community. In response to the attacks, U.S. leaders 
called for a reevaluation of national security practices, arguing that Cold War security 
practices were no longer sufficient to meet the demands of terrorism in the 21st century. 
Within the FBI, organizational change was vast. Over a decade after the 9/11 attacks, 
security experts reflected upon the success and failures of new security practices. This 
contemporary reflection showed that gaps exist in the effort to fight and prevent 
terrorism. While reports recognize notable successes of the FBI, there remain areas for 
improvement. These areas continue to frame the context of counterterrorism.  
For the purposes of this project as a whole, this chapter achieves two primary 
goals. First, by articulating the story of 9/11, this chapter showcases the FBI as a primary 
counterterrorism resource. Second, this chapter frames responses to 9/11 to identify gaps 
in counterterrorism prior to 9/11. 
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Introduction 
 Over 15 years after the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, these events continue 
to shape our nation’s security practices and response to threats. 9/11 proved that Cold 
War methods were inadequate against terrorism and that a major restructuring of the 
security apparatus of the U.S. was necessary. In response to the attacks, security leaders 
urged the intelligence community to work together in making counterterrorism a national 
security priority, resulting in structural changes within security organizations. This 
chapter tells the story of 9/11 beginning with a selective history and sequence of the 
day’s events. This chapter continues by overviewing the recommended changes for the 
intelligence community and concludes by discussing the success of the current state of 
the FBI. The 9/11 terror attacks continue to shape our engagement with counterterrorism 
and offer a ground for responding to current and future threats. The attacks are also a 
significant influence on the FBI counterterrorism narrative. Exploring this story provides 
us with a practical entryway for thinking about communication ethics applications.  
Through three sections, the following pages engage two major official reflections 
on 9/11. Section one, “September 11, 2001: The 9/11 Commissioner Report,” tells the 
story of 9/11 using The 9/11 Commissioner’s Report. The U.S. government recognizes 
this report as an official “full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.”54 The purpose of this section is twofold. First, this 
section presents an account of the day’s events as told by official representatives of the 
U.S. government. Second, this selective history textures the story of 9/11 to show the 
diverse backgrounds and competing communicative goods made visible on September 
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11, 2001. While it is important to note that there exists multiple versions and 
interpretations of 9/11 as story, this project, in focusing on FBI counterterrorism, limits 
exploration of this story to the U.S. government’s official account of the event. Section 
two, “September 11, 2001: National Security Report,” overviews the immediate response 
to the attacks by the U.S. government, and outlines the recommendations for improving 
security practices to effectively respond to terrorism made by the 9/11 Commission. The 
purpose of this section is to outline the security gaps identified by U.S. leaders in 
response to 9/11. These gaps shape over a decade of counterterrorism practices in the 
U.S. and remain a valid source of referral for implementing changes to security processes 
and procedures. Section three, “FBI and Counter-Terrorism: Adapting to New Threats,” 
turns to the Congressionally mandated response to the Commission Report entitled “The 
FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century.” This recently released report responds 
to the recommendations for terrorism prevention presented by the 9/11 Commission. The 
report outlines the FBI’s successes and opportunities for growth with respect to 
counterterrorism. This chapter ends by identifying places of value where communication 
ethics research and practice can make a contribution to further understanding the needs of 
security professionals and vetting the practices of these professionals.  
 The story recounted below presents a backdrop to the attacks that forever changed 
the way in which the U.S. thinks about and coordinates counterterrorism. The attacks on 
September 11, 2001 exposed the reality of Islamic terror and displayed the limitations of 
the U.S. defense community. Following the attacks, two significant and demanding 
questions arose: Why must we change our security practices? And, how can we adapt our 
intelligence community to better address the threat of terrorism? Nearly two decades 
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following the 9/11 attacks, these questions continue to demand research as security gaps 
still exist in U.S. efforts to fight terrorism. The story of 9/11, as a significant turning point 
in U.S. national security, continues to shape the narrative of national security writ large. 
Communication ethics in this project takes seriously the stories that shape one’s 
communicative practices. For current and ongoing security demands, 9/11 acts as a 
pivotal story that guides communicative response. The richness of 9/11 shows us that 
counterterrorism practices must attend to the complex and dynamic background 
influences that fuel foreground violence when there is any attempt to make sense of 
future directions.  
September 11, 2001: A Selective History  
 Immediately following 9/11, families of 9/11 victims, the American public, and 
leaders in the U.S. and abroad called for an official inquiry into the attacks and a 
recounting of the event. In November 2002, the U.S. Congress and President at the time, 
George W. Bush, responded to the call for this official response and announced the 
establishment of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, a 
bipartisan and independent group of ten commissioners charged with preparing a 
complete account of the 9/11 terror attacks. This Commission worked with two 
objectives: First, the Commission provided clarity to the story of al-Qaeda and the 
background of the 9/11 attacks. Second, the Commission provided direction for counter-
terrorism by articulating security practices to prevent future attacks.55  
                                                 
55 Commissioners included the following individuals: Thomas Kean, Lee H. Hamilton, Richard Ben-
Veniste, Fred F. Fielding, Jamie S. Gorelick, Slade Gorton, Bob Kerrey, John F. Lehman, Timothy J. 
Roemer. And James R. Thompson. Please see “Commissioner Biographies,” National Commission on the 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, from http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/about/bios.htm 
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 On July 22, 2004, the Commission released “The 9/11 Commission Report.” The 
Commission closed on August 21, 2004.56 The purpose of the Report was to provide a 
full account of the terror attacks to best of the committee’s ability and to acknowledge 
valuable lessons regarding preparation for and prevention against future attacks. The 
authorized edition of the report includes thirteen chapters.57 These chapters fit within 
three theme areas:  
 Chapters one through eight discuss the background of the events including a 
history of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda and an overview of the 9/11 hijackers. 
 Chapters nine and ten tell the story of the day’s event and immediate aftermath. 
 Chapters eleven through thirteen present recommendations for advancements in 
U.S. national security.  
This section is divided into two main subsections, which, taken together, summarizes 
chapter one through chapter ten. Subsection one, The Story of 9/11: The Emergence of a 
New Terrorism, overviews the history of bin Laden and al-Qaeda. It also provides an 
overview of U.S. security responses to bin Laden. Subsection two, September 11, 2001: 
Overview of Events, recounts the events of 9/11 beginning with the strategic planning of 
the attacks and ending with event of the day. As a whole, this section contextualizes the 
story of 9/11 in an effort to show the complexity, depth, and richness of this story. 
The Story of 9/11: The Emergence of a New Terrorism 
                                                 
56 https://www.9-11commission.gov 
57 The 13 chapters are as follows: (1) “We Have Some Planes”; (2) “The Foundation of the New 
Terrorism”; (3) “Counterterrorism Evolves”; (4) “Responses to Al Qaeda’s Initial Assaults”; (5) “Al Qaeda 
Aims at the American Homeland”; (6) “From Threat to Threat”; (7) “The Attack Looms”; (8) “‘The 
System was Blinking Red’”; (9) “Heroism and Horror”; (10) “Wartime”; (11) “Foresight—and Hindsight”; 
(12) “What To Do? A Global Strategy”; (13) “How To Do It? A Different Way of Organizing the 
Government.” 
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 The story of 9/11 begins with the conclusion of the Cold War and the birth of the 
modern Middle East. The modern Middle East resulted from the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire at the conclusion of World War I and independence from Western powers 
following World War II. During the 1960s and 1970s, Middle East states experienced a 
period of vast social and economic prosperity.58 This growth resulted in “unmodernized 
oil states attempt[ing] to shortcut decades of development.”59 Quickly, education reforms 
and vast infrastructure projects began. Yet, by the late 1980s, decreasing oil revenues 
negatively impacted the economy as corruption and the downfall of public programs 
increased. By the 1990s, high birthrates and a declining economy resulted in an increased 
population of young, unemployed men among Middle Eastern states. 
 Authors of The 9/11 Commission Report attribute these social ills to the 
development of what they call new terrorism in the Middle East. Distrust in the 
government and anger at corrupt leaders resulted in violence planned and executed by 
non-state actors typically associated with extremist organizations. Unlike traditional 
terrorism led by small groups with clear political goals, this new wave of terrorists 
organized widespread violence based on religious grounds. Authors of the Commission 
Report write that the significance of new terrorism for national security was seen in 1998 
when Osama bin Laden, publicly recognized leader of al-Qaeda during the September 11, 
2001 attacks, issued a public fatwa (religious order) in an Afghan newspaper. While the 
roots of this extremist terror began in the 1980s and 1990s, This fatwa, given by bin 
Laden was one of the first significant public statements of terror released from Islamic 
                                                 
58 Tarik M. Yousef, “Development, Growth and Policy Reform in the Middle East and North Africa since 
1950,” The Journal of Economic Perspective 18, no. 3 (2004): 91. 
59 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report 
(Washington, DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004), 53. 
 37
terror leaders. To place this fatwa into context, the Commission provides a brief history 
of bin Laden and the birth and development of al-Qaeda. The following paragraphs 
summarize this selective history.  
 The story of al-Qaeda begins in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, conflict with the 
Soviet Union between 1979 and 1989 provided Islamic extremists with a common goal 
and meeting place. This common center—a shared enemy—under the leadership of bin 
Laden would eventually birth al-Qaeda. During this decade of conflict in the late 1970s 
through the late 1980s, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in an effort to maintain 
Communist control of the country. Afghan nationals resisted the intervention and young 
Muslims from around the world came to Afghanistan to aid their companions in the fight 
against Soviet Russia. bin Laden stood out among volunteers; his family’s fortune 
allowed him to be a major financer of the anti-Soviet fight. For bin Laden, the success of 
Afghanistan depended upon a larger, worldwide organization. In April 1988, the Afghan 
jihad was successfully expelling Soviet forces. Leaders of the jihad including bin Laden 
debated what to do next. bin Laden and others agreed that the organization should not 
break up and established a foundation, al-Qaeda, as a headquarters for a global jihad.60 
By August 1988, al-Qaeda followers recognized bin Laden as their leader.  
 In 1991, bin Laden, at the request of Hassan al Turabi, a Sudanese political leader, 
moved al-Qaeda headquarters to Sudan. Over the course seven years, bin Laden laid the 
groundwork for a global extremist organization. By August 1998, al-Qaeda included a 
military, financial component, political committee, media affairs and propaganda group, 
                                                 
60 Ibid., 53–55. This organization included a financial network of 28 financers from Saudi Arabia and the 
Persian Gulf named the “Golden Chain.” bin Laden and the anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan relied heavily 
upon this Golden Chain who supported “‘holy warriors.’” 
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intelligence group, and an Advisory Council made up of bin Laden’s closest confidants.61 
Mosques and schools around the world served as recruitment centers for al-Qaeda. In 
Egypt, Ayman al Zawahiri led a group of Egyptian jihads. Shortly after the victory in 
Afghanistan, Zawahiri’s group joined forces with al-Qaeda. The relationship between bin 
Laden and al Zawahiri would last many years with Zawahiri replacing bin Laden as 
leader of al-Qaeda following bin Laden’s capture by U.S. forces.62 By the early to mid-
1990’s, bin Laden had established himself as a well-known leader among Islamic 
extremists. As leader, he focused his attention on attacking the United States. The 
Commission notes that with the support of al-Qaeda members and extremist leaders 
around the world, bin Laden began approving attacks on the U.S.  
 Throughout the 1990s, Islamic extremists planned and executed a number of 
small terror attacks against the U.S. and its supporters.63 In 1996, bin Laden returned to 
Afghanistan where the Taliban had exerted control over much of the country excluding 
some key centers such as Kabul.64 The Taliban offered a safe haven to all persons who 
wanted to travel to Afghanistan and train in their camps. Thus, the alliance between the 
Taliban and bin Laden gave al-Qaeda a home plate to train fighters and connect with 
other extremist groups. In 1998, bin Laden issued the public fatwa discussed in previous 
                                                 
61 Ibid., 56.  
62 bin Laden was killed in May 2011 by a special team of U.S. Navy Seals who ambushed his home in 
Pakistan under direction from then President, Barack Obama.  
63 For example, in December 1992, Yemeni associates of bin Laden detonated bombs at two hotels in Aden 
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Americans. In November 1995, four Saudi persons inspired by bin Laden exploded a car bomb outside of a 
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Ibid., 59–60. 
64 Ibid., 65. 
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paragraphs. This fatwa was a “public launch of a renewed and stronger al-Qaeda.”65 By 
the summer of 1998, the strength of al-Qaeda was displayed on an international scale.  
 The Commission writes that al-Qaeda’s first organized strategic attack occurred in 
August 1998 when trucks carrying bombs drove into the U.S. Embassies in East Africa 
(the Nairobi Embassy, Kenya and Dar es Salaam Embassy, Tanzania). The attack in 
Nairobi killed 12 Americans and 201 other persons of varying nationalities. The attack in 
Dar es Salaam killed 11 additional people. Following the African embassy attacks, U.S. 
president at the time, Bill Clinton, organized a response to al-Qaeda. As noted in the 
Commission Report, the 1998 embassy bombing shaped U.S. policy toward al-Qaeda 
until the 9/11 attacks. Experts expressed a need to “reevaluate the threat posed by bin 
Laden,”66 and even though intelligence linked bin Laden to the attacks, a divide amongst 
U.S. leadership existed. This divide separated those who recognized bin Laden as a 
“novel threat” and recommended action, and those who believed bin Laden not to be 
dangerous enough for a U.S. response. This divide is witnessed within security agencies 
leading up to the 9/11 attacks. 
 Authors of the Commission Report note that “although the 1995 National 
Intelligence Estimate had warned on a new type of terrorism, many officials continued to 
think of terrorists as agents of states . . .. Hence, government efforts to cope with 
terrorism were essentially the work of individual agencies.”67 At the federal level, the 
Justice Department was responsible for counterterrorism, with the FBI being the 
dominant agency. Abroad, the CIA and State Department were responsible for 
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counterterrorism intelligence. While these agencies were leaders in U.S. 
counterterrorism, the White House did make efforts to combat new terrorism, and often, 
resources were not allocated or viable for these agencies to successfully grasp the scope 
and range of terrorists’ capabilities. For instance, in 1995, Clinton issued the Presidential 
Decision Directive 39 stating that the “United States should ‘deter, defeat, and respond 
vigorously to all terrorist attacks.’”68 Clinton also allotted increased funds to the FBI 
designated for counterterrorism, and supported budget requests within the CIA for 
counterterrorism objectives. Abroad, Clinton encouraged cooperation among nations in 
support of counterterrorism and denying homes to terrorist organizations.69 These 
directives, however, resulted only in small counterterrorism policy changes within the 
FBI and CIA. 
 In 1996, the CIA, then interested in terrorism finance, developed the bin Laden 
Unit, a headquartered based unit focused solely on research aimed at bin Laden. In May 
1996, the unit received an intelligence “breakthrough” when Jamal Ahmed al Fadl, a 
former senior employee of bin Laden, went to a U.S. embassy in Africa and provided the 
CIA with information on al-Qaeda directives and objectives.70 With the assistance of 
Fadl, by 1997, the bin Laden unit recognized al-Qaeda as a leading terrorist organization 
and bin Laden as the leader. By 1998, the CIA and agencies within the Justice 
Department were developing plans to capture and trial bin Laden for attacks in the 
1990s.71 Yet, only one plan for capture was fully prepared. In 1998, the CIA 
Counterterrorist Center sought approval for a bin Laden capture plan—a plan well 
                                                 
68 Ibid., 101. 
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71 Ibid., 111. 
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detailed and rehearsed. However, senior management within the CIA worried about the 
risk of the plan and decided that these risks outweighed the benefits. No other plan to 
capture bin Laden was successfully or fully developed before 9/11.72 
 For the FBI, Clinton appointed Louis Freech as Director; Freech recognized 
terrorism as a significant threat to homeland security.73 In 1999, the agency underwent a 
large reorganization process, which included the development of the Counterterrorism 
Division.74 This development marked the first time that counterterrorism activities were 
handled within a stand-alone division. In 2000, the Chief of the Counterterrorism 
Division, Dale Watson, launched MAXCAP 05, a program to “enhance the FBI’s 
counterterrorism capacity” across all FBI offices.75 In theory, the FBI established plans to 
make counter-terrorism a significant priority. In reality, field offices did not dedicate 
significant resources to counterterrorism. These offices, instead, maintained focus on 
local priorities and criminal justice, both apart from intelligence and terrorism research. 
As a result, the FBI did not complete any assessments regarding the “overall threat” of 
terrorism to the U.S. prior to 9/11.76 At the time of the September 11, 2001 attacks, up-
to-date intelligence regarding the capabilities of al-Qaeda was not available.  
 As the U.S. was determining an appropriate response to bin Laden and al-Qaeda, 
terrorists were strategically developing plans for the 9/11 attacks. As shown in the above 
paragraphs, significant gaps in counterterrorism knowledge and practice were present 
leading up to the attacks. First, security professionals in the U.S. developed no successful 
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plans to address the threat of bin Laden before 9/11. Second, the FBI completed no 
formal assessments regarding the capabilities, plans, and reach of terror groups prior to 
9/11. As discussed, by the late 1990s, al-Qaeda was a worldwide organization 
spearheaded by bin Laden. The organization “relied heavily on the ideas and work of 
enterprising and strong-willed field commanders who enjoyed considerable autonomy.”77 
Field officers strategically planned and executed the 9/11 terror attacks. Authors of the 
Commission Report discuss Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as the “mastermind” of the 
attacks.78 The following section discusses the planning and execution of the 9/11 attacks. 
The Story of 9/11: Planning 9/11 
 The 9/11 terror attacks began with a proposal by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to 
bin Laden in the mid 1990s. As a major player in the story of 9/11, the authors of the 
Commission Report spent time presenting the story of Mohammed’s life and plans for 
attacks against the U.S. Mohammed serves as the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks and his 
life story is one of diversity. Below is an overview of this story.  
 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (b. 1964) joined the Muslim Brotherhood79 at the age 
of sixteen. Upon graduating from secondary school in 1983, Mohammed left his 
hometown of Kuwait and enrolled in Chowan College in North Carolina. Soon after, 
Mohammed transferred to North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University 
where he graduated with a Mechanical Engineering degree in December 1986. After 
graduation, Mohammed returned to the Middle East to join anti-Soviet fighters in 
                                                 
77 Ibid., 145. 
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Afghanistan. In 1987, Mohammed visited Pakistan. While in Pakistan, Mohammed’s 
brother introduced him to Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Head of the Afghanistan Islamic Union 
Party (also referred to as the Islamic Dawah Organization of Afghanistan).80 Sayyah 
became Mohammed’s mentor, and between 1988 and 1992, Mohammed ran a 
nongovernmental organization under Sayyah’s sponsorship. Around this time, 
Mohammed learned of Ramzi Yousef, the organizer of the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombings. Mohammed came to the attention of U.S. intelligence agencies after wiring 
$660.00 to supporters of Yousef. Yousef’s 1993 attack inspired Mohammed to plan his 
own attack against the U.S.81 Authors of the Commission Report write that Mohammed’s 
disdain of the U.S. stemmed from his disagreement with U.S. policy favoring Israel over 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization. By 1994, Mohammed and Yousef accompanied 
one another to the Philippines and began planning the “Manila air plot.”82 The Manila air 
plot was a terror plan intended to bomb a dozen U.S. airplanes in flight at the same time. 
The plan was stopped by U.S. intelligence and Philippine authorizes, but Yousef was not 
captured until years later.  
 In 1996, Mohammed travelled to Afghanistan to meet bin Laden. During this 
meeting, Mohammed proposed his plan for the 9/11 attacks. His original proposal 
included an airplane attack on key cities in the United States and a simultaneous airplane 
attack in East Asia. By 1999, bin Laden gave Mohammed the “green light” for his World 
Trade Center plot and selected four individuals to serve as the suicide pilots— Khalid al 
                                                 
80 The Islamic Dawah Organization of Afghanistan was founded with the goal of unifying Islamic forces in 
Afghanistan.  
81 Ibid., 145–147. 
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Mihdhar, Nawaf al Hazmi, Khallad and Abu Bara al Yemeni. In the fall of 1999, the four 
chosen pilots attended a training course with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The training 
session focused on physical fitness, English language skills, firearms and target practice 
among other skills. In the spring of 2000, bin Laden ordered the cancelling of the East 
Asia portion of the 9/11 attacks. Thus, the attention of Mohammed and the chosen pilots 
lay solely on the U.S.83  
  In the beginning months of 2000, bin Laden added the so called “Hamburg 
group” to the list of persons responsible for carrying out the 9/11 attacks. The Hamburg 
group84 included four aspiring Islamic extremists from Germany who were fluent in 
English and familiar with the West. Each of the Hamburg group members—Mohamed 
Atta, Ramzi Binalshibh, Marwan al Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah—served as key plays in the 
attacks. Upon formal inclusion in the attacks, the four men returned to Germany to begin 
training. As noted in the Commission Report, the 9/11 terrorists spent between $400,000 
and $500,000 on planning, training, and conducting the attacks.85 By May 2000, the 9/11 
jihadists were arriving in the United States.  
 Within the U.S., major political changes took attention away from 
counterterrorism preparations. Authors of the Commission Report note that the 
“millennium scare” of 2000 consumed much of the FBIs attention, and that the 
presidential election of 2000 played a significant role in the preparedness of the 
intelligence community. These events, coupled with disagreements within the FBI 
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concerning the capabilities of bin Laden and Islamic terrorism, kept the attention of 
security professionals away from terrorism.  
 In November 2000, the U.S. presidential election resulted in a race so close that 
the Supreme Court was charged with deciding the outcome. Due to the circumstances of 
the vote, the transition period between Bill Clinton and George W. Bush was shortened 
by nearly half. The quick transition in personnel and the cut in time for training resulted 
in a steep learning curve regarding security threats, bin Laden, and al-Qaeda. During the 
36-day transition, the newly named security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, and her deputy, 
Stephen Hadley, focused attention on the disputes with “China, missile defense, and the 
collapse of the Middle East peace process.”86 While attention amongst some security 
leaders was directed at al-Qaeda, the debate regarding the actual threat that al-Qaeda and 
bin Laden posed to the U.S. was ongoing.  
 At the FBI, Watson and Director Freeh continued to argue for additional funding 
and attention for counterterrorism. In the spring of 2001, Freeh announced his retirement. 
Just prior to 9/11, Freeh’s successor, Robert Mueller took office.87 Additionally, after 
winning the Presidential election, Bush named John Ashcroft as U.S. Attorney General. 
Upon his entrance to this new role, Ashcroft expressed the need for reform within the 
FBI. These transfers of power between key security personnel created gaps in knowledge 
and policy as funding and direction of counterterrorism was revised.  
 In the days and hours leading up to the attacks on the morning of September 11, 
2001, all signals regarding a terror attack on U.S. soil were “blinking red.”88 Yet, 
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significant transitions of power and leadership within the U.S. drew attention away from 
the terrorist threat thus creating gaps in security knowledge. As the attacks began and 
continued throughout the morning hours of 9/11, the vulnerability of U.S. intelligence 
and preparation was exposed. The following section overviews the day’s events on 
September 11, 2001.  
September 11, 2001: Overview of Events  
 This section describes the events on September 11, 2001, overviewing the story of 
the attack and initial response to the attack as listed in The 9/11 Commission Report. It 
also summarizes the story reported by the Commission. On September 11, 2001, 19 
terrorists from a variety of social backgrounds and countries of origins hijacked four 
planes with the purpose of carrying out well-planned suicide attacks at four strategically 
selected sites across the U.S. Two of the planes hit the Twin Towers in Lower Manhattan, 
one crashed into the Pentagon, and one crashed in a field in Pennsylvania. Close to 3000 
persons perished due to the attacks. These attacks serve as a significant turning point in 
U.S. national security that continue to shape U.S. counterterrorism policy nearly two 
decades later.  
 The hijackings took place on the morning of September 11, 2001. The first of four 
planes, American Flight 11, was scheduled to fly from Logan Airport in Boston, 
Massachusetts to Los Angeles, California on the morning of September 11. The aircraft 
was boarded by five hijackers, Mohamed Atta, Abdulaziz al-Omari, Wail al-Shehri, 
Waleed al-Shehri, and Satam al-Suqami. Both Atta and Omari had arrived at Logan 
International around 6:00am by a flight travelling from Portland, Oregon to Boston. 
American 11 took off from Logan International at 7:59 a.m.  
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 At a second terminal in Logan International, Marwan al-Shehhi, Fayez 
Banihammad, Mohand al-Shehri, Hamza al-Ghamdi, and Ahmen al-Ghamdi boarded 
United Airlines Flight 175 to Los Angeles International Airport. United Flight 175 took 
off from Logan International shortly before 8:00 a.m. Concurrently, Hani Janjour, Khalid 
al-Mihdhar, Majed Moqed, Nawaf al-Hazmi, and Salem al-Hazmi boarded American 
Airlines Flight 77 at Dulles International Airport in Washington, D.C. The flight, headed 
for Los Angeles International airport departed D.C. at 8:20 a.m. Finally, in Newark, NJ, 
Ziad Jarrah, Ahmedal-Haznawi, Ahmen al-Nami, and Saeed al-Ghamdi, boarded United 
Airlines Flight 93 to San Francisco International Airport. The plane departed Newark at 
8:42 a.m.  
 Of the 19 hijackers, 10 were selected for extra screening during the pre-flight 
security checkpoints. Each of the 10 received extra baggage screening before being 
allowed entrance to the flight terminals. American Flight 11 from Logan International 
Airport in Boston to Los Angeles International Airport was hijacked approximately at 
8:14 a.m. Communication between flight attendants Betty Ong and Madeline “Amy” 
Sweeny and the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary, North 
Carolina allowed Boston’s Air Traffic Control Center to be alerted of the hijacking.89 At 
8:46 a.m., the flight crashed into the North Tower of World Trade Center in New York 
City killing all persons on board and an unknown number of persons working in the 
tower.  
 United Flight 175 was hijacked sometime between 8:42 a.m. and 8:46 a.m. 
Communication between passengers onboard the flight and their family members alerted 
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authorities to the hijacking. Additionally, the rerouting of the plane away from Los 
Angeles and toward New York City cautioned New York Air Traffic Controllers of a 
possible problem aboard the plane. At 9:03 a.m., United Flight 175 struck the South 
Tower of the World Trade Center killing all on board and an unknown number of persons 
working in the Tower.90 
 American Flight 77 was hijacked sometime between 8:51 a.m. and 8:54 a.m. At 
8:56 a.m., the plane’s transponder was turned off thus alerting Indianapolis Air Traffic 
Control of an issue. At 9:00 a.m., American Airlines Executive Vice President, Gerard 
Arpey, ordered all American Airline Flights in the Northeast to be grounded until further 
notice. Upon learning of the hijacking of United Flight 175, Arpey grounded all 
American Airlines flights nationwide. At 9:37 a.m., American Flight 77 crashed into the 
Pentagon in Washington, D.C. killing all on board and an unknown number of personnel 
in the building.91 
 The pilots of United Flight 93 were alerted to the previous hijacking at 9:24 a.m. 
At approximately 9:28 a.m., the flight was hijacked. Communication between passengers 
and their family members alerted passengers to the previous three hijackings. Aware that 
they were in a hijacking, the passengers attempted to fight the terrorists. The passengers 
succeeded in preventing the terrorists from reaching their destination of Washington, 
D.C. The plane crashed into a field in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, killing all 
passengers on board.  
 Upon knowledge of the hijackings and the subsequent crashing of aircrafts into 
the North and South Towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, U.S. leadership 
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began implementing crisis management practices. The 9/11 Commission noted that the 
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) were “unprepared” to manage the circumstances of the 9/11 
hijackings.92 Therefore, the President, Vice-President, and Secret Service of the United 
States worked without clear Intel on the situation.  
 At 8:30 p.m. on the evening of 9/11, President Bush addressed the nation from the 
White House declaring, “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who 
committed these acts and those who harbor them.”93 Within the White House, leaders 
worked to coordinate immediate and long-term emergency response efforts. By the 
following day, September 12, 2001, Bush led meetings regarding the declaration of war 
against terrorists. As noted in the Commission Report, while intelligence sharing between 
security organizations was not a priority, as soon as a week following the attacks, what 
would become the U.S. Patriot Act began to take shape.94 
 Over the weekend of September 15 and 16, 2001, President Bush coordinated 
meetings amongst his war council at Camp David with the purpose of “assign[ing] tasks 
for the first wave of war against terrorism.”95 These tasks evolved into the National 
Security Presidential Directive 9 (or, “Defeating the Terrorist Threat to the United 
States”). The directive expanded war against Al-Qaeda to war against all terrorists and 
restated the president’s remarks not to distinguish between terrorist and those who harbor 
them.96 In a set of meetings on September 21 and October 2, Bush approved military 
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action against Afghanistan. This plan, “Enduring Freedom,” included four phases of 
military action: 
1. In the days and weeks following 9/11, the U.S. and its allies moved forces into the 
countries surrounding Afghanistan. 
2. Beginning on October 7, air strikes and special operation attacks hit for key al-
Qaeda and Taliban locations.  
3. By December, all key Afghan cities fell to the coalition.  
4. After liberation, armed forces focused on security and stabilization of the 
country.97  
In addition to the action taken against Afghanistan, military plans for actions against Iraq 
began to take shape. 
 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States ends their 
story of the 9/11 attacks with the overview of plans for Afghanistan. At the time of the 
reports completion, this publicly accepted text offers as full and complete recounting of 
the events leading to 9/11, the terror attacks, and the immediate aftermath.  
This selective history of 9/11 textures the story of the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks showing the multiple persons, voices, and actions taken to develop, 
execute and respond to this communicative event. Of particular importance, the history 
reveals the driving forces of the 9/11 jihadists, including their commitments and beliefs. 
On September 11, 2001, nineteen men from nineteen different backgrounds, funded by 
multiple sources, carried out the most deadly terror attacks ever witnessed on American 
soil. These men died for their cause, and their motives, commitments, and actions 
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continue to persuade persons toward violence today. Understanding the varying and 
multiple background, influences, and identifies of these men shapes the context of the 
9/11 attacks as expending far beyond the day of the event. This event, and the 
communicative events leading up to it, exposed U.S. national security as incapable of 
meeting the demands of emerging threats.  
 The 9/11 Commission Report ends with a discussion of the security failures 
identified before and during 9/11. Responding to these failures, the Commission provided 
recommendations for counterterrorism practices in hindsight of 9/11. The following 
section outlines the recommendations for improving security practices as a contributing 
portion of the story of 9/11. 
September 11, 2001: National Security Report 
 Distance and time provide greater clarity to the security practices in place prior to 
9/11. At the conclusion of the Cold War, America “stood out as an object for admiration, 
envy, and blame.”98 As shown in the selective history discussed above, intelligence 
leaders found it difficult to secure funds or approval for counterterrorism practices as the 
threat of al-Qaeda often seemed distant and minor compared to local challenges including 
drug and mafia related crimes, amongst other domestic criminal activities. As the 
Commission notes, while Afghanistan seemed very far away to the U.S., the U.S. seemed 
within reach for members of al-Qaeda.99 If the American public and American leaders 
recognized al-Qaeda as an approaching threat, the outcome of 9/11 may have been 
different. However, as noted within the 9/11 report, hindsight is often 20/20. The focus of 
attention now, proclaimed the Commission, must remain on the valuable security lessons 
                                                 
98 Ibid., 340. 
99 Ibid., 340. 
 52
9/11 taught us. With distance, time, and clarity, the Commission identified the following 
four failures regarding pre-9/11 national security and terrorism: imagination, policy, 
capabilities, and management.100 The following paragraphs will introduce these four 
failures—imagination, policy, capabilities, and management. These failures will continue 
to serve as a significant source of reflection throughout the remainder of this project. As 
this work continues to discuss the relationship between communication ethics and 
counterterrorism practices, it will periodically refer to these failures in greater detail as a 
cornerstone of security opportunities and limitations. 
 Imagination—The Commission notes that leaders and the public alike did not 
understand the threat of al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden prior to the 9/11 attacks. Despite 
intelligence reports noting bin Laden’s desire to attack the U.S., “there were no complete 
portraits of [bin Laden’s] strategy or of the extent of his organization’s involvement in 
the past terrorist attacks.”101 While both former U.S. president Clinton and former 
president Bush were briefed on bin Laden, the Commission argues that the threat was not 
“compelling.”102 Yet, the Commission also argues that suicide attacks and the hijackings 
of planes were both terrorism realities prior to 9/11. Since the attacks at Pearl Harbor, the 
intelligence community has raised awareness regarding security preparations for surprise 
attacks. While efforts to thwart surprise attacks have been discussed by multiple leading 
researchers, each of these methods include practices to “institutionalize imagination”; or, 
to see the capabilities of terror organizations as unlimited.103 The Commission 
recommended that the following practices could institutionalize imagination in a way that 
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could prevent future surprise attacks. These practices include (1) brainstorming about 
how attacks may be carried out; (2) identifying telltale indications that a surprise attack is 
being planned; (3) collect intelligence on the indicators when possible; and (4) integrate 
defense mechanisms to stop or alert to the most deadly attacks.104 These practices, the 
Commission argues, were never developed or implemented into security practices prior to 
9/11.105 
 Policy—The Commission argues that the 1998 Embassy bombings offered an 
opportunity for the entire intelligence community to exam the threat of bin Laden and al-
Qaeda. This examination could have made visible the reach and power of al-Qaeda. 
However, security organizations “did not meet this the threat.”106 Policymakers placed 
responsibility with the CIA, who, the Commissioner argues, worked hard to prevent an 
attack. However, the CIA alone was limited in their efforts. Before 9/11, the president 
took no action against al-Qaeda. Therefore, no formal policy for addressing Islamic 
terrorism existed. As a result, transfers between leadership created gaps concerning the 
policies and procedures for terrorism research and counterterrorism practiced.  
 Capabilities—Prior to 9/11, leaders attempted to combat al-Qaeda with the same 
capabilities used during the Cold War. “These capabilities were insufficient, but little was 
done to expand or reform them.”107 In addition, the Commission writes that at no point 
prior to 9/11 was the entire Defense Department entirely engaged on the terrorism threat. 
In the domestic arena, the FBI failed to link intelligence and agent knowledge to national 
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threats.108 Finally, the lack of communication and sharing of intelligence between 
agencies resulted in security gaps and intelligence overlaps. There was no developed 
procedure for sharing intelligence across organizational lines. Thus, resources were 
limited by an inability to foster strong intelligence relationships between security 
organizations.  
 Management—As discussed above, communication between agencies was nearly 
limited. Thus, the intelligence community failed to work as a team. Clarity of objectives 
and roles was not managed between and among intelligence offices effectively. In effect, 
there were missed opportunities concerning the communication and management of 
terrorism research. 109 What was missing prior to 9/11, the Commission argued, was an 
overarching manager who communicated the roles and security needs to various 
organizations. Without a developed plan for communicating roles, policies, and 
procedures, each agency, office, and personnel worked independently toward a variety of 
different objectives and goals. When personnel attempted to alert others of terrorism 
threats, they were met with resistance; this resistance prevented the allocation of 
resources necessary to develop formal plans capable of addressing the threat of al-Qaeda.  
 Reflecting on the failures outlined above, the Commission developed a list of 
security practices for the U.S. intelligence community to implement. Specifically, the 
Commission outlined considerable security changes for the FBI, which included a 
detailed plan for implementing budget increases put into effect following 9/11. The 
enemy, Commissioners argued, was twofold: First, there is al-Qaeda, the network of 
terrorists; Second, is Islamic extremism, a “radical ideological movement” inspiring 
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terrorists around the globe.110 A successful counterterrorism strategy will be broad, 
including policy and military objectives that address each of the aforementioned enemies 
alongside future terror networks that could possibly stem from a variety of ideologies and 
places.  
Broadly, the requested changes reflect the following all-encompassing  
recommendations: (1) The intelligence community must be unified under a director and 
share information between and among agencies; (2) The community must balance its 
commitment to criminal justice and national security, (3) The U.S. should commit itself 
long-term to the stabilization of Afghanistan and the rooting out of terror cells; (4) The 
U.S. should work with other nations to support youth in Muslim states and combatting 
Islamic terrorism; and (5) The U.S. should be vigilant in tracking terror funding. These 
broad recommendations were successfully implemented by changing the practices within 
the various agencies of the U.S.  
Due to the focus of this particular project resting with the FBI as an entrance into 
the intelligence community at large, the following paragraphs outline the FBI practices 
for adoption listed within the Commission Report. Authors of the Commission Report 
recommend the following practices to be adopted by the intelligence community as a 
whole and the FBI in specific: 
 The FBI will create and maintain through specialized training a national security 
group dedicated to the prevention of terrorism. This workforce will consist of 
analyst, agents, linguists, and surveillance specialists trained in intelligence and 
national security.  
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 The FBI will train all new hires on intelligence gathering, analysis, and 
dissemination. Following the broad training on intelligence and national security, 
agents and analysts will specialize in one subject area.  
 The FBI will certify all leaders in intelligence training.   
 The FBI will create a management position to be filled within every field office. 
This manager’s goal will be to ensure that national security priorities are carried 
out amongst their local offices.  
 The FBI budget will align with four primary objectives: intelligence, 
counterterrorism, criminal, and criminal justice.  
 The FBI will regularly report their progress on the aforementioned 
recommendations to Congress. 
 Congress will make sure funding is available to the FBI when needed.  
In response to the changes listed above, the U.S. government funded research for the 
2014 report, “The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century.”111 This report 
addressed the following questions: Has the FBI successfully met the above 
recommendations? Have these recommendations improved the effectiveness of the FBI in 
countering terrorism within the county? Are additional recommendations necessary? The 
final section of this chapter summarizes this report and ends this selective history of 9/11.  
FBI and Counter-Terrorism: Adapting to New Threats 
 This section turns to the second official report on 9/11, “The FBI: Protecting the 
Homeland in the 21st Century.” In January 2014, the FBI 9/11 Review Commission was 
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established in response to a congressional mandate to complete an external review of the 
FBI’s implementation of the 9/11 Commission Report’s recommendations. Specifically, 
the Review Commission was tasked with the following aims: (1) Assess the progress and 
challenges of impending the recommendations; (2) Analyze the FBI’s response to 
terrorism and domestic radicalization since 9/11; (3) Assess any information not known 
to the 9/11 Commission regarding the terror attacks on 9/11; and (4) provide any 
necessary additional recommendations to the FBI. This report serves as the official 
response to the 9/11 Commission Report recommendation for the FBI.  
 The Review Commission, funded by Congress in 2013, 2014, and 2015 was 
composed of Edwin Meese, former U.S. Attorney General, Tim Roemer, former 
Congressman and Ambassador, and Bruce Hoffman, counterterrorism expert and 
professor at Georgetown University. These members appointed former CIA Deputy 
Director, John Gannon, as the Review Commission Executive Director. Together, these 
four leaders completed an analysis of FBI progress concerning counterterrorism between 
2001 and 2014. Additionally, the FBI Review Commission offered an evaluation of the 
lessons learned from more recent terrorist attacks, an assessment of the FBI’s 
preparedness for terrorism in the next decade, and an evaluation of the FBI’s current and 
future needs for intelligence community partners.  
 For their research report, the FBI Review Commission evaluated over 60 
extensive briefs from FBI headquarters, interviewed over 30 intelligence community 
agents and leaders, and visited 8 FBI field offices. The report recognizes that today, the 
FBI is facing a complicated threat, which “demands an accelerated commitment to 
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reform.”112 The following paragraphs provide an overview of the FBI Review 
Commission’s findings.  
 Reviewers note that three trends define current challenges facing the FBI. First, 
the collapse of the Cold War world order (discussed in chapter one) resulted in the 
increase of non-state terror actors. To further this challenge, lone wolf attacks following 
the decrease of centralized terror networks have increased in the past few years.113 
Second, a significant increase in research and development resulted in the fast-paced, 
changing landscape of technology; innovations in science and technology offer terrorists 
new avenues for recruitment and the carrying out of violence. Particularly, the use of 
social media by terror groups has been largely noted in recent scholarship.114 Third, an 
increase in domestic terror attacks has refocused resources to the state and local level. 
Community police forces currently have a legitimate need for FBI intelligence 
resources.115 The report notes that the FBI is successful in responding to the 9/11 
Commissioner Report. However, these changes were not rapid enough and, in the years 
since the 9/11 attacks, terror threats have evolved. While the recommended changes may 
have been sufficient to meet the demand of Islamic terrorism as it stood in 2001, current 
terrorism challenges require additional swift and ongoing changes.  
 Currently, the FBI assesses threats through three primary levels: the FBI 
headquarters in Virginia, field offices located throughout the country, and legat attachés 
(LEGATS), temporary overseas offices developed to address unique threats. The 9/11 
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Review Commission offered the following list of high-level recommendations to address 
each challenge within each FBI location.  
 The FBI must develop a multi-year strategic vision that identifies ongoing and 
emerging threats. This plan should include a budget request to be approved by 
Congress yearly. This budget request will overview the FBI’s plan for resource 
allocation.116  
 The FBI must streamline and accelerate the recruitment and implementation of an 
intelligence workforce.117 “Innovative thinking and efforts to identify new 
threats” should be rewarded, and a clear career path for intelligence workers must 
be defined. 
 The FBI must define more clearly the value of the LEGAT program, the FBI’s 
international program. Intelligence support for LEGATs should be increased with 
some LEGATs having a dedicated intelligence analyst present oversees.  
 Threat identification processes at field offices should be flexible enough to 
incorporate new and emerging threats as they arise.  
The above selective history of 9/11 commences with the 2014 FBI Review Commission’s 
recommendations. These official reports of 9/11 depict the story of September 11, 2001 
as complex, of diverse origin, and of ongoing significance. Thus, 9/11 as a significant 
turning point in counterterrorism research, development, and practices continues to shape 
our response to the demand of this historical moment.  
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Conclusion 
 Communication ethics seeks clarity on the goods protected and promoted by self 
and other. On the eve of 9/11, intelligence systems were “blinking red.” Islamic 
extremists had systemically planned an attack that was executed with minimal 
interruption. As noted in the Commission Report, al-Qaeda was more globalized than 
America, who remained committed to Cold War security practices. These practices failed 
to prevent an attack on U.S. soil because they failed to take into consideration the depth 
and reach of Islamic extremism. The intelligence community failed to recognize what al-
Qaeda protected and promoted.  
 The 9/11 Commission notes, “Now is the time for that reflection and reevaluation. 
The United States should consider what to do—the shape and objectives of a strategy. 
Americans should also consider how to do it—organizing their government in a different 
way.”118 As the Review Commission looked back on the effectiveness of FBI 
organizational change, the group found that while many of the measures implemented in 
the decade following 9/11 have proved successful, the agency still has significant room 
for growth. This project argues that this growth can be grounded in communication 
ethics; why should we do this.  
 Communication ethics in this project takes seriously the stories that shape our 
communicative responses in given moments. For current and ongoing security demands, 
9/11 continues to act as a pivotal and influence story that guides our communicative 
response. Yet, as shown, this story is not only dynamic, it is diverse. The 9/11 terror 
attacks were the culmination of various backgrounds, influences, and demands that 
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coordinated together on that fateful day. The richness of 9/11 shows us counterterrorism 
practices must attend to this dynamic background in order to attempt to make sense of 
future directions. Threats and challenges do not exist in a vacuum. Equipping security 
professional with an interpretive lens for exploring these backgrounds is a practical asset 
that communication ethics literacy can provide.  
 To understand the value of communication ethics for counterterrorism, the 
following chapter will review communication ethics literature and present the dialogic 
approach to communication ethics which frames this project’s interpretive lens. Up to 
this point, we have explored the changing landscape of national security and the turning 
point posed by the events on September 11, 2001. With this information, the following 
chapter frames the theoretical insights that will be used to apply communication ethics in 
the subsequent final chapters. 
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Chapter 3: Communication Ethics: The Importance of Being Literate 
 In this work, communication ethics is the protection and promotion of goods. The 
question of terrorism reflects the struggle of communication ethics among a diverse and 
mobile society. It concerns varied, distinct, and competing goods protected and promoted 
by multiple groups—uncovering these goods is the challenge of counterterrorism experts. 
This chapter examines the literature of communication ethics from the thesis of the 
protection and promotion of differing goods and connects the reader to the hermeneutic 
center of this project—taking communication ethics literacy to the past, present, and 
future practices of counterterrorism. This project’s approach to communication ethics 
begins with the recognition that there is conflict regarding what matters to different 
persons, and communication ethics is an appropriate tool to navigate this conflict. 
Becoming literate in communication ethics will assist security professionals in 
interpreting intelligence in a way that offers pragmatic assistance in the research and 
development of counterterrorism.  
Introduction 
 Communication ethics takes seriously the goods, beliefs, values, and motives that 
drive groups’ communicative practices. In their 2009 seminal text on communication 
ethics, Ronald C. Arnett, Janie Harden Fritz, and Leeanne Bell articulate the approach to 
communication ethics that guides this project. They write, “communication ethics rests at 
the intersection of philosophy of communication and applied communication adding a 
meaningful bridge between the communicative why and the communication how”119—
communication ethics navigates amongst conflict by restructuring one’s approach to 
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communicative events. The literacy of communication ethics presented by these authors 
allows for the identification of the goods guiding everyday action. In this project, I argue 
that when moved into an interpretive lens for data collection, analysis, and application, 
this literacy equips researchers with practical tools necessary for continued 
counterterrorism practices.  
 Three sections guide this chapter. Section one, “Approaches to Communication 
Ethics,” reviews the defining approaches in communication ethics research that shape 
communication scholarship and provide background for this project’s approach—the 
dialogic approach. This section situates the dialogic approach to communication amongst 
multiple theoretical insights regarding communication ethics. Regarding this project, the 
purpose of this section is to remind readers that multiple viewpoints and approaches to 
communication ethics exist in scholarship and practice. Section two, “Communication 
Ethics as Literacy and Interpretive Lens,” summarizes the literacy of communication 
ethics and presents communication ethics as a real-time interpretive lens capable to 
assisting persons in data discovery and analysis. This section details how communication 
ethics literacy offers a practical interpretive distance between researcher and 
communicative events that afford clarity and direction in future action and decision-
making. Section three, “Communication Ethics Lens: Application,” offers readers three 
ways in which this interpretive lens can be used pragmatically to understand the 
counterterrorism practices of the FBI. These identified practices will guide this project’s 
application in the final two chapters of this work. 
 Communication ethics literacy invites persons to identify, acknowledge, and learn 
about the goods that shape their own and others’ actions. Being literate in communication 
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ethics moves one’s focus of attention beyond the self and allows opportunities for 
response and creative insight into current and ongoing emergent contentions. 
Communication ethics provides us with the tools to interpretive the diverse and 
competing goods that exist in our society. These tools offer practical assistance in 
addressing the recommendations for improving FBI counterterrorism made in response to 
9/11 and recent evolutions in terrorism threats.  
Approaches to Communication Ethics 
 This section provides a topical overview of the key approaches to communication 
ethics. Communication ethics acts as a fulcrum or meeting point between philosophy of 
communication and applied communication situating communicative practices as a 
reflection of what matters to particular persons/organizations.120 Since the founding of 
the Communication Ethics Division of the National Communication Association in 1984, 
communication ethics research has grown, coming to encompass multiple topics beyond 
theoretical development to include applied conversations. Among this scholarship are six 
approaches to communication ethics. The following paragraphs overview the approaches 
to communication ethics recognized in our discipline’s scholarship.   
 In his seminal 1987 review essay of communication ethics scholarship,121 Arnett 
extends the work of James Chesebro and identifies five approaches to the study of 
communication ethics—democratic, procedural/code ethics, universal-humanitarian, 
contextual, narrative. Arnett surveys 128 articles on communication ethics published 
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between 1915 and 1985, finding that communication ethics scholarship naturally aligns 
with one of the five approaches listed above. In response to this article and the defined 
approaches to communication ethics, Arnett, Arneson, and Bell introduce the dialogic 
approach to communication ethics in their 2006 article, “Communication Ethics: The 
Dialogic Turn.”122  
Each of these six approaches to communication ethics protect and promote a 
particular set of communicative goods. As discussed in chapter one, communicative 
goods show what matters to particular persons and organizations.123 Communicative 
goods are that which one protects and promotes at all costs. These goods are supported by 
communicative practices embodied and performed in a given moment as response to a 
particular demand. The paragraphs below offer a brief summary of each approach.  
 Democratic ethics—The democratic approach to communication ethics surrounds 
questions of the public process of decision-making, especially amongst diverse publics. 
This approach recognizes the value of difference and dissent, while remaining committed 
to debate and rational choice. Arnett recognizes the work of Karl Wallace who identified 
four habits of democratic communication. These habits—habit of search, habit of justice, 
habit of public and private motivation, habit of respect for dissent—protect the freedom 
to find, present, and debate research. This approach promotes the process of creating and 
maintaining spaces that give voice to minority publics.  
 Codes, procedures, and standards ethics—The codes, procedures, and standards 
approach to communication ethics emphasizes a given organization’s public standard for 
ethical decision-making. This approach recognizes that elected officials design and make 
                                                 
122 Arnett, Arneson, and Bell, “Communication Ethics: The Dialogic Turn.”  
123 Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, Communication Ethics Literacy.  
 66
public a code for handling complex situations. These codes become a standard bearer for 
decision-making involving the protection of an organization’s values. This approach 
protects and promotes an organization’s publicly stated mission and commitments.  
 Universal humanitarian ethics—The universal humanitarian approach to 
communication ethics emphasizes public, a priori principles for ethical decision-making. 
The a priori principles find value in the work of Immanuel Kant who articulated the 
categorical imperative approach to ethics. This approach recognizes the value of 
universal principles that bind persons to prescribed ethics in any and all contexts. Arnett 
notes that this approach protects the value of wisdom that allow persons to navigate 
culturally accepted morals.  
 Contextual ethics—The contextual approach to communication ethics emphasizes 
the value of private discernment within particular contexts. This approach recognizes the 
private self’s ability to deliberate and decide upon an appropriate response to a given 
need. This approach protects individual and cultural ethics that do not have a universal 
appeal. Contextual ethics recognize that persons are rooted within particular locations 
that shape and guide given values for decision-making. This approach protects the 
uniqueness of context and promotes a given individual’s wisdom for acting ethically.  
 Narrative ethics—Narrative ethics emphasize the local stories that shape our 
lives, providing meaning to our decision-making. Arnett frames the narrative approach as 
an alternative to the previous four approaches. He recognizes the scholarship of Alasdair 
MacIntyre and Walter Fisher as founders of this approach. The narrative approach is 
grounded in the agreement of a community on values that should guide ethical decision-
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making. Rather than a rigid set of expectations, the narrative approach protects and 
promotes a given community’s agreed-upon vision of action.  
These five approaches provide a conceptual framework for addressing 
communication ethics questions, and they provide grounding for the dialogic approach 
discussed by two seminal studies on communication ethics and postmodernity: Arnett, 
Arneson, and Bell and Arnett, Fritz, and Bell. These studies are more fully summarized in 
future paragraphs. Extending the work of Arnett in his 1987 seminal essay, Arnett, 
Arneson, and Bell survey 73 communication ethics articles published between 1986 and 
2004. Their review shapes the emergence of the dialogic approach to communication 
ethics. These authors frame the dialogic approach as an alternative to the previous five by 
establishing an approach to communication ethics that introduces to this study a 
pragmatic examination of communicative practices.124 Unlike the approaches that 
precede it, the dialogic approach recognizes that each approach is valuable depending 
upon the needs of a given situation. With a communication ethics literacy, we are able to 
sense the particularities of a given situation and respond appropriately.  
The dialogic approach to communication ethics recognizes the reality of a 
postmodern moment characterized by diversity and disagreement concerning what 
matters. Arnett, Arneson, and Bell explain, “The ‘dialogic turn’ [in communication ethics 
scholarship] embraces [postmodernity’s] multiplicity of ‘goods,’ seeking to meet, learn 
from, and negotiate with difference.”125 This approach also acknowledges that we live in 
an era rich with diversity, where persons protect and promote a variety of substantial 
                                                 
124 Arnett, Arneson, and Bell, “Communication Ethics: The Dialogic Turn.”  
125 Ibid., 62.  
 68
goods. The paragraph below offers a summary of the dialogic approach presented by 
Arnett, Arneson, and Bell. 
Dialogic ethics—The dialogic approach recognizes that human communication 
meets ethics when a given person enacts the protection and promotion of a chosen 
communicative good or set of goods. This protective action “shapes a given 
communication ethic.”126 The dialogic understanding of communicative goods transforms 
ethics from a study focused on the question what is ethical, to one focused on exploring 
the tensions of everyday life lived amongst difference. This approach to communication 
ethics protects and promotes an ethics literacy for better learning, analyzing, and making 
sense of diverse and competing communicative goods. Additionally, this approach 
recognizes that in each communicative event, a dialogue between and among various 
goods is played out through human communication. Through attentiveness to these goods 
of self and other, communicative actors navigate their commitments alongside the needs 
of a given situation.  
 The approaches to communication ethics summarized in this section begin to 
shape a communication ethics literacy. While the above approaches offer helpful tactics 
for responding to particular challenges, no single approach to communication ethics in 
this moment can adequately address all communicative events; no approach is all 
encompassing. Amongst a diverse and mobile society where persons protect and promote 
a variety of goods, being literate in communication ethics is important, and application of 
this literacy in action is invaluable.  
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It is important to note that literacy in this project refers to a continued 
attentiveness to the metaphors that offer actors an interpretive distance for exploring, 
analyzing, and responding to communicative events. A communication ethics literacy is 
never complete; thus, one can never be literate across all time and space. Rather, being 
literate in communication ethics is akin to learning a new language. When learning a new 
language, success is based on the ability to speak and act with a new dialect in a variety 
of contexts and amongst multiple people; success depends on a continued learning and 
application of one’s newly acquired literacy. This project, therefore, acknowledges that 
being literate in communication ethics is an ongoing task. The following section 
summarizes dialogic ethics literacy outlines by Arnett, Fritz, and Bell and frames this 
literacy as an interpretive toolset for continuous data collection and analysis.  
Communication Ethics as Literacy and Interpretive Lens 
 This section outlines the dialogic approach to communication ethics and presents 
this literacy as an interpretive lens. While the dialogic approach to communication ethics 
responds to postmodernity, this project’s approach to ethics recognizes hypertextuality as 
a significant and guiding reality of our current moment. Therefore, regarding this project 
as a whole, this section grounds communication ethics literacy as attentive to 
hypertextuality, defined here as the coexistence of commitments to multiple eras. As 
such, this section will articulate the dialogic approach as attentive to postmodernity 
followed by a discussion of applying this approach as interpretive lens with 
acknowledgment of the hypertextual reality of this moment. This section is divided into 
two subsections. Subsection one, Dialogic Communication Ethics as Literacy, 
summarizes the dialogic literacy of communication ethics presented by Arnett, Arneson, 
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and Bell and extended by Arnett, Fritz, and Bell. Subsection two, Communication-ethics-
literacy-as-interpretive-lens, identifies practices for moving this literacy into action.  
Dialogic Communication Ethics as Literacy 
 Responding to changing landscape of communication ethic scholarship, Arnett, 
Arneson, and Bell present the “dialogic turn” in ethics in their 2006 article 
“Communication Ethics: The Dialogic Turn.”127 This introductory work on dialogic 
ethics transforms the study of communication ethics from the application of a singular 
communication ethic to a “postmodern reality of a multiplicity of communication 
ethics.”128 This recognition of multiple communication ethics transcends the five 
approaches (democratic, universal-humanitarian, contextual, codes, procedures, and 
standards, narrative) acknowledged by Arnett in his article, “The Status of 
Communication Ethics Scholarship.” The dialogic turn recognizes that communicative 
actors are each situated upon a given ground. As such, within every communicative event 
exists multiple communicative goods.  
 This approach to communication ethics acknowledges the work of postmodern 
writers, notably Jean-Francois Lyotard. Lyotard’s work rejects the modern assumption 
that there exists a universal understanding of ethics via Truth. Rather, we live amongst 
multiple petite narratives where truth is dependent upon the ground of the communicative 
actor.129 Communication ethics amongst postmodern petite narratives recognizes the 
existence of multiple communicative goods in each communicative event. Due to the 
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presence of multiple communicative goods, dialogic communication ethics invites 
attentiveness to difference. This attentiveness encompasses learning from others and the 
creative possibilities that emerge when one meets these differences in communication.  
Dialogic ethics also presupposes competition between persons in communication. 
This competition manifests through each persons’ commitments to multiple, competing 
communicative goods. The dialogic approach protects and promotes the necessity of 
knowing the goods that shape one’s own commitments while being open to learning 
about an other’s commitment to goods. This learning is made possible by communication 
ethics literacy, which consists of communication ethics metaphors.  
 Communication ethics metaphors provide a “fuzzy clarity” on communicative 
events.130 Metaphors provide us with a scope through which we can explore 
communicative events with an interpretive distance resistant to overshadowing the event 
with one’s own biases or predetermined findings. Metaphors acts as the literacy of this 
approach to communication ethics, providing researchers with a language for exploring 
events with decreased limitations. Communication ethics metaphors are abundant. 
However, the metaphors of historical moment, narrative, communicative goods, and 
attentiveness to multiplicity drive this project.  
 The literacy of communication ethics is presented in the 2009 book, 
Communication Ethics Literacy: Dialogue and Difference, by Arnett, Fritz, and Bell. 
This text frames the dialogic approach as tied to the enactment of communicative 
goods—those values requiring protection at all costs.131 The literacy of communication 
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ethics encompasses narrative ground, communicative goods, and learning amongst 
difference. While these terms have been used in a preliminary fashion throughout this 
project thus far, the following paragraphs offer an extended summary of these key terms.  
 Historical moment—Historical moments are defined by the emerging questions 
that shape a given period of time. “How once responds to these questions their identity.132 
Alasdair MacIntyre discusses the importance of historical moments in his text A Short 
History of Ethics.133 Throughout his text, MacIntyre shows that meaning and ethics are 
not universal but rather always tied to a given time and locale. Attentiveness to historical 
moments reminds us that we cannot examine communicative events apart from the 
communicative context in which they exist. One’s embeddedness in a given historical 
moment is a significant factor in shaping communicative action. Historical moments are 
responsive to the past, present, and future demands that call on communicative actors to 
respond.  
Narrative—Narratives are the stories, persons, and goods that provide meaning to 
our communicative practices. Narratives are situated by publicly agreed upon stories that 
tell us why goods are important, giving meaning to the practices that protect and promote 
a set of communicative goods.134 Narratives act as human ground offering a meaningful 
“center” or dwelling place that guides human action. Narratives also shape the way we 
view the world, and act as embedded monologue to one’s belief, worldviews, and 
identity. Narratives situate persons within given communities with particular histories or 
monologues. Recognition of this monologue is the first step in understanding an other as 
                                                 
132 Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, Communication Ethics Literacy, 
133 See Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics (IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998).  
134 Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, Communication Ethics Literacy, 
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“embedded communicative agent” who thinks, acts, and communicates based upon a 
particular view of the world.   
Narratives provide a frame for making meaning in our lives. They also shape our 
worldview. When one understands that narratives shape our own view of the world, it 
becomes clear that we explore the actions of others from a specific standpoint. Clarity on 
the stories that shape our narrative as well as the background motivators that shape the 
narratives of others, allows one to witness the multiple communicative goods present in 
each communicative event.  
 Communicative goods—The dialogic approach to communication ethics is 
characterized by the protection and promotion of communicative goods.135 
Communicative goods are those values protected and promoted by given persons at all 
costs. These goods shape the decision-making of groups as they act as a rhetorical guide 
for communication practices. Communicative goods have two components. The first 
component is the substantive good to be protected and promoted. The second component 
is the communicative practices enacted to protect and promote the substantial good.136. 
The communicative practices characterize communication ethics as pragmatic and 
responsive; communicative practices are embodied and performed in a given moment in 
response to a given situation.  
 Understanding which goods groups protect and promote and how these groups 
protect and promote provides insight into the motivations and commitments that define 
what matters to given persons. Identity is shaped by how persons or groups respond to the 
needs before them, this response is often guided by one’s commitment to a particular set 
                                                 
135 Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, Communication Ethics Literacy, p. 3.  
136 Ibid., 3. 
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of communicative goods.137 As a key term in the literacy of dialogic communication 
ethics, this articulation of communicative goods allows researchers to move the focus of 
attention beyond personal interpretations of given actions toward the understanding of 
motivated decision-making. The recognition of communicative goods provides us with a 
textured entrance into the values, commitments, and practices of given groups.   
 Multiplicity and Difference—The dialogic approach to communication ethics 
recognizes difference between and among persons as ever-present. Attentive to 
postmodernity as an era defined by multiple petite narratives, the dialogic approach 
understands that “a single communication ethic . . . no longer exists.”138 Rather, 
differences and disagreements center upon what one defines as requiring protection and 
promotion. The meeting of multiple and, at times, competing goods between persons 
requires that communicators negotiate difference.  
 The dialogic approach to communication ethics is ever attentive to the richness 
and multiplicity of difference in a postmodern moment and moves away from prescribing 
or describing what is ethical, explicating the importance of learning how different 
persons or groups define what is important and what requires protection and promotion. 
Communication ethics as literacy is a practical and important tool for navigating conflict 
is a moment rich with diversity.  
 Communication ethics literacy invites persons to identify, acknowledge, and learn 
about the goods that shape their own and others’ actions. Being attentive to the 
communicative goods, narrative ground, and difference between communicators opens 
new avenues for analysis. The following subsection presents the core of this project—
                                                 
137 Arnett The Fulcrum Point of Dialogue: Monologue, Worldview, and Acknowledgement,” 105. 
138 Arnett, Arneson, Bell, “Communication Ethics: The Dialogic Turn.” 
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how a communication ethics literacy can be used pragmatically as an interpret lens for 
data collection and analysis.  
Communication-ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens 
 The following paragraphs address the primary aim of this project—articulating 
the dialogic literacy of communication ethics as an interpretive lens for data collection 
and analysis. When used as a tool for data analysis, the literacy of communication ethics 
provides us with an intellectual distance for exploring and navigating difference. This 
distance allots creative insight into conflicts that are stalled or overwhelming. As an 
interpretive lens, communication ethics literacy recognizes human action and decision-
making as situated within a given narrative and reflective of the commitments protected 
and promoted by a unique and specific view of the world.139 My presentation of 
communication ethics as an interpretive lens is made in reflection of the work of Hans 
Georg Gadamer who discussed interpretation as philosophical hermeneutics and the work 
of Arnett who bridged Gadamer’s sentiments with this approach to communication 
ethics.140 Additionally, communication-ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens acknowledges 
the hypertextual nature of our current moment defined by Umberto Eco and integrated 
into communication ethic scholarship by Arnett.141  
 For the importance of communication ethics literacy, Gadamer’s work shapes an 
approach to philosophical hermeneutics that embeds interpreters within a given historical 
moment. Philosophical hermeneutics works with the assumption that texts, understood 
                                                 
139 See Ronald C. Arnett, Leeanne Bell McManus, and Amanda G. McKendree, Conflict Between Persons: 
The Origins of Leadership (Dubuque, IA: Kendall Hunt Publishing Company, 2014). 
140 See Ronald C. Arnett, “Interpretive Inquiry as Qualitative Communication Research,” Qualitative 
Research Reports in Communication 8, no. 1 (2007): 29—35. 
141 See Ronald C. Arnett, “Communicative Ethics: The Phenomenological Sense of Semioethics,” 
Language and Dialogue 7, no. 1 (2017): 81. 
 76
here as communicative events, bring life and new meaning to given contexts. This 
approach to interpretation is attentive to this acknowledging that findings are not final 
answers, but findings for a given time and place. Arnett discusses the influence of 
Gadamer on communication ethics as resting on the understanding of meaning as situated 
within a horizon of authenticity. Meaning is made in the communicative events that shape 
a life.142 To interpret communicative events, it is necessary to understand the 
communicative context in which a person is situated. Meaning does not take shape in a 
vacuum. Rather, attentiveness to the persons, goods, and motives that shape a given 
artifact and event are of utmost importance. An interpreter always walks a thin line 
between making sense of a given artifact and imposing undue significance onto an event. 
Successful interpretation walks along a horizon of authenticity. Dialogic communication 
ethics works along this horizon. The following paragraphs briefly overview Gadamer’s 
work to display the significant of this sentiment for this project. 
 Gadamer’s Wahrheid und Methode (Truth and Method), published in 1960, is 
guided by the following question: how can hermeneutics do justice to understanding once 
it is freed from the scientific understanding of ontology? For Gadamer, understanding is 
not a grasping of objects themselves, but a grasping of objects through their history.143 
Gadamer suggested that hermeneutics, the study of interpretation, had historically been 
understood as a scientific inquiry or approach to understanding a text. In Truth and 
                                                 
142 In his 1969 text, Hermeneutics, Richard Palmer explains Gadamer’s significance for hermeneutics. 
Palmer explains that Schleiermacher brought hermeneutics out of biblical interpretations, and Wilhelm 
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space between a reader and a text. With his work, Gadamer established philosophical hermeneutics, 
moving away from a prescriptive hermeneutic method and away from authorial intent and toward meaning 
discovery and making. See Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, 
Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1969).  
143 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York, NY: Bloomsbury, 1975).  
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Method, he asks, whether there is a method to understanding. Responding to the work of 
Martin Heidegger, Gadamer acknowledges the importance of acknowledging one’s biases 
as one approaches a given text.  
 Gadamer finds that understanding with and through biases is not an objective task 
and that these biases do not disappear. Rather, the process of identifying biases allows 
one to locate the origin of these foreprojections in a way that increases understanding of 
one’s own point of reflection.144 The task of the reader, he writes, is to examine their own 
literacy as they work to understand the intent of the original author.145 An interpreter, 
thus, does justice to a communicative event by questioning rather than finding; 
interpretation begins with an openness to learn.  
 Openness to learning with, from, and alongside a communicative event begins 
with an acknowledgement of one’s own biases and commitment to discovering the 
communicative context surrounding an event. One gains interpretive authority as one 
engages events with insights grounded in reflection and recognition of the 
communicative context. This authority of understanding never seeks to control or own a 
communicative event. Rather, it secures a ground off of which genuine understanding or 
interpretation can push. When we approach an event with an openness to learn, we shift 
our focus of attention away from finding answers toward opening opportunities for new 
and creative insight. Where answers limit, successful interpretation pushes boundaries. 
 The importance of Gadamer’s work for this project’s presentation of 
communication ethics as an interpretive lens rests on this idea of the fusion of horizons. 
An interpreter is always already interpreting based upon the ground upon which they 
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stand. Without recognizing the biases of this context, interpretations can be made in vain, 
without adequate care for the communicative person, event, or artifact. Dialogic 
communication ethics recognizes this horizon as the communicative context or historical 
moment that shapes the questions that guide lives. This context shapes the background 
sentiments that come to play in foreground communicative action. The following 
paragraphs shape this interpretive lens in reflection of Gadamer’s work. 
 Bringing the study of communication ethics to current and ongoing 
communicative events illuminates the nature of conflicts in a moment both rich with 
diversity and riddled with disagreements. Arnett argues that postmodernity, characterized 
by hypertextuality146—the existence of multiple historical moments and their 
corresponding communicative goods in any one moment—necessitates the study of 
communication ethics in conflict because it “unmasks” the multiple biased grounds 
present in a given conflict.147 When conflict is viewed through communication ethics 
attentive to hypertextuality, the focus of attention moves past the conventional 
understandings of a conflict, exploring the multiple perspectives energizing and 
responding to this conflict. 
The literacy of communication ethics, when brought to conflicts of this nature, 
provides a framework for interpretation.148 As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
evolution of terrorism results in difficult and demanding counterterrorism issues. 
Attentiveness to the literacy of communication ethics amongst conflict acknowledges the 
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Donsbach (Wiley-Blackwell, 2015): 533. 
148 Hannah Karolak and Susan Mancino, “The 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum: Conflict Attentive 
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communicative gestalt interplay between background sentiments comprised of the 
narratives, communicative goods, and communicative practices of communicative actors  
and foreground competition between and among communicative goods.149 While 
foreground struggles may be transparent; research, investigating, and learning is required 
to uncover the competing background communication ethics motivating the foreground 
disagreements. This background data analysis is aided in creative and beneficial ways 
when the literacy of communication ethics is applied.  
 The recognition of conflict as a gestalt allows us to move dialogic communication 
ethics literacy into an interpretive lens. Communication ethics attentive to a gestalt 
understanding of conflict recognizes that in order to understand conflict, we must move 
our focus of attention beyond the immediate state of conflict in the foreground in an 
attempt to identify and learn about the driving commitments in the background. These 
background commitments, shaped by particular narratives and the protection of a set of 
communicative goods, are uncovered when researchers take seriously the communicative 
commitments of their subjects. For counterterrorism experts, this means data analysts 
must acknowledge the commitments of terrorists as valid for communicative action—a 
task not easily accepted. As an interpretive lens, the literacy of dialogic communication 
ethics is performed as persons are attentive and open to learning from competing 
communicative goods. The enactment of this literacy is outlined below: 
 Attentiveness to narrative ground: The agreed upon stories that make up the 
narratives guide one’s communicative action. These stories are often complex and 
                                                 
149 Arnett, McManus, and McKendree, Conflict Between Persons: The Origins of Leadership, 2014. The 
authors detail the relationship between communication ethics and conflict using the metaphor of 
“communicative gestalt.” As a communicative gestalt, conflict is presented as a foreground issue driven by 
competing background communicative goods. 
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span great distances in time and across places. One’s narrative commitments exist 
in the background, and, when left uncovered, foreground communicative action 
may be deemed irrational or unexpected. Uncovering the narrative grounds upon 
which decision-making finds its meaning aids researchers in better understanding 
and predicting current and future communicative action. This uncovering begins 
with background research addressing the communities, family, public and private 
affiliations to which a person attends. Further, it is important to remember that in 
this postmodern moment characterized by hypertextuality, people have multiple 
narrative grounds. Being attentive to this multitude of grounds is necessary. 
Attending to multiple narrative grounds opens new research possibilities. For 
instance, research may uncover that a given person is highly committed to a given 
religious affiliation. However, if research is only focused only on this narrative, 
researchers may fail to uncover the importance of other commitments in 
predicting communicative action. Navigating the multiple grounds and 
commitments of research subjects textures insights in a way that opens new 
avenues for discovery. 
 Attentiveness to communicative goods: Arnett, Fritz, and Bell argue that narrative 
ground serves as a “voice or articulateness to a good or set of goods.”150 By 
attending to one’s narrative commitments, one can uncover the goods protected 
and promoted through communicative practices. Yet, it is important to recognize 
that researchers work form their own narrative grounds. Thus, biases and 
assumptions regarding others’ goods may be overlooked. Analysis cannot end 
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with the identification of the goods guiding one’s action. Rather, researches must 
continuously explore and learn about these goods beyond their own 
interpretations. While two persons may protect and promote the same good, the 
commutative practices they embody to do so will differ.  
 Attentiveness to multiplicity and difference: Hypertextuality, the co-presence of 
goods emerging from historical moments, reminds us that goods transform over 
time.151 One’s interpretation and commitment to a given communicative good is 
negotiated and renegotiated over time. Thus, researchers must remain committed 
to uncovering the background sentiments that guide action as this background will 
transform in time. Being attentive to these changing goods requires ongoing 
alertness to the dynamics of a given situation and ongoing openness to learning. 
Attentiveness to the metaphors of narrative, goods, and multiplicity shape an interpretive 
lens that afford professionals a guide for engaging research. This literacy as interpretive 
lens reminds researchers to reflect continuously on the complex and changing aspects of 
communicative events so as to avoid missing gaps in research. 
Communication Ethics Lens: Application 
Communication ethics in this project finds value in exploring significant, ongoing 
issues with recognition that this area of study provides a practical framework for 
exploring and engaging difference. The theoretical heart of this approach to 
communication ethics moves the focus of attention beyond “reductive and abstract 
engagement to experience of the subject matter before us.”152 The final section offers 
                                                 
151 Umberto Eco, “Books, Texts, and Hypertexts,” The Power of Words: Literature and Society in Late 
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152 Ronald C. Arnett, “Philosophy of Communication: Qualitative Research, Questions in Action,” 
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three practices for applying this interpretive lens to counterterrorism efforts of the FBI. 
Applying the literacy of communication ethics is not a new task. This application works 
in reflection of communication ethics applications that have come before it. These 
scholarly applications provide direction and legitimacy to this project as a whole. I 
outline a selection of these applications briefly below. 
 Ronald C. Arnett, Janie Harden Fritz, and Leeanne Bell use communication ethics 
literacy to understand Victor Hugo’s Les Misérables. Arnett, Fritz, and Bell 
explore the novel through the viewpoint of competing ethical goods. They find 
that “Les Misérables is an ongoing interplay of goods that shaped and transformed 
lives in a particular historical moment.”153 Applying the metaphor of goods in a 
moment of conflicting ethical goods shows that the protection and promotion of 
goods shapes one’s ethical life.  
 Ronald C. Arnett interprets the work of Hannah Arendt with communication 
ethics in Communication Ethics in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt’s Rhetoric of 
Warning and Hope.154 Using Arendt’s historical moment of modernity as a 
starting point, Arnett finds that Arendt’s scholarship poses a communication 
ethics response that resists modernity’s attempts to overrun reality with imposed 
obligations and solutions.  
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Hope (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2013).  
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 Arnett, McManus, and McKendree use communication ethics literacy to explore 
The Odyssey.155 These authors apply communication ethics metaphors to reflect 
on the multiple conflicts presented in Homer’s classical work. 
Like these works that have come before, this project attempts to apply communication 
ethics literacy to communicative events. Where this work differs is in the prospects of 
applying this literacy in real-time as to open new avenues for research and foreshadow 
events to come.   
Real-time application of communication ethics begins with recognition of one’s 
own and Other’s narrative ground, communicative goods, and openness to learning. This 
attentiveness expands avenues for exploring current research and future possibilities. As a 
key artifact in counterterrorism, the FBI provides an exemplar of how the literacy of 
communication ethics can be applied to offer creative openings for new avenues of 
practice. The following paragraph outlines this application. 
Metaphors provide a level of clarity into a given situation that shapes a possibility 
for opening new avenues for counterterrorism research and development. Attentiveness 
to the metaphors that guide this project—narrative, communicative goods, and 
multiplicity—begins with situating the communicative context of events within their 
historical moment. Application of communication-ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens for 
this project, therefore, begins by framing the current communicative context of 
counterterrorism. With knowledge of the communicative context, one can address the 
challenges of terrorism with tools and practices that are grounded in current context, 
capabilities, and limitations. From there, researchers can locate with better clarity specific 
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areas in FBI counterterrorism practices that can benefit from a communication ethics 
lens. Using the communicative context of counterterrorism situated within our current 
historical moment as a guide, this communication ethics lens offers connections between 
communication ethics metaphors and counterterrorism. Attentiveness to narrative as the 
ground which hosts the stories, persons, and goods that shape meaning and decision-
making in everyday life thus becomes a pragmatic tool for counterterrorism research and 
development. Finally, with clarity on embedded communicative actors and the narrative 
grounds shaping motives, good, and practices, this communication ethics lens can offer a 
set of practical practices that both acknowledges the limits of our hypertextual moment 
and embeds creative insights into the intelligence process.  
This project understands terrorism as a communicative gestalt fueled by diverse 
background sentiments. While application of communication ethics literacy happens in 
current time, researchers must remain attentive to the background knowledge and 
experience that have fostered new insights in counterterrorism. Therefore, this project’s 
application begins by examining the current failures, challenges, and opportunities of FBI 
counterterrorism. The application continues by addressing the recommended practices for 
continued improvement and growth of the organization. The application ends by 
identifying current and suspected future challenges the organization will face and 
detecting research tools for better data collection and analysis.  
 This work’s applications of communication ethics literacy spans the final two 
chapters of this project. The final two chapters of this work will address this 
communication ethics literacy as lens application. This interpretive lens acknowledges 
the existence of multiple and competing goods in each communicative event and takes 
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seriously the multiplicity of background commitments that drive human action. In 
summary, this lens allows us to recognize the value of communication ethics as tied to 
being literate. This approach to communication ethics is not tied to a theory; rather, the 
interpretive lens offers a pragmatic examination of communicative practices. The 
dialogic approach to communication ethics establishes this literature, and performing this 
literacy provides us with an interpretive lens for data collection and analysis. The 
following chapter will explore this lens in reflection of the current issues facing the FBI. 
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Chapter 4: Communicative Context: Counterterrorism in this Historical Moment 
 In order to apply communication ethics literacy, we must first situate the 
communicative context of counterterrorism. This chapter frames the communicative 
context of counterterrorism in this historical moment. This chapter also begins to frame 
the application portion of this project by establishing specific areas in FBI 
counterterrorism practices that can benefit from a communication ethics lens. The 
purpose of this chapter is to offer the FBI as a key artifact in the battle against terrorism 
in this moment. As discussed thus far, communication ethics literacy assists researchers 
by providing an interpretive lens through which they can better identify the 
commitments, motivators, and aims of communicative actor—all of which are shaped by 
a given historical moment. With communication ethics literacy, we can enrich findings 
for future improvements and explore current issues with an intellectual distance capable 
of uncovering new findings. Recognizing the FBI as a key artifact in counterterrorism, 
this chapter becomes an exemplar of how the literacy of communication ethics can 
sustain creative opportunities for new avenues of practice. With this communicative 
context, the final application chapter will interpret these findings using communication 
ethics metaphors. 
Introduction 
 This work argues that communication ethics literacy as an interpretive lens offers 
pragmatic insights for security professionals charged with detecting and responding to 
terror attacks. Communication ethics provides us with the tools to interpret the diverse 
and competing goods that exist in our society; these tools are the communication ethics 
metaphors that, when applied to current and ongoing events, offer an interpretive distance 
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for research and development. These tools offer practical assistance in addressing the 
recommendations for improving FBI counterterrorism made in response and reflection on 
9/11. When applied to past events, communication ethics offers researchers a tool for 
widening past research on security policy and finding new areas for inquiry.  
Communication ethics literacy acknowledges one’s embeddedness in a given 
historical moment as a significant factor in shaping communicative action. Historical 
moments are responsive to the past, present, and future demands that call on 
communicative actors to respond. Our current historical moment situates the 
communicative context of counterterrorism as one void of simplicity. Additionally, our 
current historical moment is one characterized by the existence of multiple and 
competing communicative goods. “Each communicator protects and promoted a given 
good through communicative action.”156 This communicative action is shaped in 
response to the particular historical moment, which, in this approach to communication 
ethics, is understood as the major questions that shape our given time. To identify the 
practical and significant contributions that communication ethics makes to 
counterterrorism and the FBI, we must first understand the emerging questions and 
demands that shape our historical moment and the communicative context of 
counterterrorism.   
 This chapter elucidates the communicative context of counterterrorism in this 
historical moment. To do so, it presents past, present, and future counterterrorism FBI 
challenges. Three sections guide this first application chapter. Section one, 
“Communicative Context: Understanding Past Challenges,” articulates the identified 
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failures of the FBI security practices and overviews the Bureau’s organizational response, 
identifying the major questions that continue to shape counterterrorism. Section two, 
“Communicative Context: Exploring Current Challenges,” identifies and reviews current 
demanding challenges facing the FBI, identifying the questions that shape contemporary 
counterterrorism challenges. Section three, “Communicative Context: Exploring Future 
Challenges,” overviews the proposed future security challenges the FBI will face, 
identifying the questions that will shape counterterrorism efforts in the near future. 
Within each section, the major questions, challenges, or demands regarding 
counterterrorism are identified. These questions, challenges, and demands emerge from, 
and help researchers to identify, the current historical moments. 
 Apart from the Commission Report, this chapter leverages for-public releases by 
the FBI, unclassified FBI documents, and speeches by FBI leaders, often times using 
direct quotations from these sources. This primary literature provides an intimate look 
into the FBI as an organization growing, adapting, and responding to the needs a given 
moment. In addition, other scholarly sources are used to texture and provide clarity to 
FBI statements.  
 As an interpretive lens, communication ethics literacy finds value in providing an 
interpretive distance that allots better clarity on communicative events of the past, 
present, and future. When the pragmatic value of applying communication ethics to 
counterterrorism challenges is acknowledged, tools for incorporating this interpretive lens 
into future analytics can be developed. In order to apply communication ethics literacy, 
we must first establish the major questions that shape our current moment and demand a 
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counterterrorism response. The following section provides an expanded overview of past 
FBI challenges and failures. 
Communicative Context: Understanding Past Challenges 
This section expands on the FBI failures prior to 9/11 and explores the systemic 
changes implemented by the FBI in the wake of these findings in order to initiate 
application of communication ethics literacy. Interpreting past conclusions using 
communication ethics metaphors offers a new way to explore findings. These 
interpretations cast light on data, opening new avenues for engagement. Communication 
ethics allows us to think differently, think beyond what has already been found. With this 
insight, security professionals can continue to enrich data.  
 The failures identified by the Commission Report offer a starting point for 
addressing past, current, and future FBI challenges. The Commission Report identified 
failures of imagination, policy, capabilities, and management regarding counterterrorism, 
the FBI, and the September 11 attacks. The following paragraphs offer an extended read 
of these failures in order to frame the FBI responses to these failures.  
Responding to Old Failures and New Directives 
 Today’s FBI is the result of structural changes implemented in response to the 
9/11 attacks and in the wake of evolving terrorism threats to the U.S. After 9/11 and the 
Commission Report, U.S. leadership implemented structural changes to reorganize U.S. 
national security agencies. For the FBI, this meant large scale, centralized changes. The 
directives, goals, organization of offices, and training initiatives were overhauled in 
response to the failures identified by the Commission Report. These sweeping changes 
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“challenged both the design and identity of the FBI in fundamental ways.”157 Arguably, 
the most significant change regarding the FBI after 9/11 was the shift in mission from 
solving domestic crimes after they occurred to the prevention of future terror attacks 
before they occurred.158 Operationally, this change foreshadowed a need for 
counterintelligence personnel and resources. Changes in the objective of the FBI required 
changes in the organizational structure. The top-down implementation of change invites 
questions regarding how the Bureau adapted to this overhaul while also adapting to new 
identified goals. For the Bureau, failures noted in the Commission Report’s offered a 
starting point for designing these changes.  
 As noted previously in this project, the Commission Report identified the 
following failures regarding the FBI: imagination, policy, capabilities, and 
management.159 The organizational response to these failures shape the Bureau as it is 
today. Exploring these failures in light of the structural changes within the FBI opens 
ways for thinking about the value of applying communication ethics literacy. The 
following paragraphs review these identified failures offering additional insights and 
greater clarity concerning past FBI failures.  
 Imagination—Regarding imagination, the Commission recommended the 
following practices: (1) brainstorm about how attacks may be carried out; (2) identify 
telltale indications that a surprise attack is being planned; (3) collect intelligence on the 
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indicators when possible; and (4) integrate defense mechanisms to stop or alert to the 
most deadly attacks.160 Significantly, the Commission noted that, looking back upon the 
events of 9/11, telltale signs that an imminent terror attack using planes as weapons were 
visible but overlooked by security professionals. The question remained as to how and 
why these signs were overlooked. Per the Commission’s findings, security professionals 
failed to recognize the magnitude of opportunity terrorists had in terms of resources. 
Additionally, security professionals limited their research to more current, pressing issues 
and failed to understand the reality of a large-scale attack; security professionals could 
not imagine the possibility of another Pearl Harbor like surprise attack on U.S. soil. The 
focus on current issues at the sacrifice of future planning allowed these professionals to 
overlook the signs that a plan of this nature was underway. Responding to the failure of 
imagination, the Commission offered a list of specific practices that resulted in what they 
term the failure to institutionalize imagination. 
 Per the commission, “institutionalizing imagination” begins with addressing the 
following past failures: 
1. Security professionals failed to explore opportunities from the enemy’s 
perspective. This type of red team analysis—a strategy of playing devil’s 
advocate and exploring the opposition’s strategies for decision making—could 
have increased awareness regarding the capabilities of large-scale suicide 
attacks.161 
2. Security professionals failed to develop telltale signs regarding terror attacks. 
While this list of telltale signs is difficult to develop if awareness concerning 
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capabilities is nonexistent, this tactic finds value in taking the perspective of the 
enemy. With greater care concerning the objectives, goals, and practices of the 
enemy, security professionals could identify tactics that are out of line with the 
normal practices of these groups. Such identification could trigger a warning and 
thus instigate further analysis.162  
3. Leadership failed to communicate expectations regarding the above mention 
telltale signs. Without this set of expectations, the “potential significance” of such 
signs were overlooked.163 Personnel were unable to connect the dots between and 
among signs of an impending attack. 
4. Security professionals failed to institute broad security practices for future threats. 
There existed security practices for current and credible threats, but practices 
regarding unplanned for, future threats were not institutionalized.  
These identified failures speak to the need to institutionalize imagination. As a whole, 
they also encompass the failures of policy, capabilities, and management discussed 
below. 
Policy—Regarding policy, the Commission recommended that research regarding 
possible threats be coordinated among all security organizations and be carried out 
thoroughly. Each security organization within the U.S. has limits to what they can 
achieve in terms of intelligence gathering and preparation for attacks. The ability to move 
quickly on threats in a coordinated fashion was limited prior to 9/11. Specifically, 
arguing for the spending of resources against a threat that was not yet validated proved 
difficult.  
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Prior to 9/11, the FBI’s focus centered on domestic crimes. This area of law 
enforcement worked apart from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who were 
primarily charged with counterterrorism intelligence. Directives were identified and 
coordinated within each local field office, and broad-based directives delivered from 
headquarters were limited. Without a formal policy concerning communication, goals, 
and collaboration, opportunities for research closed. Thinking beyond the local level of 
threats, resources, and security needs created silos of security personnel who either could 
not see value in collaboration, or who were not offered areas where collaboration could 
effectively take place between office and organizations.  
Capabilities—Regarding capabilities, the Commission noted that the FBI failed to 
link intelligence and agent knowledge to national threats,164 and the lack of 
communication and sharing of intelligence between agencies resulted in security gaps 
and intelligence overlaps. Per the commission, boundaries between security organizations 
limited the free sharing of intelligence. Without the sharing of intelligence, professionals 
who argued for an increased focus on terrorism found it difficult to plead their case as 
other professionals were not aware of these threats. Additionally, communication 
amongst FBI offices was limited. Therefore, a coordinated effort at identifying security 
threats and implementing training efforts did not exist. Organizational boundaries and 
limited access to intelligence sharing created gaps in acknowledging terrorism as a direct 
threat to the U.S.  
Prior to 9/11, there were limited spaces for intelligence experts within the FBI. 
Those who worked in intelligence were placed at FBI headquarters. Field offices did not 
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have intelligence analysts and instead were housed by special agents. Without 
intelligence training, special agents were unable to link data to national threats, missing 
key opportunities to discover implications of an impending terror threat.  
Management—The Commission found that managerial coordination and 
communication regarding the goal of counterterrorism failed. The Commission Report 
contextualizes this failure thusly:  
However the specific problems are labeled, we believe they are symptoms of the 
 government’s broader inability to adapt how it manages problems to the new 
 challenge of the twenty-first century. The agencies are like a set of specialists in 
 the hospital, each ordering tests, looking for symptoms and prescribing 
 medications. What is missing is the attending physician who makes sure they 
 work as a team.165 
There was no central command to communicate the roles and security needs to various 
organizations. For the FBI specifically, field offices fell victim to varying goals and 
objectives. Resource allocation to counterterrorism intelligence was limited. Across the 
board of security organizations, goals differed as well.  
 Taken together, these failures highlight the inability to explore the possibilities of 
new threats and work in a coordinated manner to address threats. Responses to these 
failures urged security professionals to reimagine both why and how persons terrorize. 
Additionally, they urged professionals to challenge their assumptions regarding 
background influences on terrorism and work across organizational lines to address 
emerging threats. Upon identifying threats, the Commission urged organizations to 
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coordinate resources to address future violence. “Insight for the future is thus not easy to 
apply in practice. It is hardest to mount a major effort while a problem still seems 
minor.”166 Success in mobilizing policy rests on finding opportunities to engage common 
goals amongst multiple organizations. 
In response to these threats, the FBI implemented structural changes to their 
organization, leadership, and training. These changes attempted to address the failures of 
imagination, capabilities, policy, and management while staying prepared and ready to 
meet the demands of emerging threats. The following subsection provides an overview 
these structural changes.  
Organizational Responses to Commission Identified Failures 
 The FBI responded to recommendations made within the Commission Report by 
aligning their organizational goals around the development of five branches—National 
Security, Criminal Investigations, Science and Technology, the Office of the Chief 
Information Officer, and Human Sources. Within the National Security branch were the 
Counterterrorism Division, Counter Intelligence Division, Directorate of Intelligence, and 
the Directorate of Weapons of Mass Destruction. These structural changes aligned with 
large-scale changes to national security as a whole. Additionally, this new structure 
decentered criminal investigation as a primary goal allowing space for intelligence and 
counterterrorism initiatives.  
 To grasp how vast the structural changes were within the FBI, it is necessary to 
reflect on how the FBI was organized prior to 9/11. Colleagues at the Harvard Business 
School, Ranjay Gulati, Jan Rivkin, and Ryan Raffaeili explore the changes in the FBI 
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between 2001 and 2016. The authors write that between the founding of the Bureau in 
1908 and the September 11, 2001 attacks, the FBI built its organization around the goal 
of law enforcement. FBI offices were situated locally amongst 56 major cities within the 
U.S., where most domestic crime occurred. FBI Headquarters provided “light-handed, 
advisory coordination,” and field office leadership led their local office according to the 
geographic demands where they were located. Coordination against large-scale crimes 
was led by the “office of origin,” or the field office that first began researching the case. 
In 2001, the FBI assigned nearly 76% of agents to criminal cases, 21% of agents to 
intelligence, and approximately 2% of agents to counterterrorism.167 Gulati, Rivkin, and 
Ruffaeli find that until 2001, the FBI’s primary objective amongst security organizations 
in the U.S. was to enforce domestic laws after a crime had occurred. This objective was 
drastically reformatted following the 9/11 attacks.  
 The Director of the FBI at the time of the attacks, Robert Mueller, describes the 
structural changes to FBI organization as divided into three phases, which are overviewed 
below.  
 Phase one, triage, involved direct responses to the attacks. During this phase, 
national security objectives were separated from criminal law enforcement and 
direction was centralized at the FBI Headquarters. The “office of origin” directive 
was diminished. Additionally, FBI personnel developed relationships with local 
police forces to coordinate intelligence sharing and plan attack responses (during 
this time, FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces increased from 35 to 66).168  
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 Phase two, search, described the founding and development of intelligence. 
Cleared of the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Mueller focused on 
building a program for intelligence capable of ensuring national security. During 
this time, Mueller created the Director of Intelligence position to develop a 
pathway for FBI offices to analyze threats, identify gaps in research, and allocate 
resources to the greatest threat. To aid intelligence, analysts were placed at each 
FBI Field Office.169  
 Phase three, crystallization, described the implementation of intelligence as a key 
focus of FBI work. During this period, intelligence and national security practices 
were aligned with criminal investigation to create a unified approach to FBI goals.  
Together, the implementation of these structural changes characterize the organization of 
the FBI as it stands today.  
 Currently, the FBI has field offices in 56 cities throughout the U.S., 355 satellite 
offices, a headquarters in Virginia including the FBI Academy, the FBI Engineering 
Research Facility, and the FBI Laboratory, a fingerprint identification complex in West 
Virginia, and the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC) in Alabama.170 
The FBI also has 63 Legal Attaché (LEGAT) offices and 27 sub-offices in 75 countries 
around the world. LEGAT offices are temporary dispatches that respond to global threats. 
At the core of these offices is the FBI Headquarters, which provides centralized 
operations, policy, and administrative support. Whereas prior to the 9/11 attacks, the FBI 
was focused on domestic crime with little resources dedicated to terrorism, this 
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organization situates the FBI as a primary resource in preventing and responding to 
terrorism.  
 Additionally, FBI resource allocation is now divided among four units—
Intelligence, Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence, Criminal Enterprises and Federal 
Crimes, and Criminal Justice Services. Resources are allocated to these units based upon 
the FBI’s core mission, workload, and necessary administrative support. Apart from these 
units, the FBI allocates resources to support current and emerging threats to the U.S. and 
its interests. These allocations are at the discretion of the Director, who identifies and 
prioritizes threats.  
 The reorganization of the FBI to address the failures identified by the 
Commission accomplished three objectives. First, the FBI created processes for 
establishing accountability regarding intelligence. No longer did the sole focus of the 
Bureau rest on law enforcement. Intelligence became a primary directive of the Bureau. 
Second, the FBI aligned national security objectives with the organizational goals of the 
Bureau. FBI Headquarters centralized the direction for these goals and communicated the 
primary goals and threats to each field office. Third, FBI leadership developed 
communication pathways between field offices and local law enforcement to understand 
the local threat and coordinate plans for future large-scale attacks. This sharing of 
resources opened a line of communication to align national goals with local concerns. 
Still, even with excellent analytics, coordinated communicative practices, and an endless 
supply of resources, the FBI cannot predict all violence and terror attacks. The current 
and ongoing threat of terrorism continues to evolve, transforming national security 
challenges and directions. As these threats evolve, past failures and areas for inquiry 
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resurface as significant questions needing continued reflection. The following paragraphs 
identify the questions that continue to shape counterterrorism responses in our current 
moment. These questions are as follows:  
1. How can imagination be an ongoing and necessary component of terrorism 
prevention in order to preempt future capabilities, policy, and management 
failures? 
2. How can the FBI adapt with future organizational responses and structural 
changes as new threats emerge and current threats evolve?  
These questions characterize the past concerns that continue to shape the current 
communicative context of counterterrorism. This application as a whole will continue to 
reflect upon these questions. 
This section overviewed the failures of the FBI prior to 9/11 and discussed the 
structural changes put into place by FBI leadership to address these failures. Exploring 
these past failures has allowed the questions that continue to shape the communicative 
context of counterterrorism in this moment to emerge. While time has allowed reflection 
and structural changes to take place, the FBI continues to respond to past challenges and 
the call to attend to the identified questions remains. In response, the identified two 
questions will shape the application of communication ethics literacy in the pages to 
come. Following suit, the next section explores current threats identified by FBI 
leadership as demanding of our attention and resources.  
Communication Ethics Context: Exploring Current Challenges 
 Section one overviewed past security failures and their subsequent FBI responses 
in order to identify the emerging questions that continue to shape this moment’s 
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communicative context of counterterrorism. This section explores current terrorism 
challenges identified by FBI leadership as today’s most demanding issues. This section 
identifies the current and ongoing challenges that demand a response in this historical 
moment. The following list outlines the topics to be discussed in this section:  
1. Alongside changes in technology, the use of social media by terror organizations 
to increase followers and promote violence is steadily increasing. These 
innovations in science and technology offer terrorist groups expanded 
opportunities for planning attacks and recruiting new followers.171  
2. Alongside the increased use of social media by terror groups, the FBI noted an 
increase in lone wolf attacks. Specifically, the increase in lone wolf attacks has 
corresponded with the decrease of centralized terror networks.172 
These current challenges, which have come to shape FBI counterterrorism practices in 
the most recent years leading up to 2018, give rise to the current questions demanding 
FBI attention.  
In his 2017 remarks for the Global Coalition Working to Defeat ISIS, U.S. Secretary 
of State Rex Tillerson noted “A ‘digital caliphate’ should not flourish in place of a 
physical one” as “the internet is ISIS’s best weapon for turning a recruit into a self-
radicalized attacker.”173 As travel to ISIS locations such as Iraq and Syria have become 
increasingly difficult, ISIS messages via social media have called for followers to both 
create local networks and carry out attacks in their home states. Tillerson’s remarks 
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reflect on the unique challenges facing counterterrorism professionals today. These 
challenges are rooted in the increasing use of the internet by terror groups. The 
paragraphs below overview the emergence of these threats. 
Terrorism and the Use of Social Media 
 Communicating in spite of temporal and spatial barriers is crucial to the success 
of terror organizations.174 Terrorists’ use of technology and media evolves along with 
technological advancements. “Unless a terrorist group is ideologically opposed to 
technology itself, it will generally use every available tool to do its work.”175 The 
progression to the use of social media begins in the 1980s when terror organizations 
began using both video technology to film propaganda films and advanced printing 
techniques to produce color magazines for distribution. Distributions happened through 
mail and within mosques around the world. Groups engaged the films or print materials, 
discussing the implications of the materials together.176 Moving forward, groups began 
producing sophisticated newsletters and magazines to distribute through email. Around 
the same time, groups produced digital videos to be distributed through downloaded files 
rather than DVD or VHS. By the 1990s, groups were engaging online chat rooms to 
communicate. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, online message boards became 
the primary networking platform for terror organizations.177 Online message board 
forums followed a clear hierarchical organization. The threat organizer owned the forum 
with the ability to add or delete users and content. Some threads were restricted to elite 
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members of the organization who could “meet” via video conferencing to plan or 
coordinate attacks.178 By 2009, terror supporters began using social media platforms. 
 Social media platforms (YouTube, Facebook, Twitter) created new opportunities 
for terror groups and new issues for counterterrorism professionals. With social media, 
terror groups could create new media without being at the control of media interpretation; 
with social media, terror groups could communicate with publics via a direct channel. 
While open source information (data depicting the use of social media by terror groups 
and their potential supporters) was “generated at a speed and volume unprecedented in 
the history of conflict,” questions concerning the validity, legality, and influence of this 
social media use emerged. Social media platforms offered jihadists a simple interface 
open to millions of users. Access to these platforms required limited internet access and 
few products; terrorists could access social media platforms from nearly any location on 
the globe, and because social media platforms are owned by private organizations, 
suspending or deleting accounts associated with terror groups happened at a slow rate, 
often as the result of much pressure.  
 Terrorists use social media for two purposes: (1) to attract new recruits and (2) 
inspire lone wolf attacks.179 Prior to the emergence of social media use, terror recruiting 
often occurred in person. With social media, jihadists could recruit without leaving their 
physical location.180 J.M. Berger, Brookings Institute fellow on U.S. Relations with the 
Islamic World, and Jonathon Morgan, technologist and data scientist for Brookings 
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Institute, conducted research on the volume and reach of ISIS use of Twitter. Berger and 
Morgan found that an estimated 46,000 pro-ISIS Twitter accounts were active in 2014. 
Of these accounts, 6,216 were detected using bot or spam technology to tweet pro-ISIS 
statements. This propaganda is used not only to recruit new followers, but to influence 
lone wolf attacks resulting in the increase of domestic terrorism. 
Terrorism and Lone Wolf Attacks  
 Since 2010, the FBI has declared lone wolf attacks as a significant threat to the 
U.S. This realization is unique being that the Commission Report, written less than a 
decade prior, has no mention of lone wolves. Finding a concrete statistic on lone wolf 
attacks is difficult because the term itself is weighted. In the words of the Brookings 
Institute, “it is the rare lone wolf who is truly alone.”181 Lone wolfs are described as “an 
individual or small group of individuals who uses traditional terror tactics . . . but who 
acts without membership in, or cooperation with, an official of unofficial terrorist 
organization.”182 While lone wolf violence is not a new phenomenon, lone wolf attacks in 
the United States and Europe have doubled in the past seven years.183 Typically, these 
lone wolves find connection and validation through online interaction with terror groups. 
The increase in lone wolfs directly correlates to the third current challenge facing the 
counterterrorism professionals in the US, an increase in domestic terrorism.  
 Traditionally, lone wolfs were considered persons who commit violence without 
any connections to a network or terror group. However, today’s lone wolf differs. 
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Modern lone wolfs typically has some sort of contact with individuals associated with a 
terror network, the degree of this contact varies by person and attacks. What is common 
among lone wolves is the use of the internet. “Technology better enables a Lone Wolf 
credo.”184 Connection to terror leaders, which formerly would only happen through direct 
contact, can now take place through social media platforms. This connection allows terror 
groups to disseminate their messages at a broader level and provide direction, support, 
influence and training to suspected lone wolves. The evolution of terror groups has made 
lone wolf terrorism the issue it is today.  
 While lone wolf terrorism is not new, the threat has evolved alongside new terror 
tactics. Gregory Ehrie, FBI Special Agent in Charge of Intelligence at the New York 
Field Office, explains:  
 ISIS represents a different style of terrorism. Al-Qaida and their affiliates are 
 still there. The threat from these groups has been mitigated but it is still there. 
 Those groups plan their attacks very carefully and they plan big attacks that 
 attract attention. The intelligence community understands how they operate. ISIS 
 is different. It is more like an autonomous collective where members are loosely 
 affiliated and they are more interested in throwing all sorts of punches, no matter 
 how small. It’s very difficult to mitigate that threat.185  
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As intelligence improves, terror groups adapt to improve the strategies for planning and 
carrying out attacks. For security professionals, the increase in lone wolf terrorism 
presents unique challenges.  
 Lone wolfs recruited through social media present a demanding threat to security 
professionals because these individuals can be recruited, communicate, and plan attacks 
without leaving their home.186 Where traditional intelligence would target individuals 
with a history of radical ideological tendencies, or ask nonviolent groups to identify 
persons who may have radicalized, there are limited means for identifying lone wolfs 
who solely use social media. Regarding lone wolf attacks, Ehrie explains that the time 
frame from when a recruit decides to carry out violent attacks to the time in which the 
attack takes place can be very short.187 Additionally, there exists no concrete profile for 
lone wolfs. Security professionals have identified persons of all races, religious 
affiliations, social-economic backgrounds, and cultures as lone wolf recruits.  
 Terrorists’ increasingly sophisticated use of social media as a channel for 
propaganda and recruitment and the subsequent increase in lone wolf attacks presents a 
multilayered threat to the U.S. As social media allows terrorists to coordinate and plan 
violence without time and space limitations, the FBI has continued to call for increased 
intelligence sharing and collaboration between the U.S. and foreign governments and for 
resources to continue the engagement of “lawful investigative techniques . . . including 
both physical and electronic surveillance.”188 While the Bureau continues to pursue 
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methods for staying abreast of these current threats, the social media and lone wolf 
challenge is demanding. The following paragraphs explore the opportunities and 
limitations to addressing these challenges.  
Emerging Questions: Communication Opportunities/Limitations 
 In his 2017 budget request to Congress, then FBI Director Comey stated, 
“Countering ISIS’s social media use is a demanding task requiring delicate research.” 
The reach and use of social media by terror organizations is more than simple 
propaganda; “tampering with social networks is a form of social engineering.”189 
Countering social media use by terrorists presents a complex problem. First, social media 
platforms are protected legally from liability as internet service providers. Second, social 
media offers an abundant open source resource for counterterrorism research wanting to 
access data information depicting the use of social media by terrorists and their 
supporters as well as data depicting the audience of such content.  
As mentioned, social media platforms have experienced pressure by the public 
and security professionals to suspend accounts thought to be supportive of terrorism. 
While there is pressure to suspend and delete social media accounts associated with 
terrorism, this may not be the best solution. While simply finding and suspending social 
media accounts associated with terrorism propaganda can limit the distribution of pro-
terror messages, questions regarding “how social radicalization works” and the 
“unintended consequences” of simply deleting accounts demand attention.190 To address 
the widespread and multilayered threat of social media use by terror groups, the FBI has 
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acknowledged the following capabilities and resources as necessary for countering 
current threats. 
First, resources that allow for the collection and interpretation of data are needed. 
These resources are often publicly shamed in connection to the increase in government 
surveillance.191 Bureau leaders note: 
 We respect the right of people to engage in private communications, regardless 
 of the medium or technology. . .. Our aim is not to expand the government’s 
 surveillance authority, but rather to ensure that we can obtain electronic 
 information and evidence pursuant to the legal authority that Congress has 
 provided to keep America safe.192 
Yet, as the sheer volume of social media use increases, and technological advances in 
terms of encryption increases, FBI needs for collecting and interpreting data increase. 
Presenting these needs in a way that is favorable for the public will continue to be a 
challenged in the upcoming years.193  
 Second, new directions for the training and development of FBI intelligence 
professionals and relationship building between the Bureau, local authorities, and 
additional national security agencies are needed. Michael Steinbach, executive assistant 
director of the FBI’s National Security Branch notes that responding to the challenge of 
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increased use of social media as a recruitment strategy for lone wolf terrorism begins 
with providing security professionals with the right tools.194 Many of these tools include 
data programs that can sift through online intelligence in place of human professionals. 
However, apart from these digital tools, there needs to be a cultural shift within the 
Bureau that demands rapid adaption to new threats. “Being adaptive also means looking 
at how these complex organizations communicate and move . . .. We need to allow that 
information sharing itself is complete and work with partners to develop robust systems 
that take into account the type of information to be shared.”195 At the core of this new 
training is innovation. Steinbach asks: how can we instill a culture of innovation among 
Bureau employees? Innovation will drive counterterrorism measures in the next decade.  
 As we continue to confront the current challenges explored in this section, the 
following questions will shape the FBI response: 
1. How can the FBI work alongside with Social Media organizations to establish 
principles and goals for reducing terror groups’ use of the platforms? 
2. How can the FBI challenge the narrative used as propaganda by terror groups 
online?  
These questions currently demanding an FBI counterterrorism response address the 
realities of an evolved terrorism threat amongst a mobile society where distances in space 
and time are increasingly closed.  
This section explored the current challenges that the FBI is facing in terms of 
counterterrorism. While responding to these challenges, it is also imperative that leaders 
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stay abreast of future threats. The final section of the chapter identifies and discusses 
these upcoming threats.  
Communication Ethics Context: Exploring Future Challenges 
 The final section of the chapter explores future challenges for the Bureau. As the 
FBI’s goals have changed from persecuting past crimes to preventing future violence, 
processes and procedures have focused on identifying and responding to future threats 
before attacks can occurs. In the 2018 budget request to Congress, FBI leadership 
acknowledged domestic terrorism, violence committed by homegrown terrorists aimed at 
persons within the same country, as the primary future threat to security. The following 
paragraphs overview this threat, as well as the necessary FBI developments required to 
address it. 
 Domestic terrorism is broadly within the scope of counterterrorism measure of the 
FBI. Domestic terrorists, as defined within a 2017 special Congressional report, are 
“people who commit crimes within the homeland and draw inspiration from U.S.-based 
extremist ideologies and movements. . .. These include individuals who commit crimes in 
the name of ideologies supporting animal rights, environmental rights, anarchism, white 
supremacy, anti-government ideals, black separatism, and beliefs about abortion.”196 Due 
to the nature of the violence—which can differ sharply from traditional terrorism—
addressing domestic terrorism is a complicated issue. Since domestic terrorism includes a 
multiplicity of ideologies, motives, and tactics, the first question to be addressed is what 
is domestic terrorism? At a basic level, domestic terrorism is terrorism that occurs within 
the United States. In addition to acting within the homeland, domestic terrorists “lack 
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foreign direction.”197 While their actions may take influence from the type of violence 
committed by foreign terrorists, there is no direct communication between domestic 
terrorists and foreign terrorists. This distinction separates domestic terrorists from lone 
wolf terrorists.  
One place where these two issues are connected, however, is the influence of 
traditional terror groups on domestic terrorists. Brian Michael Jenkins of the RAND 
Corporation explains that jihadists are often born, raised, and recruited in the U.S. 
Jenkins’s research finds that of the 178 terrorists who planned 86 terror attacks thwarted 
by U.S. security agencies, and successfully carried out 22 attacks between 9/11/2001 and 
December 2017, 86 were U.S. born.198 Jenkins’ research, intended to assist professionals 
in developing protocols for vetting visitors to the U.S., assimilate immigrants and 
refugees, and identify possible terror recruits within the U.S., finds that as pressure on 
terror groups increased following 9/11, terror groups have increasingly focused on 
inspiring domestic terrorists to launch domestic attacks. “The most economically 
advanced, liberal democracies, including the United States, have also been the theaters of 
domestic terrorism campaigns—in many cases, led by the most privileged members of 
these societies.”199 These findings are supported by research showing that alongside 
terror attacks planned and coordinated from outside the U.S. have been thwarted.   
 Yet, while there is separation between these two groups, policy against domestic 
terrorism has largely been grouped alongside lone wolf terrorism. This is likely to change 
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in the upcoming years as the FBI has listed domestic terrorism as a primary threat to 
security. Since 9/11, efforts to prevent domestic terror attacks have increased. Laws in the 
U.S. have expanded to allow prosecution “on the basis of intention alone,”200 and new 
focused efforts have been coordinated to find solutions to home grown extremists. Yet, 
these efforts focus solely on prevention and work under the premise that potentially 
violent individuals can be identified by law enforcement. So far, the key response to 
domestic terrorism is the coordinated Combatting Violent Extremism task force (CVE). 
 The Combatting Violent Extremism task force (CVE) began as a presidential 
directive in 2011. The task force brought together security experts from the FBI, 
Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). CVE was developed to address and implement the 
strategic goals outlined by then President Barack Obama, in his August 2011, “National 
Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United 
States.” This plan outlined the role of local police forces, the FBI, and national security 
agencies coordinated approach to preventing local terrorism.  
 The National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 
Extremism proposed that local community stakeholders—police forces, business owners, 
citizens, and community leaders—were a beneficial asset to preventing extremism. The 
local stakeholders are imperative to the fight against local lone wolf attacks because they 
know their community and its members best. Speaking to the strategy, President Obama 
noted the following: 
                                                 
200 Jenkins, “The Origins of America’s Jihadists,” 8. 
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 We rely on local, state, and Federal law enforcement to deter individuals from 
 suing violence and to protect communities from harm . . .. Countering 
 radicalization to violence is frequently best achieved by engaging and 
 empowering individuals and groups at the local level to build resilience against 
 violent extremism.201  
The U.S. modeled this approach to countering violent extremism on previous successful 
partnerships between local, federal, and national forces. Specifically, the task force was 
modeled based on three initiatives.  
 Comprehensive Gang Model, an initiative to reduce and prevent gang activity 
through social intervention and education. This initiative led by local community 
forces with the support of the FBI succeeded in reducing gang related crimes in 
high-crime cities throughout the U.S.  
 Building Communities of Trust Initiative, a coordinated effort between the 
Department of Justice and Homeland Security to improve relationships between 
local police forces and the communities they serve. The initiative successfully 
developed lines of communication between the police and their community 
members to address “information sharing, responding to community concerns, 
and distinguishing between innocent cultural behaviors and conduct that may 
legitimately reflect criminal activity or terrorism precursors.”202  
                                                 
201 Barack Obama, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States 
(Department of Homeland Security, August 2011), 2. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 
publications/empowering_local_partners.pdf. 
202 Ibid., 4. 
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 Safe Schools/Healthy Students Initiative (SS/HS). Launched by the Departments 
of Education, Justice and Health and Human services, the SS/HS initiative 
successfully reduced violence and substance abuse in American schools.  
CVE was founded on the premise that “Although we have learned a great deal about 
radicalization that leads to violence, we can never assume that the dynamics will remain 
same.”203 Thus, research and communication between individuals, local government, and 
national security agencies is imperative. This current strategy to counter domestic 
terrorism is based upon three goals: “(1) enhancing engagement with and support to local 
communities that may be targeted by violent extremists; (2) building government and law 
enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism; and (3) countering violent 
extremists’ propaganda while promoting our ideals.”204  
 At the core of the CVE rests two primary objectives to be accomplished by the 
FBI: open communication with local and national security forces and engagement with 
the American public needs to increase awareness about domestic terrorism. President 
Obama explained:  
Engagement is essential for supporting community-based efforts to prevent 
violent extremism because it allows government and communities to share 
information, concerns, and potential solutions. Our aims in engaging with 
communities to discuss violent extremism are to: (1) share sound, meaningful, 
and timely information about the threat of violent extremism with a wide range of 
community groups and organizations, particularly those involved in public safety 
                                                 
203 Ibid., 6. 
204 Barack Obama, “Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 
Extremism in the United States,” Department of Homeland Security, December 2011, 2. 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/sip-final.pdf. 
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issues; (2) respond to community concerns about government policies and 
actions; and (3) better understand how we can effectively support community-
based solutions.205 
For this engagement to be successful, the FBI must be cognizant of civil liberties while 
increasing awareness amongst the public of domestic terrorism. This engagement 
requires security professionals to take a “consultative approach” to community 
prevention methods.206  
These methods for countering domestic terrorism will continue to take shape over 
the upcoming years. The following paragraph outlines the questions that will shape the 
FBI’s counterterrorism response in the months and years to come. 
Emerging Questions—Future Demands 
 As the FBI continues to respond to current threats, including the increased use of 
social media and instances of lone wolf attacks, they will need to address the following 
challenges emerging as a result of new threats: 
1. How can the FBI build relationships with local community members and police 
forces to better address domestic terrorism?  
2. How can the FBI address domestic terrorism while showing that they do not wish 
to overrun civil liberties? 
While not yet fully developed, awareness concerning domestic terrorism begins with 
increased engagement with the local communities who will be affected by this type of 
terrorism.  
                                                 
205 Ibid. 
206 Ibid., 11. 
 115
 The questions identified in this section as past, present, and future concerns shape 
the current communicative context of counterterrorism in this historical moment. These 
questions demand continued response by security professionals, and these questions 
situate the FBI as a significant organization in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. This section 
identified and discussed upcoming challenges noted by the FBI. The ongoing sensing and 
responding to upcoming threats will shape the future of the FBI and impact our 
understanding of national security and counterterrorism in the decade to come. With 
these questions in mind, the following paragraphs introduce a template for applying 
communication-ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens in action.  
Engaging the Communicative Context and Application 
 The previous pages presented the questions that shape counterterrorism in this 
current moment. Understanding these emerging questions provides a basis for which one 
can investigate the communication ethics response. Part two of this application uses 
communication ethics metaphors to understand this communicative context in a manner 
that provides better clarity and direction for future action. Part two of this application will 
serve as the primary focus of application in the following chapter. 
 These emergent questions provide a list of current and future demands that the 
FBI must consider while shaping their response to terrorism. These questions shape 
federal counterterrorism response in this current historical moment: 
 How can imagination be an ongoing and necessary component of terrorism 
prevention in order to preempt future capabilities, policy, and management 
failures? 
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 How can the FBI adapt with future organizational responses and structural 
changes as new threats emerge and current threats evolve?  
 How can the FBI work alongside with Social Media organizations to establish 
principles and goals for reducing terror groups’ use of the platforms? 
 How can the FBI challenge the narrative used as propaganda by terror groups 
online?  
 How can the FBI build relationships with local community members and police 
forces to better address domestic terrorism?  
 How can the FBI address domestic terrorism while showing that they do not wish 
to overrun civil liberties? 
At the base of these emerging questions are the following issues: (1) building creativity 
and imagination into counterterrorism training and practices; coordinating security 
responses amongst multiple organizations; (2) challenging negative narratives including 
those used as propaganda by terror groups and those used negatively against the FBI; and 
(3) building local relationships with community groups in an effort to present a strong 
and unified force against threats. These issues are primary communicative challenges 
shaping our current and future responses to terrorism. Responding to these issues will 
prove the FBI’s effectiveness in adapting to ongoing, current, and future threats. 
 As shown, one’s engagement with historical moments’ questions shape their 
communicative practices and identity. As one confronts the issues that demand attention 
in our current moment, they recognize that these questions are formed in response to 
communicative events of the past, present, and future. Our communicative response, 
then, is made with attentiveness beyond the given moment. This understanding of 
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historical moment frames this project’s application of communication ethics as 
responsibility beyond the given moment, recognizing that decision made in current time 
affect persons beyond a given special or temporal realm.  
 With knowledge of the communicative context of counterterrorism, this project 
can begin to shape a response that addresses the challenges of terrorism with tools and 
practices that are grounded in current context, capabilities, and limitations. Through the 
lens of communication ethics, this application aims to offer practical next steps for 
groups charged with responding to and countering terrorism. To apply communication 
ethics literacy as lens in a way that attempts to identify (1) the emerging limitations to 
practices and research; (2) existent touch points between these two areas of research; and 
(3) hermeneutic openings for engagement, the remainder of this application begins with 
connecting the communicative context of FBI counterterrorism with this work’s approach 
to communication ethics to find the overt connections between theory and practice. 
Where these connections between theory and practice exist, this work aims to craft 
communicative practices that open and maintain spaces for creative responses to the 
complex and ongoing challenge of terrorism.  
With the communicative context of counterterrorism and list of significant 
questions that shape FBI counterterrorism practices in this moment, the final chapter of 
this project, and part two of this application section, will apply communication ethics 
metaphors to seek clarity and direction regarding the past, present, and future challenges 
of the FBI and counterterrorism. Attention to terrorism in this historical moments 
requires that one makes sense of the threats we continue to face, while identifying the 
current and future challenges that demand our response. Applying communication ethics 
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metaphor to these identified challenges equips security professionals with tools for 
remaining vigilant, relevant, and prepared for the future.  
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Chapter 5: Communication Ethics Literacy as Lens: Responsiveness, 
Imagination, and Creativity  
This chapter concludes the communication ethics application in this project. Until this 
point, this project has situated communication ethics as the protection and promotion of 
communicative goods, acknowledging that in this historical moment, multiple goods exist 
and compete for public recognition and space. Previous chapters have articulated the 
importance of recognizing a given historical moment by identifying the emerging 
questions that place an existential demand on the communicative agent. The literacy of 
communication ethics, presented in this project through the metaphors of narrative, 
communicative goods, historical moment, and attentiveness to multiplicity/difference, 
frame this chapter’s application. The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate and discuss 
how communication ethics literacy functions as an interpretive lens, and why this lens 
affords communicators—and in this case, security professionals—a pragmatic capability 
to respond to our moment’s demanding counterterrorism questions. Communication-
ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens infuses communicative events with ethical height and 
weight.207 In moments where professionals are called to respond to ongoing, dynamic 
challenges, communication ethics literacy provides tools for navigation.  
Introduction  
We begin this chapter where the previous chapter left us, with knowledge of the 
communicative context of counterterrorism in this historical moment. Attentiveness to 
historical moment reminds us that communicative contexts are intertwined with past 
                                                 
207 Ronald C. Arnett discusses ethical height and weight in his work on Emmanuel Levinas. See Ronald C. 
Arnett, Levinas’s Rhetorical Demand: The Unending Obligation of Communication Ethics (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 2017).  
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findings, current events, and future demands; communication is embedded with the 
muddiness of everyday life, which include the voices and experiences from the past, 
present, and future sentiments.208 With this knowledge, we can connect communication 
ethics metaphors. This project frames communication ethics metaphors beginning with 
narrative as the communicative ground that houses the persons and stories that give rise 
to communicative goods, which shape particular communicative practices. Narrative as a 
communication ethics metaphor has overt connections to the FBI as an organization 
charged with counterterrorism. Yet, navigating narrative in this era rich with diversity 
and conflict is a difficult task. The hope of this chapter, then, is to show how engaging 
narrative provides openings for creativity and imagination grounded on reflection.  
Three sections shape this final application chapter. Section one, “Literacy and 
Hypertextuality: The Limits of Application,” discusses the limits and opportunities of 
communication ethics in a hypertextual moment. In reflection of research on the FBI and 
counterterrorism as it has evolved since 9/11, this section frames application of 
communication-ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens as resisting the assumption that one 
can provide definite answers to the complex and dynamic questions that shape our world. 
Section two, “Communication Ethics Literacy, Narrative, and Counterterrorism,” 
provides overt connections between communication ethics metaphors and the questions 
that shape and will continue to shape the communicative context of counterterrorism in 
this historical moment. The purpose of this section is to situate communication ethics 
literacy in a way that announces new insights and directions. This section leverages a 
diverse body of communication ethics scholarship to (1) establish a connection between 
                                                 
208 François Cooren, Action and Agency in Dialogue: Passion, Incarnation, and Ventriloquism. 
(Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publish Co., 2010). 
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communication ethics and counterterrorism demands; and (2) situate a theoretically 
textured approach to applying these metaphors in action. Section three, “Engaging 
Communication Ethics Literacy in Action: Pragmatic Practices,” offers a list of 
communicative practices for security professionals engaging counterterrorism amongst 
hypertextuality. This section identifies a list of communicative practices that can be 
engaged pragmatically to open the scope of counterterrorism research and action. In 
conclusion, this chapter discusses the communicative practice of reflection as the 
defining communicative task in predicting and responding to future threats.  
Communication ethics literacy affords professionals a lens for exploring the 
questions that shape counterterrorism. And while this application does not provide 
answers for the demands that terrorism places on us in this historical moment, it provides 
meaningful assistance for navigating these threats in a manner that does justice to the 
diverse nation it seeks to protect. Equipped with such tools for navigation, it is the hope 
of this project that creative ways for engaging security will emerge. Communication 
ethics and counterterrorism in this moment presents us with the critical ethical demand 
that characterizes this historical moment: our communicative response has no final 
resolution.209 Navigating security in this moment requires that we recognize the limits of 
reality—we may never achieve security in the objective sense; however, communication 
ethics in this moment is shaped by our response to the challenges that call us. One can, in 
the face of such reality, respond to security threats in a way that opens rather than limits 
future possibilities for action.  
Literacy and Hypertextuality: The Limits of Application 
                                                 
209 Arnett, Levinas’s Rhetorical Demand: The Unending Obligation of Communication Ethics. 
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This section discusses the application of communication-ethics-literacy-as-
interpretive-lens as responsive to the hypertextual nature of this current moment. 
Hypertextuality, understood in this project as the coexistence of commitments to multiple 
historical eras, does not signify a time period following postmodernity. Rather, 
hypertextuality recognizes that persons and organizations committed to a modern 
commitment of process and procedure stand alongside persons committed to a 
postmodern commitment to protect and promote difference. Hypertextuality is a 
characterization of a postmodern world rich with diversity where agreements are 
temporary, and conflict is complex. Acknowledging hypertextuality bounds this project’s 
application of communication ethics literacy to limitations. These limitations are the 
result of the inability to offer final solutions to the demands that terrorism places upon the 
FBI and nation at large. Yet, understanding the application of communication ethics 
literacy in a moment defined by hypertextuality offers space for practical and important 
insights. The following paragraphs overviews the reality of applying communication 
ethics literacy amongst hypertextuality. 
 Communication ethics in this moment acknowledges the coexistence of goods. 
Attentiveness to the coexistence of goods recognizes that we live in a historical moment 
that is rich with diversity of communicative agents; rich with diversity of communicative 
goods; and, rich with diversity of communicative practices. This approach to 
communication ethics rejects a modern assumption that a universal method of ethics 
exists. More importantly, however, this approach to communication ethics is grounded in 
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the acknowledgment of hypertextuality210—this is the understanding that ethics as the 
commitment to the goods of multiple eras exist side by side.  
Hypertextuality, defined by Umberto Eco and situated in communication ethics 
scholarship by Arnett, is the recognition that varying approaches to communication 
ethics—the protection and promotion of goods—exist concurrently in this historical 
moment. Thus, persons committed to a modern prospect of processes and procedures live 
and work alongside persons committed to a postmodern protection and promotion of 
difference. Understanding this historical moment as hypertextual, one can acknowledge 
that not only are there multiple, competing goods being protected and promoted, there is 
also disagreement concerning how these goods should be protected through 
communicative practices.  
For this project, this acknowledgment of hypertextuality and the understanding of 
communication ethics in this historical moment recognizes that there is no one publicly 
agreed-upon set of communicative practices to protect and promote national security; 
there is no one publicly agreed-upon way to navigate intelligence in a world riddled with 
terrorism; there is no one publicly accepted and agreed upon manner in which we can 
perform counterterrorism. Practices of counterterrorism are situated within particular 
organizations who respond to the demands of the moment in a way that is both unique to 
their defined communicative goods and interpretation of what matters. Embracing the 
hypertextual nature of this moment means that communication ethics must be both 
attentive to the why (the philosophical discernment of the good) and how (the 
performative enactment of communication ethics) of communicative action.  
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How we engage communication ethics in action matters. Our communicative 
practices are made meaningful not only in contemplating which goods to protect and 
promote, but in choosing a given communicative practice to accomplish this task. This 
task of reclaiming communicative practices as a significant and vital component to 
communication ethics literacy stands alongside Arnett in his work on hypertextuality. 
Arnett writes that accepting our current historical moment as hypertextual “offers a 
critical stance, challenging unreflective acceptance of process and procedure in a time of 
global communication expansion.”211 It is the communicative obligation of each and 
every person to engage their response to our moment’s demanding questions with 
reflection, research, and, at times, critique of self and Other.  
 Communication-ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens attentive to hypertextuality 
directs attention to the narrative structures that shape our own response and, concurrently, 
varying narrative structures that shape the communicative practices of our research 
subjects. For security professionals charged with the task of counterterrorism, this 
twofold approach to intelligence collection, interpretation, and application opens areas for 
new insights and directions—a task that was, is, and will continue to be the 
communicative task of counterterrorism.  
The purpose of this project’s application, then, is not to provide answers to the 
questions that shape counterterrorism in this historical moment.212 Its approach to 
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212 Chapter four of this project identifies the current communicative context of this historical moment and 
counterterrorism as follows: How can imagination be an ongoing and necessary component of terrorism 
prevention in order to preempt future capabilities, policy, and management failures? How can the FBI adapt 
with future organizational responses and structural changes as new threats emerge and current threats 
evolve? How can the FBI work alongside with Social Media organizations to establish principles and goals 
for reducing terror groups’ use of the platforms? How can the FBI challenge the narrative used as 
propaganda by terror groups online? How can the FBI build relationships with local community members 
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communication ethics resists the assumption that we can provide definite answers to the 
complex and dynamic questions that shape our world. Rather, the hope of this application 
is to offer theoretically grounded, practical tools for which security professionals can 
engage issues of counterterrorism in a creative and insightful ways.  
This response to this moment’s communicative context of counterterrorism 
demands a recognition of monologue as a formative communicative ethics that underpins 
this project’s presentation of narrative ground. Specifically, with the acknowledgment of 
hypertextuality, this section notes the following realities, which will provide a backdrop 
to this chapter as a whole: 
1. When we recognize our historical moment as hypertextual, we recognize that 
multiple narratives compete for public recognition and authority. In each 
communicative space, there are limitations as to who/what speaks; what can be 
heard; and what will be heard. Competition between and among groups 
committed to competing communicative goods begins before the clashing of these 
goods take place. This competition works to secure successfully the viability of 
communicative space—be it physical spaces, technological spaces, or ideological 
spaces.  
2. Sense-making in this moment rests upon the ability to identify and interpret 
multiple understandings of the good. The assumption that communicative actions 
follows a path for interpretation that makes sense is an assumption void of the 
complexities of this current moment. Communicative action need only make 
                                                 
and police forces to better address domestic terrorism? How can the FBI address domestic terrorism while 
showing that they do not wish to overrun civil liberties? 
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sense to those engaging in the communicative practice shaped by their narrative 
ground. Navigating this difference is the communicative task of this moment.213  
Utilizing communication ethics literacy as an interpretive lens for past, present, and 
future engagement with acknowledgment of hypertextuality avoids critique or the 
intention to replace systems with new structures for action. Communication ethics 
literacy and hypertextuality allows one to view demands as historically complex and void 
of simple solutions. At best, we can offer areas where we can add insight.  
Offering practices that address the complexities of the moment without 
overrunning reality, then, becomes a practical and pragmatic goal for this type of 
application. With this insight, the following section begins to foreshadow this work’s 
recommended practices by drawing overt connections between communication ethics 
literacy metaphors and the FBI as an organization charged with the demanding task of 
counterterrorism in a moment void of simplicity.  
Communication Ethics Literacy, Narrative, and Counterterrorism 
Equipped with an understanding of the current historical moment of 
counterterrorism, this section identifies pragmatic connections between communication 
ethics literacy and the FBI as an organization charged with counterterrorism. 
Communication ethics assists counterterrorism professionals by providing an interpretive 
lens through which security professionals can better identify the commitments, 
motivators, and aims of terrorists. Whereas previous chapters reviewed communication 
ethics literature and presented the dialogic approach to communication ethics that frames 
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this project’s interpretive lens, this section integrates communication ethics literacy 
metaphors into this project’s counterterrorism application. To that end, this section builds 
upon the research previously presented to undergird the importance of narrative as the 
ground that shapes us; our communicative ethic.  
Communication ethics literacy is shaped by communicative metaphors that offer 
researchers a lens for exploring current and ongoing challenges in a way that opens 
boundaries for creative insight. In this project, communication ethics literacy is grounded 
in the metaphors of narrative, communicative goods, and multiplicity/difference. This 
project has framed our historical moment as it relates to counterterrorism by identifying 
the former, current, and future terror threats demanding a response from the FBI. This 
section explores these demands through the remaining communication ethics metaphors 
to offer creative ways to explore these demands. This section, specifically, frames 
connections between narrative—the stories, people, and practices which shape 
communicative response—and the FBI.  
Within the following paragraphs is an overview of this project’s communication 
ethics metaphors alongside connections to the FBI. To navigate these connections, the 
following paragraphs reference various communication ethics scholars. The aim of these 
paragraphs is to offer practical areas where communication ethics literacy meets FBI 
counterterrorism research gaps. Narrative guides this section. This project defines 
narrative as the communicative ground that houses the stories, persons, communicative 
goods, and communicative practices that shape communicative events and responses to 
the demands of our historical moment. Narrative houses the communicative goods we 
protect and promote; acknowledgment of our current moment as one void of narrative 
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agreement shapes communication ethics literacy commitment to multiplicity and 
difference. When we recognize our historical moment as hypertextual, we recognize that 
multiple narratives compete for public recognition and authority.  
Regarding communication ethics literacy, communicative goods and practices 
derive meaning from particular narratives. Narrative ground houses one’s identity and 
shapes one’s communicative practices.214 Citing the work of Charles Taylor, Arnett 
writes that narrative shapes the monologue of one’s life. Without recognizing the 
narrative ground of another, one can never understand how and why another makes the 
decisions they do and performs communicative practices in a particular manner. 
Additionally, predictions regarding future actions are groundless.215 Narratives are 
negotiated and renegotiated over time as they adapt to the needs a given moment. Arnett, 
Fritz, and Bell trace the roots of narrative in the discipline of communication to Walter 
Fisher and W. Barnett Pearce. Following the work of Pearce, Fisher bridged 
communication and narrative through rhetoric and argumentation.216 Fisher discusses the 
importance of storytelling for human communication. Arnett, Fritz, and Bell bridge 
storytelling and communication ethics literacy noting that publicly agreed upon stories 
serve as narrative ground.217 The stories that shape our identity—narrative ground—
embed communicative goods and direct communicative practice. Like individuals, 
organizations work within a given narrative. Organizational goals and practices should 
align with their narrative ground upon.  
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Narrative as persons, stories, and practices that shape individual communicative 
ground are gathered around what would be called the good. Arnett reminds us that we 
live in an era of narrative and virtue contention.218 This contention produces a 
multiplicity of discourses that come to life in the public sphere as persons work to protect 
and promote a variety of contrasting goods. Regarding communication ethics literacy, the 
protection and promotion of communicative goods classifies communication ethics as 
pragmatic. In each communicative event, persons perform the protection and promotion 
of multiple goods. As noted in chapter three, two conceptions of goods exist. Substantial 
goods are the identifiable position(s) that a communicator works to protect and promote. 
Substantial goods are grounded in particular narratives and attentive to the needs of a 
given historical moment. Communicative practices are the actions that protect and 
promote the substantial goods.219 This understanding of communicative goods allows 
communication ethics to be defined by the act of protecting and promoting goods through 
performative communicative practices. As performative, communication ethics is both 
practical and pragmatic; it responds to meet the demands that are everyday life.220 
Acknowledging this moment as hypertextual requires that we understand competition 
between communicative goods. Narrative and virtue contention results in competition 
between and among goods for public space. No longer can one assume that a modern 
framework of defined communicative goods shaping communicative practice exists. 
Rather, there is a multiplicity of goods, perspectives, and practices within, among, and 
behind each communicative event. 
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Differences between and among persons and organizations drive disagreements 
and conflict. Our current historical moment is one of vast disagreement concerning what 
matters and what affords our attention and resources. Sense-making in this moment rests 
on the ability to identify and interpret multiple understandings of the good. Navigating 
this difference is the communicative task of this moment.221 Focusing our attention to the 
demands that call us to respond in hopes of offering assistance without seeking final 
resolution requires an attentiveness to the dynamic and diverse ethics present in each 
communicative event.222 
The application of communication ethics literacy to the questions that shape 
counterterrorism in this moment rests on the above presentation of narrative as the 
persons and stories which embed communicative goods and shape communicative 
practice amongst multiplicity and difference. The following paragraphs identify overt 
connections between these communication ethics metaphors and the FBI in order to offer 
practical associations between these two areas.  
Communication Ethics Literacy and FBI as Counterterrorism Organization  
 This subsection draws connections between the FBI and communication ethics 
metaphors through the work of various communication ethics scholars. These 
connections allow the reader to witness practical associations between this theoretically 
rich literature and the FBI as a pragmatic organization charged with securing a diverse 
nation.  
The FBI works within the larger framework of national security organizations 
within the U.S., but their narrative is specific to mission: “To protect the American 
                                                 
221 Arnett, “Communicative Meeting: From Pangloss to Tenacious Hope.” 
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people and uphold the Constitution of the United States.”223 As discussed in chapter two, 
this mission is shaped by the stories in response to which the FBI responded and evolved. 
At the heart of this mission is the origins of the FBI as a criminal investigation 
organization, the transformation of the Bureau in response to the failures of 9/11, and the 
current organization of the FBI in relation to emerging threats. The FBI’s narrative, 
including the stories and person that shape this narrative over time, frame the 
communicative goods they work to protect and promote. Yet, this narrative exists within 
and among multiple narratives and, at times, must compete for dialogic space.  
 In addition to their own narrative, FBI analysts and agents find value in 
acknowledging and researching the narratives of prospective terrorists. Without context 
on the background of terror actions, analysts and agents can overlook future planning of 
terror groups. With narrative background, researchers can better predict how and why 
terrorist will make certain decisions. Research into the narratives of terror groups, 
therefore, becomes a practical tool in aiding security professionals in the pursuit of 
preventing future attacks. Coordinating efforts against future attacks requires information 
that is grounded in intelligence. In terms of narrative, understanding the difference 
between possible future threats versus impractical future threats is a distinction of 
importance for security professionals. While the FBI does not seek to be in dialogue with 
terror organizations, dialogue understood in this project as the meeting of different 
narratives with an openness to learning, the FBI does compete against terror narratives 
for physical, technological, and ideological space and authority. This competition is not 
tied to overrunning terror narratives by imposing a single worldview. Rather, the FBI 
                                                 
223 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Mission and Priorities.” https://www.fbi.gov/about/mission. 
 132
works to interrupt terror narratives in a way that reminds persons to hear multiple stories, 
persons, and practices within a given space. At the center of this competition is an 
acknowledgement that other groups and individuals are grounded upon narratives that 
make sense from the standpoint of their own worldviews. Regarding terror groups, these 
narratives are a national security threat. Even still, it becomes the effort of the 
communicator to recognize these narratives as a valid source of communicative goods 
and practices.  
Our current historical moment demands that we take narrative seriously. To 
assume that in this historical moment we can dismiss another’s narratives as invalid is a 
fantasy assumption that disconnects our communicative action and tries to escape the 
reality in which we live. Arnett articulates fantasy and communication ethics by 
discussing Immanuel Kant’s distinction between imagination and fantasy tied to narrative 
writing, “imagination is the faculty of making present that which is absent.”224 
Imagination is rooted in the “persons, stories, and ideas” that validate a particular 
narrative. In contrast to fantasy, imagination is confirmed through research tied to a given 
narrative. Fantasy, on the other hand, is not connected to a real ground. Unlike 
imagination, which begins with acknowledgement of narrative ground, fantasy is based 
only on optimism.225 Arnett and Pat Arneson explain that optimism is a naive 
engagement of current issues and demands that overlooks the challenges that shape our 
lives. Communicative practice based on optimism does not engage the realities of our 
current moment as hypertextual. In comparison, imagination as attentiveness to narrative 
ground fuels genuine hope for communicative responses. This hope acknowledges the 
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real-time demands, as difficult, demanding, and challenging as they may be, in an effort 
to respond in a way that offers solid implications for future engagement.226  
 For counterterrorism professionals, imagination tied to narrative is dependent on 
research that is attentive to the background motivators, resources, and capabilities of 
terror groups or individuals. For example, it would be fantastical to assume that terror 
resources are limited or unchanging. Security professionals charged with predicating 
future terror trends must stay on the forefront of intelligence, being ever attentive to 
change. Additionally, for federal counterterrorism practices, imagination offers avenues 
for creative insight. Regarding the recommendations made by the Commission for the 
FBI—brainstorm about how attacks may be carried out; identify telltale indications that a 
surprise attack is being planned; collect intelligence on the indicators when possible; and 
integrate defense mechanisms to stop or alert to the deadliest attacks227—beginning these 
tasks with attentiveness to narrative ground will fuel imagination. Expanding research 
beyond the foreground to discover the background persons, stories, events, and ideas that 
may shape future communicative action can open doorways for new areas of exploration.  
Attentiveness to narrative ground as a gateway to increased awareness and 
intelligence opens pathways for identifying the communicative goods competing for 
viability in this moment. The FBI currently has an established and vetted set of 
communicative goods that claim significance in their day to day work. These goods 
emerge through the set of priorities that guide the action of security professionals. These 
communicative goods also shift as old threats decrease or evolve and new threats emerge. 
                                                 
226 Ronald C. Arnett and Pat Arneson, Dialogic Civility in a Cynical Age: Community, Hope, and 
Interpersonal Relationships (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999). 
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Currently, the FBI works to protect and promote prevention of terror attacks against the 
U.S., prevent foreign intelligence and espionage, and detect cyber-attacks against the 
U.S. and public corruption.228 For counterterrorism, the FBI privileges the prevention of 
terror attacks on U.S. soil. Within this communicative good are smaller communicative 
goods that shape FBI professional’s communicative practices. These communicative 
goods are, as identified in the previous chapter, as follows: counter social media 
recruiting and propaganda by terrorists, prevent lone wolf attacks, and combat 
homegrown violent extremism. The FBI navigates the protection and promotion of these 
goods amongst multiple goods competing for viability in public space. These goods 
compete not only against those who support terrorism as an indiscriminate tool of 
violence and communication, but with those who challenge the communitive practices of 
counterterrorism professionals. For instance, public outcry against intelligence as an 
oversight of privacy continues to shape conversations surrounding the FBI and 
counterterrorism.229 
This project’s approach to communication ethics assumes that even if agreement 
regarding the communicative goods exists, how to protect and promote this good can be a 
point of contention between and among persons. Solution-based practices impose a 
fantasy ideal that shifts attention away from the reality of multiple perspectives of the 
good toward imposed demands regarding what matters and what actions should be 
                                                 
228 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Mission and Priorities.”  
229 For examples of this criticism see Andrew Rosenthal, “Invading Your Privacy,” New York Times 26 
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taken.230 This approach to communication ethics as universal commitment to a singular 
set of goods disregards the recognition that within each communicative event past stories, 
current persons, and future directions shape our demands. For the FBI, this project’s 
approach to communicative goods requires that one work without assurance of a solution.  
Additionally, for security professionals, acknowledging that current conflicts and 
threats are shaped by a diverse background of multiple and competing communicative 
goods helps to frame foreground threats as textured. Research into the various narratives 
of terror actors can provide insight into the goods they protect and promote. Recognizing 
terrorists as individuals acting to protect and promote a set of communicative goods 
defined by their given narrative opens the communicative why and how of 
communicative action. Arnett, Leeanne Bell McManus, and Amanda McKendree offer 
insight into communicative goods and conflict that provide additional support here. 
Conflict and violence in the present is the result of conflicting background goods. These 
authors explain that communicative actors promote and promote their representative 
communicative goods in each communicative event. This protection and promotion in the 
foreground makes communication ethics pragmatic. Acknowledging the background 
goods of others provides clarity into the why and how of their communicative practices. 
Research into the background motivators of communicative actors textures the analysis 
of foreground communicative events. This textured approach to conflict illuminates the 
foreground events in a way that offers new insights for analysts. Looking beyond present 
actions to identify the underlying goods allows us to see why actors are making the 
                                                 
230 Ronald C. Arnett, “The Communication Ethics of Bioethics,” in Encyclopedia of Global Bioethics. Ed. 
Henk ten Have (Springer, 2015), 2. 
 136
decisions being made. This looking beyond offers professionals a critical approach for 
making sense of terror actions that read as inexcusable and incomprehensible.   
Discernment of communicative goods with recognition that solution-based 
practices overlook the significance of multiplicity and difference in this moment opens 
the conversation for navigating conflicts in a way that is creative and insightful. For 
security professionals, understanding the background motivators of varying security 
organizations as well as the background motivations of terrorists can broaden the scope 
of action. As discussed, it is imperative that the FBI build and maintain relationships with 
local partners to prevent violent extremism.  Finding the touch points between and among 
the multiple security organizations can assist the FBI is bridging and maintaining key 
relationships with organizations charged with similar tasks. This relationship building 
among multiple constituencies can account for a better dispersing of valuable resources. 
Each organization protects and promotes their interpretation of a given good. Thus, while 
aims may be singular, interpretations and practices are multiple. François Cooren 
expands on this meeting of difference between and among communicators in this given 
historical moment. Cooren notes that within every communicative event there are actions 
that can be observed and analyzed. However, behind these actions is an organizing 
structure that governs communicative practices.  
Negotiation between persons, therefore, is not limited to the communicative 
event. Each actor in communication speaks and acts on behalf of their given organization. 
When these background organizations are acknowledged, we free communicative events 
from the present and open the possibility of future interactions between and among 
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organizations.231 For resource allocation, those proposition resources can add weight to 
their claim by acknowledging the organizations, broadly, that give them the authority to 
make such claims. At the core of U.S. security is a coordinated effort that transcends each 
individual organization. Being attentive to communication ethics literacy in action 
requires that communicative agents practice due diligence in reflection and learning. This 
due diligence provides a backdrop of information that assists in navigating the diverse 
backdrop of communicative events. Recognition of this historical moment as 
hypertextual requires that one recognize the coexistence of competing narratives. This 
recognition resists an attempt to overrun reality with a commitment to process and 
procedure.  
With these connections, the following subsection offers a set of communicative 
practices for practically engaging counterterrorism is a way that acknowledges the limits 
of our moment while opening avenues for creative insight. These practices offer security 
professionals a pragmatic first step for navigating terrorism and its demands amongst 
uncertainty.  
Communication Ethics Literacy as Practice  
Exploring counterterrorism and the FBI through the communication ethics 
metaphors of narrative, communicative goods, and multiplicity/difference allows us to 
draw overt connections between these two areas. These connections open space for 
exploration that is not limited to the conflict of the current moment; interpreting with 
these metaphors broadens the scope of research allowing professionals to see the 
textured, varied, and demanding reality of the threats we continue to face. These 
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connections show that (1) all persons and organizations work from narrative grounds. 
These narrative grounds are formed from past stories, persons, and practices recognized 
as valid sources of meaning amongst a group of individuals. (2) Communicative goods 
compete for public viability in each communicative event. Competition of these goods 
can stem from differences concerning what matters. Competition can also be fueled by 
disagreements regarding choice of communicative practice for defending such goods. 
Thus, two persons committed to the same good can disagree on the best approach to 
promoting the good. (3) Multiplicity and difference makes sense-making a temporary and 
difficult task. Looking beyond the current practices to see that each moment is full of 
various governing structures that shape communicative actors can create new spaces for 
insight.  
Drawing overt, yet practical, connections between communication ethics literacy 
and the FBI’s counterterrorism efforts identifies the following insights: 
1. Attentiveness to narrative ground provides an interpretive gateway to increased 
awareness and intelligence. This gateway opens pathways for identifying the 
communicative goods competing for viability in this moment. With this 
knowledge, security professionals free communicative events from present 
demands to explore the future possibilities of threats and action.  
2. Acknowledgement of communicative goods as competing for public recognition 
and public space allows professionals to understand the limitations of solution-
based practices. Solution-based practices impose a fantasy ideal that shifts 
attention away from the reality of multiple perspectives of the good toward 
imposed demands regarding what matters and what actions should be taken. 
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Attentiveness toward practical response in place of solution-based practices opens 
the conversation for navigating conflicts in a way that is creative and insightful. 
3. Acknowledging the complex and diverse nature of relationships between persons 
and organizations affords security professional the ability to transcend 
organizational constraints in a way that does not dismiss the realities of the 
current moment and to work in a coordinated fashion for increased intelligence. 
This attentiveness to diversity provides a backdrop of information that assists in 
navigating the diverse backdrop of communicative events. 
Attentiveness to communication ethics literacy in action shifts the focus of attention from 
limits and constraints to openings for future thought and action. The above insights 
provide a pathway for developing thoughtful and attentive communicative practices that 
assist navigation of counterterrorism in our historical moment. 
This section provided overt connections between communication ethics literacy 
and the FBI as a counterterrorism organization in an effort to connect the theory and 
practice. The next section explores communicative insights to offer practical assistance 
for performing this theory in action in a way that opens creativity and hope for future 
directions.  
Engaging Communication Ethics Literacy in Action: Interpreting Effective Practices 
This section begins with the following acknowledgement made in reflection of the 
work of Arnett: hope and creativity live where assurance does not. They live in 
acknowledgment and response to the demands that shape a moment. This response, when 
made with attentiveness to the literacy of communication ethics offers avenues for 
discovery. Reflecting on this sentiment, this section asks, how do we attend to narrative, 
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goods, and multiplicity in a way that permits us to engage in the demands of our current 
moment? With insights from the connections between communication ethics literacy and 
FBI counterterrorism made in section one, this section identifies a set of communicative 
practices that respond to the questions shaping counterterrorism in this moment: How can 
imagination be an ongoing and necessary component of terrorism prevention in order to 
preempt future capabilities, policy, and management failures? How can the FBI adapt 
with future organizational responses and structural changes as new threats emerge and 
current threats evolve? How can the FBI work alongside with Social Media organizations 
to establish principles and goals for reducing terror groups’ use of the platforms? How 
can the FBI challenge the narrative used as propaganda by terror groups online? How can 
the FBI build relationships with local community members and police forces to better 
address domestic terrorism? How can the FBI address domestic terrorism while showing 
that they do not wish to overrun civil liberties?  
 This project approaches these questions not with optimism for final solutions, but 
with hope for creative insight and direction. This assertion recognizes that, at times, we 
must endure the muddiness of life in search of areas that can provide genuine hope for 
navigation. Following the insights of Arendt, Arnett explain this task as it relates to 
communication ethics: “genuine light” counters “undue optimism” that promises an 
escape from the dangers of fear and uncertainty.232 In this moment, those attentive to 
communication ethics literacy recognize that terrorism resists a final solution as national 
security evolves and changes over time. 
 
                                                 
232 Arnett, Communication Ethics in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt’s Rhetoric of Warning and Hope, 3. 
 141
Identifying Gaps for Reflective Practices  
I begin this section by reviewing the FBI process for gathering, analyzing, and 
disseminating intelligence. The FBI, among other security organizations within the U.S., 
define intelligence as (1) a product of refined research that assists policymakers in 
decision-making; (2) a process by which information is gathered, refined, and 
disseminated; and (3) organizations charged with refining raw data into useful research 
for the security community at large.233 This project has shown that September 11 exposed 
specific gaps in security intelligence. Previous chapters presented 9/11 as a significant 
story shaping our narrative of national security noting that stories guide one’s 
engagement with the historical moment and offer appropriate grounds for responding to 
current existential demands. The failures of 9/11 continue to shape our response the 
demands of our current moment. Thinking about these failures alongside the current 
process for intelligence will uncover practices for creatively navigating counterterrorism.  
Intelligence gathering and dissemination works in a cycle consisting of six 
processes. First, intelligence officers analyze pressing threats identified by FBI 
leadership. The threats provide areas to focus intelligence gathering efforts and identify 
specific subjects for research. Second, an implementation plan for data collection, 
refinement, and dissemination is developed. Third, raw information is gathered through 
sources identified during the implementation period. These sources include information 
collected from human sources, or persons of interest, through interviews or covert 
operations, signals intelligence from electronic transmissions, photo intelligence gathered 
through satellites, measurement and signatures intelligence gathered through raw data 
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concerning weapon capability tests, and open source intelligence from public sources 
including media, academic sources, and public data. Fourth, raw data is converted into 
analysis. Fifth, data is converted into intelligence, and “information’s reliability, validity, 
and relevance is evaluated and weighed.”234 Intelligence personnel then draw conclusions 
regarding implications of the data. Finally, this intelligence is distributed in three formats: 
Intelligence Information Report (IIrs), FBI Intelligence Bulletins, and FBI Intelligence 
Assessments.  
In each step of intelligence, FBI personnel are attentive to the line between data 
collection, analysis, and dissemination and civil liberties. To that end, the Bureau works 
within laws defined by the U.S. Constitution and follows guidelines directed by U.S. 
Attorney General. Additionally, all new intelligence personnel visit the U.S. Holocaust 
Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C. “to see for themselves what can happen when 
law enforcement becomes a tool of oppression.”235 This trip is planned in an effort to 
remind FBI personnel to be attentive to the dangers of oppressing publics in the attempt 
to secure intelligence. FBI policy is to share intelligence when possible with other 
security groups in order to protect against threats to the U.S. or law enforcement.  
Viewing the intelligence distribution process through the lens of communication 
ethics literacy, one can identify areas for applying communicative practice. To begin, it 
must be acknowledged that the FBI works within a modern framework of documented 
processes and procedures, committed to one understanding of the good—protecting the 
U.S. from violence. Therefore, to assume that we could overhaul all of these processes 
would also be a fantasy. The best we can do is identify practices that create areas for 
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insight and creative action, thus opening the processes and procedures in a way that 
pushes the boundaries of informational constraints.  
Taking the identified failures as a starting point, we can see that the greatest 
issues regarding intelligence gathering analysis and dissemination center upon the 
following constraints: instituting imagination, relationship building, and challenging and 
responding to dangerous narratives. This project argues that instituting imagination is 
central to the constraints outlined here. These constraints limit the possible for creative 
engagement of counterterrorism, and, when grounded in fantastical assumptions of 
solution-based practices, create further security gaps. Interpreting these constraints with 
insights from communication ethics affords professionals the ability to see limitations as 
a communicative practice worthy of implementation.  
 Integrating imagination within the intelligence process grounds this section’s 
recommended communication. This project understands imagination “as the faculty of 
making present that which is absent.”236 Imagination begins with attentiveness to 
others—as unacceptable and incomprehensible as they may be when viewed through our 
worldview. Echoing the sentiment of Hannah Arendt and her work on Immanuel Kant, 
Arnett writes that imagination works with two faculties for knowledge, sensing and 
knowing. Imagination offers an alternative to progress, or the effort to overrun reality 
with the hope of instituting processes and procedures that fix our demands. In place of a 
commitment to process and procedures that ignores the reality of difference and the 
demands of the particular moment, imagination offers the scope to explore demands 
without subjective demand that they conform to our own wishes. Building imagination 
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into the intelligence process begins with reflective practices that change the way security 
professionals think about the goals of intelligence.  
Currently, each step in the intelligence process is aimed at a particular goal: 
identifying research subjects, detailing raw data collection plans, gathering data, 
analyzing data, producing reports for audiences in charge of decision making. Within this 
process, the goal is defined at the beginning of the process when FBI leadership 
establishes the research subjects. From there, intelligence work is aimed at data collection 
and analysis for the goal of producing reports that provide clarity on the research subject. 
This process, when interpreted through the lens of communication ethics literacy, calls us 
to attend to reflection as a means of identifying and informing research gaps. Reflection 
practices offer professionals a ground for integrating imagination.  
Integrating Reflective Practices  
This project offers the following reflective practices as a means to improving 
intelligence in a hypertextual moment defined by the demands of terrorism. These 
practices remind professionals to revisit past practices with a lens for uncovering where 
and why gaps existed. With this knowledge, professionals can brace for events with 
insight and clarity. In this moment where solution-based practices are not an attainable 
reality and the demands of terrorism are ongoing, reflective practices offer a space for 
learning and adapting in real-time. The following communicative practices offer strategic 
initiative for engaging reflective practices so as to address the documented FBI 
counterterrorism failures listed throughout this project: 
1. Implement reflective practices—Reflective practices work by looking back on 
communicative events with metaphors that afford professionals an intellectual 
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space for sense-making. This intellectual space offers professionals the ability to 
identify gaps, breakdowns in process and procedure, and critical moments where 
failures emerged. Reflections on 9/11 show that, in theory, the FBI had allotted 
resources for counterterrorism to local field offices. In practice, however, these 
resources were minimal. Additionally, as witnessed with the FBI’s Countering 
Violent Extremism (CVE) initiative established in 2011, and discussed in 
previous chapters, while groundwork was laid for implementing practices to 
detect violent extremism, the processes were underdeveloped in practice. When 
we explore counterterrorism demands and actions through communication ethics 
literacy, we acknowledge the need for better attentiveness to integrated theory and 
practice.  
Following the insights of Calvin O. Schrag, praxis addresses the interplay 
of theory, action, and context.237 This interplay recognizes the importance of 
each—theory, action, and context—without privileging one above the others. 
Communicative praxis reminds us that while we cannot rely simply on the 
presentation of data, we also cannot rely on theory left underdeveloped and not 
implemented. Continuous reflection requires that we ask: is the theory for 
implementation developed? Are the practices that bring this theory into action 
defined? Are these practices practical for this given moment and context? 
Reflecting upon these questions in all stages of implementation allow one to see 
gaps in intelligence as they emerge and gaps in practice as they unfold. The 
                                                 
237 Calvin O. Schrag, Communicative Praxis and the Space for Subjectivity (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1986). See also, Ronald C. Arnett, Pat Arneson, and Leeanne Bell, “Communication 
Ethics: The Dialogic Turn,” 154.  
 146
complexity of this historical moment requires that professionals acknowledge that 
gaps and missed opportunities will occur. Reflective practice reminds us that 
amongst mistakes, professionals have an obligation to go back and interpret these 
failures in an effort to improve and resist repetition.  
2. Texture reflective practices. Strategic relationships with local community 
organizations provide multiple resources for vetting counterterrorism practices. In 
addition to intellectual space afforded through one’s own reflective practices, the 
coordination of groups and persons provides a textured approach to examine 
practices with the goal of identifying and closing gaps. The FBI depends on their 
ability to build strategic relationships with attentiveness to multiplicity and 
organizational constraints. These relationships allow for intelligence sharing that 
can provide early detection of individuals who may engage in violent extremism. 
Care in attentiveness to the interplay of multiple goods in public space can help to 
foster and maintain these strategic and necessary relationships. If we look to the 
joint CVE initiative of the Obama administration and FBI as an example, we can 
witness how inattentiveness to the multiplicity of goods can limit the growth of 
relationships and trust amongst local groups and the FBI. Attentiveness to the 
multiplicity and organizational restraints begins with recognition that all 
communicative events are shaped by multiple governing structures. This 
acknowledgment requires that security professionals ask: What goods drive this 
organization’s commitments to security? What practices protect and promote 
these goods? How do these practices compete with the goods of the FBI? 
 Attentiveness to these questions can allow professionals seeking to build 
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quality relationships with insight on the best means of resource allocation. 
Allocating resources to the strategic areas where local communities need them 
offers a pragmatic space for bridging gaps amongst local and federal 
counterterrorism efforts. Strong relationships build resources and afford 
professionals a strong capacity for reflective practices. 
3. Enhance reflective practices—Interpreting narrative ground as monologue allots 
professionals the ability to augment reflective practices further. The FBI works to 
counter terror narratives online while also navigating criticisms against their 
intelligence processes. Similar to how the FBI depends on relationships with local 
groups to strengthen the ability to identify individuals who may commit violence, 
the FBI relies on tips from citizens to identify possible terror actors. As such, it is 
important for the Bureau to have measures in place to respond to counter 
dangerous narratives online and, when needed, understand public criticisms that 
may deter individuals from sharing pertinent information regarding terror threats. 
“The notion of common sense shifts from expected uniform universal access to a 
pragmatic existential humility that acknowledge[s] biased and tainted ground a 
particular narrative position.”238 In our current moment, narratives compete for 
“conceptual or discourse space.”239 Embeddedness in a given narrative shapes 
possibilities for communication as narratives encounter one another in dialogue. 
 We can no longer assume that persons work within a narrative framework 
that make sense to us; truth and common sense are no longer tied first to 
worldview. Rather, truth and common sense are situated in narrative which shapes 
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multiple worldview perspectives. We cannot counter the worldview of another 
without recognition of the fact that the persons, stories, communicative goods, 
and practices embedded in these narratives reinforce their worldview as a 
common sense truth. In a hypertextual moment, sense-making is grounded in a 
particular worldview shaped by a given narrative. Countering opposing 
worldviews from the standpoint of one’s own narrative is not effective. The 
communicative practice for addressing dangerous narratives becomes one of 
showing fault in the ground of particular narratives rather than critiquing from 
one’s own narrative. Additionally, asking oneself where the roots of criticism 
stem from and responding in a way that takes seriously the criticisms of the public 
upon which professionals depend. Monologue offers a source of understanding 
and countering other dangerous monologues.  
Literacy as interpretive lens protects and promotes reflective communicative practices. 
Reflective practices shape practical and pragmatic measures for FBI counterterrorism 
professionals to work within the processes and procedures defined by the Bureau, while 
working to expand limitations and identify gaps and opportunities for intelligence 
professionals. Additionally, reflective practices create opportunities from which 
imagination and creativity can grow. This ground upon which imagination and creativity 
can stand is built on genuine hope attentive to the past concerns, current demands, and 
future threats that shape our moment. 
This application of communication-ethics-literacy-as-interpretive-lens shows that 
navigating counterterrorism in a hypertextual moment is an unending task of reflection. 
Literacy as interpretive lens amongst hypertextuality shows that strategic communicative 
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practices open spaces for response rather than overrunning the realities of our moment or 
oversimplifying the demands of counterterrorism. Literacy as interpretive lens affords us 
practical means for engaging this moments critical questions in a manner that does justice 
to the diverse nation it seeks to protect.  
This work’s applications place reflective practices as the practical and pragmatic 
communicative good of interpretation using communication ethics literacy. This project’s 
presentation of communication ethics as interpretive lens transforms the application of 
communication ethics metaphors application from a tool applicable to understanding past 
events to a practical and important measure for navigating current and future demands. 
This transformation rests upon one’s ability to infuse imagination rooted in reflective 
practices into the most difficult of demands and limitations. Communication-ethics-
literacy-as-interpretive-lens equips security professionals with meaningful strategies for 
engaging the demands of our moment even when these moments seem to paralyze space 
for action. Reflective practices keep communicative life and communicative action alive 
in the face of danger and violence committed to paralyzing groups with fear. With this 
sentiment, this project concludes with commentary on the implications of connecting 
communication ethics with FBI counterterrorism. 
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Concluding Remarks: Communication Ethics as The Protection and Promotion of 
Precarious Life 
This project began noting Bruce Hoffman’s seminal work of terrorism, writing, 
terrorism is the nondiscriminatory use of violence to impose fear in hopes of changing 
political landscapes or promoting specific ideologies; terrorism is most successful when 
thought translates into action or, when plans for violence are successfully carried out. 
Following insights from the previous five chapters, this project extends this definition of 
successful terrorism to add that terrorism is most successful when it, through fear and 
violence, paralyzes a given community or group of persons making it difficult, if not 
impossible, to respond. Thus, the most successful terrorists are those who translate 
thought into an Other’s inaction. In summary, terrorism exploits the freedoms it seeks to 
replace in hopes of making one incommunicable.240  
Judith Butler, Maxine Elliot professor of comparative literature at the University 
of California, Berkeley, speaks of this motive of removing one’s ability to respond in her 
work of the precarious nature of social life. Butler’s work on performativity as a 
communicative act of resistance and reliance offers implications for continued research, 
development, and application of communication ethics literacy and counterterrorism.241 
This final section explores the implications of Butler’s work on this project and the future 
of counterterrorism and communication ethics scholarship. 
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Terrorism presents us with an unending call of communication ethics; respond. 
The ability to navigate life amongst the perils of violence depends on one’s ability to 
prepare, reflect, and respond to the demands and questions that shape a given moment. 
This call to respond, specifically in the face of violence, is not a call one can avoid or 
control. In her work on the ethics of discourse, Butler explains: “No one controls the 
terms by which one is addressed . . .. To be addressed is to be, from the start, deprived of 
will, and to have deprivation exist as the basis of one’s situation in discourse.”242 Butler’s 
words echo the sentiment of this project: terrorism in all its forms (domestic, 
international, lone wolf), with its multiple motivations, theories, and actions, demand of 
us a response while aiming to close our ability to respond in any meaningful way. Thus, 
our responses are often made in darkness as it is impossible to know for certain if our 
efforts will deter or impact the capabilities of terrorist in any measurably successful 
manner.  
Terrorism confronts us with violence that is “beyond our will” and imposes upon 
professionals the obligation to navigate such dreadful conditions. How and why we 
choose to respond to this reality is the defining communicative ethical choice of this time. 
The benefit of Butler’s work for this project is found in her approach to the precarious 
nature of social life as the bonds that create and sustain one’s ability to respond; the 
bonds that keep one afloat in the face of violence. Butler’s work on precarity and 
performativity offer a constant reminder that our ability to communicate and act is, at its 
core, a life-granting and life-sustaining function of human capacity. Amongst oppression 
                                                 
242 Butler references the work of Emmanuel Levinas who discusses ethics as first philosophy. See Butler, 
Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (New York: Verso 2006), 139. For an overview of 
Levinas’s ethics as first philosophy in relation to communication and rhetorical studies, see Arnett, 
Levinas’s Rhetorical Demand: The Unending Obligation of Communication Ethics. 
 152
and violence, finding ways to sustain the ability to communicate is, at times, our greatest 
success. The paragraphs below offer remarks on the implications of Butler’s sentiments 
for this project and the future of counterterrorism responses.  
Butler situates precarity as a human condition of life lived with others.243 By 
nature, human life is precarious on the basis of social interdependence; simply put, we 
cannot determine who we share our world with, and, as a result of this indeterminism, our 
lives are precarious and full of uncertainty. Additionally, efforts to exploit this precarious 
nature of social life create or subdue additional precarious factors. For instance, precarity 
becomes tied to the body as employment, food security, housing security, and security 
against violence is threatened or alleviated based on persons, institutions, and structures 
that govern public life.244 Thus, sources and conditions of precarity are multiple and 
reducing the source or solution of precarity to singular efforts overlooks the significance 
of social interdependency. Terrorism exploits this uncertainty leveraging violence, 
propaganda, and fear to drive disconnects between persons, communities, and countries.  
The precarious nature of social life lived amongst Others acknowledges the fate of 
terrorism in this moment: No one escapes the threat of such violence as we cannot 
objectify and achieve security across all areas of life. There is no easy way to foster 
sustainable solutions to precarious cohabitation.245 At times, our best hope of responding 
to this uncertainty is to limit the harm created by our responses and to endure challenges 
in a way that keeps imagination open. Where terrorism succeeds is in the exploitation of 
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this precarious social interdependence with the use of violence, it is our response that 
ultimately determines this success. There are communicative events which can be 
overwhelming and in effect, cause the constraints of our reality to “paralyze” one to 
inaction.246 The question when confronted with the weight of such ethical burdens 
becomes: how does one carry the existence of such responsibility?247 Following the 
insights of Butler, I argue that we communicatively challenge this ethical paralysis 
through reflective practices create and sustain a ground for imagination that carries 
creative outlets for unending response.  
Writing in reflection of the work of Emmanuel Levinas, who reminds us that we 
are called to ethical response through a demand that comes often against our will, Butler 
notes that the call to respond in such dire conditions holds us hostage and situates us in a 
realm of unending responsibility.248 The ground for ethics rests where assurance does not. 
“If I possess myself too firmly or too rigidly, I cannot be in an ethical relation.”249 At the 
core of Butler’s work on precarity is the sentiment that we cannot chose with whom we 
cohabit the world. The only choice one has is the choice to respond to the demands that 
shape our time as violent, challenging, and unending as they are. The ability to 
unparalyze oneself is to not only acknowledge the ethical demand placed upon us, but to 
acknowledge the call as unending. Every time we reflect on the gaps in our intelligence, 
every time we reflect on the failures and mistakes of our processes, and every time we 
                                                 
246 Judith Butler, “Precarious Life and the Obligations of Cohabitation,” The Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy 26, no. 2 (2012): 134-151.  
247 Ibid., 135.  Butler states, “I want to suggest that these are ethical obligations which do not require our 
consent, and neither are they the result of contracts or agreements into which any of us have deliberately 
entered.” The questions rests, where does the responsibility lie, and further, how do I burden the existence 
of such responsibility. 
248 Ibid. 
249 Ibid. 
 154
reflect on the future state of unending security demands, we affirm the basis of ethics. 
Only in acknowledgment of darkness can we create the possibility for genuine hope of 
communicative action.  
Whereas terrorism attempts to abuse or exploit precarity by staking a claim as to 
whose lives matter, our continued reflection and response can open pathways for 
imagination. Each time professionals commit themselves to the preservation of life and 
reflect on the demands of terrorism, we create pathways for imagination. And with this, 
we unparalyze ourselves from terror and keep alive the possibility for genuine hope. 
Through continued reflection, we do not simply endure violence and fear, we offer 
avenues for forecasting future predictions. It is in this forecasting that sincere 
contributions will be made. This forecasting offers a continuous reminder that our ethical 
demands are not simply to those in present eyesight. We cannot avoid the precarious 
nature of our lives, but we can reflect and respond to give life to genuine outlets and 
creative hope for future engagements.  
When tasked with the burden of response in the face of fear and, at times, failure, 
reflective practices provide us with a ground off of which to push. We do ourselves a 
disservice by attempting to seek short-term answers that overlook the complexities of the 
moment place answers on a ground of optimism fueled only by fantasy. In our exposure 
to forces beyond our control and to the fear and violence perpetuated by terrorists in an 
attempt to rob us of ability to act, our persistence of reflective practices performs a 
continued message of “we are here” which, in turn, translates into a “we have not yet 
been disposed of.”250 This thereness asserts our ability to challenge terrorism on 
                                                 
250 Butler uses these words to describe the benefits of public assembly. The body enacts a message of 
thereness. See Jasbir Puar, “Precarity Talk: A Virtual Roundtable with Lauren Berlant, Judith Butler, 
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imaginative ground that keeps alive hope for future guidance and genuine social change. 
In the face of terrorism as a continued threat to safety, keeping alive the ability to respond 
through reflection is the primary good.  
With response, made through an attentiveness to continued reflective practices, 
one moves past the hope for universal response toward the mud of everyday life, 
recognizing that the answers to our current communicative issues are not simple.251 Yet, 
acknowledgement of narrative ground makes future direction possible. This future 
direction, built on creativity and imagination sustains real development for practically 
meeting the demands of terrorism in the years to come.  
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